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ABSTRACT 
 
 There is much written history for the military professional to read, but little is of value to 
his education. While many works are often wonderful reading, they are too broad or narrow in 
scope, often lacking the context to be used for serious study by professional soldiers. This work 
was written with two audiences in mind; my colleagues in the academic world, along with my 
many comrades who are professional soldiers. The present work was originally conceived as a 
contribution to historical literature on the subject of military education. More specifically, it was 
to be an exploration of the concept of operational art and the manner in which planning was 
doctrinally conducted to articulate battle on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. Any 
study of war devoid of the theory and doctrine of the period would be of little use to academics 
and military professionals alike. By the same token, it is often necessary for an author to relate 
the unfamiliar feelings of combat to a reader in order to give the perspective needed to 
understand war. Military professionals should study history to become better decision makers. 
Peter Paret best explained the role of history in relation to military professionals or historians 
when he said, “ By opening up the past for us, history added to the fund of knowledge that we 
can acquire directly and also made possible universal concepts and generalizations across time. 
To enable history to do this, the historian must be objective or as Clausewitz would have said- 
"as scientific or philosophical as possible.” 1 Decision making must be looked at through the lens 
of what Clausewitz called “critical analysis."2 Clausewitz sought to answer the question of 
“why” something happened in terms of cause and effect. A decisions being examined can only 
be understood if we know something of the character of the man who made it. These thoughts 
                                                          
 
1
 Peter Paret, Understanding War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992), 131. 
 
2
 Ibid,133. This work provides a central understanding to the use of history. Paret continues by saying “In 
the chapter “Critical Analysis” of On War, Clausewitz distinguishes between “the critical approach and the plain 
narrative of a historical event” and further identifies three paths that the critical approach might take; “The discovery 
iv 
 
together provide the foundation on which greater understanding of the art and science of war is 
built, thus giving the military professional the tools to deconstruct a decision in terms of the 
problem historically in time and space. This facilitates a greater appreciation and understanding 
of his trade. The “reenacting process” allows scholars and professional soldiers to reconstruct 
problems in terms of the terrain and material used during the period; giving a clearer view into 
the heart of the problem.
3
  As students of the art and science of war, we must make every effort 
to morally, mentally and physically put ourselves in a position to understand why leaders made 
the decisions they did. While the sheer terror of combat can never be properly replicated, our 
studies must find a way to understand them. The English language, or any language for that 
matter has a poor ability to explain in words, written or spoken, the horror of war. War is not just 
the extension of policy by other means, it is a societal interaction where human beings struggle 
within the phenomenon called war.  
We must understand war to be a human activity, thus a social affair. Grasping human 
emotions, we see events capable of motivating or terrifying combatants in the lonely hours with 
the extreme violence typical of combat. In this light, we correctly educate ourselves about the 
true nature of war. War studied at the strategic, operational or tactical-levels should always 
consider decisions made, particularly in terms of their moral, mental and physical properties. 
Common elements to the offense or defense are the weather and terrain being fought on. While 
the weather will ultimately affect each differently, weather has the ability to complicate terrain in 
ways man to this day cannot conquer. The following pages reflect a military professional’s 
understanding of the events at Leningrad, Narva and Sinimäed from 68 years ago. Understanding 
of these events was achieved through German plan for Operation BLAU. An examination of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and interpretation of equivocal facts…; the tracing of events back to their causes…; [and] the investigation and the 
evaluation of the means employed.” 
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and other operational-level documents has yielded a tremendous understanding of how the 
Germans envisioned the retrograde of their forces into the Baltic states. It brings the author joy to 
know this work can be used to explain the monumental events and sacrifices of others. To this 
end, I have made my finest attempt.   
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 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz (Lawrence: Kansas University Press 2008), 45. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction with Literature Review 
 
 
1.1 PURPOSE/SCOPE OF WORK:  
 
 The painful human phenomenon known as war is a form of social interaction like all others. 
Unlike other endeavors man participates in, which easily divide into fields of either art or science, 
war appeals to both equally. Equally affecting the art and science of war are the moral, mental and 
physical dimensions which man contributes to war while being subject to them himself. The art of 
war is concerned with intangible and fluid factors such as the effect of leadership on the human 
will, while the science of war appeals to more tangible, consistent factors such as the effects 
created by the employment of weapon against targets. The art and science of war affects the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war equally. A belligerent nation must first understand 
its own strengths and weaknesses, then those of the enemy to correctly employ the art and science 
of war to win at all three levels. It is thought by many military professionals and historians alike 
that nations can compensate for weaknesses at one level of war, yet still win the war with total 
dominance in the others. War is not governed by natural laws, but rather by luck and chance. In 
war, lessons observed come at a heavy cost. Winning at one level of war may provide a short term 
solution, but to win at war, a nation must be able to effectively communicate national objectives 
or end states from the strategic level into tactical action. Combatants must use their respective 
doctrines to link the use of tactical battle as a means to securing national political objectives as 
their ends. History has shown through timeless examples that nations capable of efficiently 
communicating the emergence of strategy and tactics through their campaign design and plans 
usually win their wars. 
2 
 
 The study of war throughout history has yielded significant reflections from which historians 
and professional soldiers have both learned. Both professional soldiers and historians usually fail 
to understand the outcome of events relative to the contemporary mentality tasked to solve the 
original problem. Often this leads historians and professional soldiers to the wrong conclusions, 
as little adjustment is made from the present mentality. Professional soldiers study history to 
develop their decision making and judgment for future engagements. For the study of history to 
be relevant to professional soldiers, problems must be understood in the ex-ante, while examined 
in the ex-post to see possibilities for a future war.
4
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Map 1: German OKH Operations Section Situation Map November12, 1943 
 
                                                          
4
 An ex-ante view of a problem is to understand it as it was at the time. The ex-post point of view sees the 
original problem through the lens of what is known today in reflection of the time.  
3 
 
 The purpose of this work is to explore the relevance of campaign design and planning through 
the examination of operations conducted in the Baltic region in 1944. [See Map 1] By first 
developing an understanding of the operational environment along with the numerous challenges 
created by the terrain and weather, the issues associated with operational design and planning are 
properly framed for investigation. By examining the variables of the Soviet and German strategic 
situations and doctrines, scholars and professional soldiers gain a better understanding of how 
each combatant’s war planners interpreted their desired strategic (end) states through the creation 
of operational plans (ways).  With this understanding, historians and professional soldiers 
correctly see the desired end states linked to the creation of a campaign plan through applied 
theory in the forms of doctrine and tactical battle. Thus, campaign planning joins the desired 
strategic end state to the use of tactical battle as a means to achieve the specified ends of a 
strategy.
6
 [See Figure 1] Identifying the emergence or ways is the essence of the campaign plan. 
In today’s parlance, military professionals refer to this practice of linking strategy to tactics as 
“operational art.”7  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
5
 NARA RG 242, Stack 33, Row 77 Compartment 15-17 Boxes 1-48. 
 6 Using the model of ends, ways and means as a method for campaign planning was introduced to the 
author by Dr. Bradley Meyer while serving as a student at the U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting 
in 2009. The origin of ends, ways and means was first recorded to describe strategy in the May 1989 edition of 
Military Review by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. See: Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Defining Military Strategy,” Military 
Review, May 1989, 2-8. When speaking of a theory for strategy, H. Richard Yarger stated of Lykke's work that, 
"There is little evidence that collectively as a nation there is any agreement on just what constitutes a theory of 
strategy. This is very unfortunate because the pieces for a good theory of strategy have been lying around the U.S. 
Army War College for years-- although sometimes hard to identify amongst all the intellectual clutter. Arthur F. 
Lykke, Jr.'s Army War College strategy model, with its ends, ways and means, is the center piece of this theory. The 
theory is quite simple, but it often appears unduly complex as a result of confusion over terminology and definitions 
and the underlying assumptions and premises." See: J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., The U.S. Army War College 
Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I  (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 45.      
7
 Explaining operational art in terms of a cybernetic control loop is possible through the use of a “Z” 
diagram as seen in Figure 1. For more on the cybernetic control loop, see Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or Control 
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New York, NY: The Technology Press, 1948). 
4 
 
 
                 
  
 
                
Figure 1 
 As a term which gained popularity in the late 1970s and 1980s in the western militaries, 
“operational art” has often been a “used and abused” military term.8 In the years following the 
beginning of the “War on Terror” or the “Long War,” operational art has been equally challenged 
for its relevance by military and academic circles. Professional soldiers and scholars have both 
searched history to validate or disprove the notion of operational art as a credible tool. Today, a 
common mistake regarding operational art is to apply an ex-post understanding of the term to 
historical scenarios without an understanding of the context. Indeed, this problem is part of a 
wider issue stemming from the military field, confusing the currency of an issue with overall 
relevance for the study of war. Two themes currently falling into this confusion are the ideas of 
joint operations and countering an asymmetric threat. Using the case study of the Baltic in 1944, 
these issues can be addressed, yielding an ex-post understanding based upon ex-ante thought and 
actions.  
 Harnessing effects created by the synergy of joint operations is as much a popular theme 
today as it was throughout the Cold War. At the heart of all force employment considerations is a 
doctrine for the conduct of war. Doctrine is based on theory regarding the nature of war. While 
the idea of joint operations finds roots in the Second World War, the name “joint” was certainly 
not applied in Soviet or German thoughts about the strategic, operational or tactical levels. A 
                                                          
8
 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters Vol XI No 1, 9-14. 
ENDS
(DESIRED STRATEGIC 
OUT COME)
WAYS
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MEANS
(USE OF TACTICAL 
BATTLE)
5 
 
similar idea which serves to confuse the issue further is the employment of weapons known as 
combined arms.
9
 Combined arms as we know it today, seeks to place the enemy in the “horns of 
dilemma,” meaning if the enemy is not exposed to the dangers created by your direct fires, he is 
susceptible to the effects of indirect fires. This concept existed before the Second World War, 
being resident in the doctrine of both the Soviet and German Armies. While the use of naval fires 
or air delivered ordinance in support of ground operations is certainly considered combined arms, 
it is not necessarily a joint operation. How a nation employs its forces through its doctrine 
determines if an operation is considered joint. A purpose of this work is to make clear the reason 
why we find so few works written on the joint use of forces in the Second World War. While the 
German and Soviet air forces and navies were separate services, during the course of the 1944 
campaign, each nation had different command relationships between the services. While the 
Soviets subordinated their air force and navy under the command and control of the ground 
commander for employment, the Germans continued to maintain three autonomous forces.  
 Explored during the course of this work is how the Soviet air force and navy were largely 
used to provide tactical level support to the army in the prosecution of their operations out of the 
Leningrad pocket into the Baltic state of Estonia. Soviet thought regarding the use of naval fires 
and airpower as a method of supporting ground tactical actions were considered enabling 
operations necessary for the army to conduct operational breakthrough.
10
  
 In 1944, the German air force on the other hand was in midst of a doctrinal dilemma. No 
doubt, learning something of the value of strategic bombing from the Western Allies in 1942/43, 
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the leadership of the German Air Force sought to return to their original concept of employment 
laid out before the war.
11
 German air force leadership thought it prudent to return to regaining air 
supremacy and attacking targets such as rail junctions and production capability. In essence, the 
German leadership was interested in conducting a strategic bombing campaign of its own, while 
continuing to support the tactical needs of the army. The employment of the German air force in 
Russia was explored in recent years by Richard R. Muller in The German Air War in Russia.
12
 
The development of German air force doctrine was explored as a combined effort by James S. 
Corum and Richard R. Muller in The Luftwaffe’s Way of War.13  Both works of scholarship 
provide great depth of thought in their comparison of German actions during the war to their 
doctrine as it developed and evolved throughout the Second World War. Reading these works, it 
quickly becomes clear they were written to substantiate the airpower paradigm of the U. S. Air 
Force. According to the paradigm, airpower is inherently offensive as a capability, strategic by 
nature, so air power must be independent as its own service to be used properly.
14
      
 Histories of the Second World War usually only consider conventional ground combat 
operations without ever mentioning the role of airpower or naval power. The campaign in the 
Baltic,1944 provides an excellent opportunity to explore how the Germans and the Soviets used 
or did not use their air and naval forces in conjunction with ground actions. Unlike land locked 
operations in the central Soviet Union or the miniscule naval operations conducted by the Soviets 
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in the Black Sea, operations in the Baltic Sea provide an example to examine the use of naval 
force in conjunction with air and ground forces.    
 Operations in the Baltic in 1944 provide the scholar and professional soldier another unique 
possibly for the study of war. Many today act as if the current wars are the first time a uniformed 
conventional symmetric force has been used against a non-uniformed asymmetric force.
15
 Indeed, 
this is not the case. While history is replete with examples, the case study of operations in the 
Baltic from 1944 have largely gone unexplored.
16
 During the course of operations in the Soviet 
Union, German forces observed value lessons about how the Soviets “operationalized” the use of 
partisan forces in concert with conventional force operations.
17
 Partisan actions often created 
several serious challenges for German forces. In a constant balancing act to find the appropriate 
level of troop strength for the front lines, and the need to secure rear areas, the Germans always 
had units of battalion or regimental strength occupying positions near senior headquarters or 
significant lines of communication. This was necessary to protect vital command and control 
structure as well as nodes and modes of communication for resupply to the front. A central lesson 
this work will examine is the Soviet as well as the German use of unconventional forces in 
concert with conventional forces to accomplish a common strategic end state. To the present, 
many still believe only the Soviets used unconventional forces. A factor never considered in the 
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study of the Second World War, is what was happening in the occupied territories. Indeed, 
nothing has been written which examines the thoughts and actions of the native populations 
during the conduct of the Second World War in relation to the major combatants. While it is 
widely known how the Soviets employed partisans against German front and rear areas with equal 
effectiveness, the story of German anti-partisan efforts is incomplete.
18
  
 While many works have been written describing the brutality of the German anti-partisan 
effort, these works lack the correct context. In the Baltic region in 1944, the Baltic states each 
wanted to regain their independence from the Germans and Soviets alike. In the case of Estonia, 
men fought in the uniform of both combatants conventionally as well as unconventionally. In the 
service of the Germans, Estonian men fought in the uniform of the 20th Waffen SS Division.
19
 
Incorrectly, many have drawn the conclusion that these men were all dedicated National Socialists 
who wanted to fight for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime. While this may have been the case for 
some, it certainly was not the case for all. There are two factors of critical importance, 1) The 
Germans deliberately drew on the native populations of the occupied territories to fulfill the 
never-ending requirement for manpower to serve at and support the front.
20
 Many senior German 
Officers did not feel non-Germans deserved to wear the field grey of the German Army, hence 
placing non-Germans under the command of Himmler and the Waffen-SS. 2) in the titanic 
struggle that was the Soviet-German War; the Estonians had a plan to reestablish their 
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independence. This task was to be accomplished through the use of conventional forces, such as 
the 20th Waffen SS Division or the lesser known operations of the Omakaitse or the Estonian 
Home Guard.
21
 As developed in the course of this work, the Germans used the Omakaitse to help 
secure the rear areas in conjunction with dedicated uniformed German forces such as the 
Kommandant des rückwärtigen Armeegebietes or Korück.
22
 While there is little doubt the efforts 
of the Omakaitse benefited the Germans in the north, the motivation of this organization was to 
again secure Estonia’s independence from foreign invaders and prevent a recurrence of 1940 with 
another Soviet occupation.   
 There is no doubt that for history to be of use to the professional soldier, he must be able to 
apply lessons being learned from what he is studying to current problems. In doing so, a 
professional soldier develops his judgment and increases his decision making ability for future 
conflict. Understanding the application of combat power on the battlefield is best gained though 
the painful experiences provide by war. Leaders do themselves a service by not just merely 
reading about war during times of peace, or in between deployments, but through studying war 
and how it is waged. Studying war means not only understanding the tangible and intangible 
factors of the art and science of war, but how these factors contribute to the decisions being made 
on the battlefield at the strategic, operational and tactical-levels. Some have argued in the past that 
study of war must stop during the execution of a campaign.
23
 While the campaign being executed 
clearly take precedence over everything, leaders must continue to challenge their minds and look 
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to other examples from the past to find similarities, thus creating efficiencies for their own time. 
In doing this, professional soldiers and scholars use history for a valuable purpose. 
1.2 METHODOLOGY OF EXAMINATION:  
 
 To gather relevant ex-ante lessons from the Soviet breakout of the Leningrad pocket and the 
invasion of the Baltic States in 1944, the framework of the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels are used throughout the course of this work. Several works of literature exist from both the 
Soviet and German perspectives which enable modern scholars and professional soldiers to learn 
valuable ex-post lessons for current operations. While thinking of war in terms of the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels is thought to be a modern construct, this framework has roots in the 
Soviet way of war.
24
 Therefore examining the Soviet breakout of the Leningrad pocket along with 
the subsequent campaign using the levels of war is not repugnant to the past. This was the method 
used by Soviet military leaders during the course of the Second World War to frame problems.  
Conversely, the Germans tended to view the conduct of war in terms of only strategy or tactics. It 
is important to understand that what the Germans generally considered “strategy,” was in fact 
what we now think of today as the operational level of war.
25
  
 Many of the works which already exist on the Soviet breakout of the Leningrad pocket and 
the subsequent German defensive campaign follow the German methodology, meaning they are 
either written from the strategic or tactical level perspectives. Much of the literature being cited 
throughout the course of this work examines only the strategic or tactical levels. To properly 
examine the operational aspects of this campaign from planning through execution, primary 
                                                          
  
24
 Faculty of History and Military Arts, Развитие Тактики Советской Армии В Годы Великой 
Отечественной Войны (1941-1945 гг.), (Evolution of Soviet Army Tactics during the Great Patriotic War (1941-
1945) (Moscow, USSR: Military Publishing House, 1958).   
 
25
 The Germans certainly had understanding of the ‘operational level’ long before any other military, but 
did not express it as a distinct level of war as the Soviets did. Indeed, the Russians developed it from the ideas of 
Sigismund von Schlichting. The Germans certainly used the terms ‘operatv’ and ‘Operationen’ as a distinction from 
tactical and tactics in the First World War. 
11 
 
German and Soviet source documents will be used to fill in the holes which exist in the 
historiography of this portion of the Eastern Front. For the needed operational examination of the 
German defensive campaign from the Leningrad pocket to the defense of the “Panther Line” 
culminating at Sinimäed or the Tannenbergstellung, along with operations into Latvia, a valuable 
series written by German commanders and planners has been found. From the Foreign Military 
Studies series, comes P-035.
26
 In the past, many scholars dismissed the Foreign Military Studies 
as a credible reference because of obvious bias and the lack of references. Many of these studies 
were written from memory, as many of the source documents were not yet found. It should be 
remembered that few documents in history were written objectively. When the documents of the 
Foreign Military Studies are combined and cross referenced against the Captured German records 
holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration, a clear and concise operational 
picture of events emerges.
27
 The value of P-035 is clear, being written by the commanders and 
primary planners of operations in the wake of the Leningrad breakout it covers events to the 
demise of Army Group North in the Kurland pocket.
28
 Many of the operations have long since 
been forgotten and it is time to learn from their fine example.  
The National Archives and Records Administration contains a wealth of German 
information in the “Captured German Documents” section. Close inspection of these holdings 
yielded T-314, roll number 1362 as well as several others. This collection is Army Group 
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North’s log book of situation reports from subordinate headquarters along with recorded 
commander’s estimates of the enemy and friendly situation from the time of the actions to be 
examined. These are vital pieces of the Narva Front which have never been explored. The 
captured German documents section also contains several army, corps and division records 
related to the actions from the Soviet breakout of Leningrad through the Narva Front from the 
German perspective.   
 Writing a history of the Second World War from the Soviet perspective, even today, is 
still a problematic for western historians. Western historians with a background in Russian aside, 
access to the ЦА МО РФ (Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense) is still extremely 
difficult to gain. During Soviet times, the archive was administered by the Military History 
Institute which was founded in 1966.
29
 Under the hand of Lieutenant General P.A. Zhilin, the 
first director of the Institute, many relevant works were written. Zhilin was instrumental in 
writing and editing the История второй мировой войны 1939-1945. (History of the Second 
World War 1939-1945).
30
 This 12 volume series is considered the definitive official Soviet 
history of the Second World War and was better written than previous attempts.
31
 Many of the 
pertinent 11 million documents in the holdings of the archive were used in the construction of the 
History of the Second World War 1939-1945.
32
 While Russia continues to placate the west with 
the recent release of documents relating to the Katyn Forest, it must be remembered that Russia 
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only provides access to those documents it wants seen. Potentially, what could yet be contained 
in the Russian Archives are documents that relate to the consolidation objectives for the Baltic 
states once they were again under Soviet control. These documents could further connect events 
of 1944 and the Soviet campaign plan with the overall political end state. This would also help 
clarify Soviet war termination criteria and lend understanding to what the official Soviet 
priorities were for the Baltic after the Second World War. While the digital age has made gaining 
Soviet information somewhat easier, the reliability of this information is difficult to ensure.     
While scholars believe gaining access to Russian primary sources through the Russian 
State Archives is too difficult, many relevant documents remain in former Soviet occupied 
countries such as Estonia where the actions took place. Weather and light records essential to 
understanding local conditions in Estonia from 1944 were found in the possession of Tartu 
University.
 33
 Located in the holdings of the Estonian National Archives in Tallinn are critical 
document related to the Soviet and German occupations along with the details of subsequent 
partisan actions. These documents not only provides the Soviet side of the campaign, but from 
intelligence work, professional soldiers and scholars may be able to regain a perspective lost 
from German documents captured at the time of the campaign.  
1.3 DEFINING THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS AND THE OPERATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT IN 1944:  
 
 Among the questions which confront scholars or professional soldiers studying any campaign 
or battle is defining the political and strategic reasons why combatants fought. The reasons men 
fight are as old as man himself. The motivations to initiate hostilities throughout the centuries 
vary, but a general commonality linking nation states or individuals to violent action stem from 
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either a perceived or real fear of something or someone, the need to maintain personal or national 
honor and some form of personal or national interest.
34
 In the past two decades historians have 
debated the extent of power exercised by Hitler and Stalin in their respective countries. This 
thesis assumes both as pivotal in their role of forming and executing policy within the limits of 
their reach. Both Hitler and Stalin knew the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 would not last. 
Some scholars believe Stalin had plans to attack Hitler before Germany could attack the Soviet 
Union. The fact is open hostility between Germany and the Soviet Union began with the German 
attack of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
35
 The strategic reasons behind the German attack 
have generally been identified with the need for resources, such as oil and grain, as well as for 
ideological reasons such as lebensraum, or living space.
36
  The horrific contributions to the 
physical dimension are well known. The political motivations for this conflict fueled the brutality 
of fighting at the tactical level on both sides as each combatant made consistent efforts to de-
humanize their opponent.
37
 Thus the political motivations for the conflict are directly linked to the 
moral and mental dimensions of war through physical evidence .  
 With an understanding of the strategic motivations for war in 1941, scholars and professional 
soldiers are better able to understand how these motivations evolve over the course of the war as a 
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result of sustained operations. While there are several variables effecting the Germans and 
Soviets, there are two which the combatants have in common, those being the terrain and the 
weather.  
 When combined, terrain and weather have the ability to bring operations to a standstill at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels. Terrain and weather are often overlooked by scholars and 
professional soldiers when examining the strategic context of a conflict. Often, most think terrain 
and weather are too tactical a consideration to examine.
38
 This lack of understanding demonstrates 
many think of war in isolation, meaning the strategic level independent from the operational and 
the tactical isolated from the strategic and operational levels. If nothing else, terrain and weather 
are unifying factors which interconnect the levels and dimensions of war more closely.  
 A key consideration of why terrain and weather are so important in the study of war resides in 
the notion of time and space. The considerations of time and space are the dominate factors 
governing the employment and sustainment of forces at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels. Forces failing to understand the terrain and the effects of weather will never be able to 
effectively measure how long it will take to move their forces into contact with the enemy, or how 
long it will take to resupply those forces once in contact.
39
  
 In the 1950s, the United States Army spent considerable effort employing captured German 
officers with Russian Front experience to write about the terrain and weather of northern 
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European Russia.
40
 The result was a series of studies elaborating issues associated with operating 
in Russia. These studies are an excellent collection of lessons observed, but lack significant 
explanation of the operations conducted to be of value to scholars. These studies also lack 
conclusive modern scientific evidence.
41
 One of the goals of this work is to show the 
interconnection between the sciences of climatology and geology in relation to planning and 
executing a campaign plan.          
1.4 SHAPING THE SITUATION IN 1944: THE EASTERN FRONT FROM DECEMBER 
1941- DECEMBER 1943:  
 
 With hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union commencing with Operation 
Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, German ground forces quickly advanced through Soviet defenses, 
winning tremendous early victories at the tactical and operational levels. German forces were 
organized into three Army Groups, Army Group North, Army Group Center and Army Group 
South to cope with the vastness of Soviet Russia.
42
 Initial German intelligence and staff estimates 
grossly underestimated the Soviet will and their numerical strength.
43
 False initial reading of 
Soviet capabilities was further reinforced by the continuous German victories, creating a false 
sense of confidence throughout the German forces.  
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 In December 1941, German offensive actions ground to a halt as severe weather conditions 
and relentless Soviet counter attacks crippled German manpower and equipment. The distance of 
German lines of communication made the timely delivery of replacements increasingly difficult. 
The Soviets analyzed how the Germans worked along exterior lines of communication and 
created  plans to affect their usage.
44
 Like all invaders of Russia, the Germans were susceptible to 
the extreme weather and distances create by the terrain. With the Germans manning massive rear 
areas, the Soviets understood how the German lines of communication (LOCs) were susceptible 
to partisan activity. In concert with conventional Soviet offensive actions, partisan bands began 
cutting German LOCs. With the thought of inflicting massive causalities and regaining lost 
territory, the Soviets executed a series of winter offensives in 1941-42. In the north, the Germans 
were stopped outside Leningrad, beginning a siege lasting over 900 days.
45
 Moscow was saved in 
the center, while the Soviets fought desperately in the south, losing large amounts of territory and 
manpower in the process.  
 Throughout 1942-43, the Soviets found ways to break the massive German offensives. First, 
the Soviets broke the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. A hard blow, but one from which 
Germany could recover. In the late summer of 1943, the Soviets inflicted the death blow on 
German forces at Kursk. Collectively, the losses the Germans suffered in manpower and 
equipment were more than they could replace. The Soviets applied a strategy of attrition, using 
superior strength in manpower and material to continually weaken German forces.  
 Throughout the remainder of the summer of 1943 and while continuing to fight the Germans, 
the Soviets continued to build significant combat power for a general offensive. The Soviets 
                                                          
44
 Lieutenant General Colmar von der Goltz, The Conduct of War (Kansas City: MO, The Hudson-
Kimberly Publishing Company,1896), 82. This classic work explains the difference between lines of operation and 
lines of communication. These concepts will be further developed in coming chapters.  
45
 Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days, The Siege of Leningrad (New York, NY: Harper and Row,1969). 
18 
 
enjoyed significant success in the fall of 1943 by retaking Kiev.
46
 On September 9, 1943 the 
Soviet commander of the Leningrad Front, General Govorov, sent forward his estimate of the 
situation recommending an attack of Army Group North to STAVKA for their approval.
47
  
Fearing insufficient combat power, the STAVKA informed General Govorov to continue holding 
positions around Leningrad while continuing to build combat power for a general assault. On 
October 12, 1943, STAVKA informed General Govorov “We do not object to your plan of 
operations for the Leningrad Front. Put it into effect quickly in the event of an enemy 
withdrawal.”48 Soviet strategic assessments of the situation led to the belief that German Army 
Group South was close to total failure. Stalin’s “Broad Front” strategy was launched in January 
1944 across the entire Russian Front. Designed to attack the Germans everywhere, the “Broad 
Front” tested German defenses for weaknesses. Once weaknesses were identified, the Soviets 
would commit significant forces to attack, with follow-on reinforcements to exploit success.
49
 
  The Germans in December 1943 could do little to defend the ground they held. To support 
offensive actions at Stalingrad and Kursk, Germany took men and material from other fronts 
giving Army Group South the manpower and material it required.
50
 Thus, Army Group North, a 
supporting effort, was incapable of supporting the main effort to the south. Throughout the fall of 
1943, Army Group North secretly began planning a delay and defend operation to withdraw 
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forces back to pre-established positions along the “Panther Line” further to the west.51 On January 
14, 1944 the Soviets launched an attack breaking the German hold on the city of Leningrad. This 
attack was a supporting effort designed to enable ongoing offense actions to the south and to 
reoccupy the Baltic region from German forces. These details form the bases of the operating 
environment in the fall of 1943/44. Attention is now to be paid to German strategic guidance and 
how operational planning was conducted in the late war period.   
1.5 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING: 
 
THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE:  
 
 There are two prominent reasons among the many why the Germans wanted to maintain 
control of the Baltic region. The foremost German strategic concern was their relationship with 
Finland and to maintain secure lines of operation and communication with them. Finland was 
important to the German war effort because it protected the flank of Swedish iron ore to the west 
while placing pressure on Soviet forces in the northern portion of the Leningrad pocket. With this 
in mind, Hitler was determined not to lose Estonia. The relationship with Finland was so vital to 
German interests that Hitler sent a delegation to Finland headed by General der Infanterie Dr. 
Waldemar Erfurth.
52
 In MS# P-041bb or The German Liaison Officer with the Finnish Armed 
Forces, Erfurth explained as a result of two meetings between the German and Finnish forces in 
“Salzburg on May 25, 1941 and Zossen on May 26, 1941, it had been agreed that a German 
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General was to be sent to the Finnish headquarters as liaison officer of the Army High Command 
(OKH) and the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW).”53 Although not written in a formal tasking 
statement, Erfurth had six core tasks that did not change during the conduct of the war comprising 
his mission to Finland:  
 1. Establishing and maintaining contact between the German and the Finnish High 
 Commands. 
 2. Coordination of planning. 
 3. Representation of mutual wishes regarding warfare in common. 
 4. Briefing of both sides on the situation of the war at any given moment. 
 5. Liaison between the German sectors and the Finnish sectors adjacent to them. 
 6. Exercising the power of a commander of a military area (Wehrkries) in regard to the 
 German agencies and troops in the Finnish zone of operations.
54
  
 
 This relationship helped secure German economic and operational interests in the Baltic while 
operating against the Soviet Union. Throughout the course of the relationship with Finland, 
General staff officers were sent from Germany to observe all facets of the relationship as 
objective observers.
 55
 This was done to give planners in Berlin some idea of what capacity 
Finnish forces had to continue the war. On one such visit, a General staff officer named Major 
Jordan conducted a visit to Finland between June 7
 
-23, 1943. Apparently asked by his higher 
headquarters to comment on the dedication of the Finnish forces, he stated in the first section of 
his official report of June 25, 1943: 
   The view being held by many Germans that the Finnish soldier is especially good and that 
 the  entire Finnish nation, unlike any other, is fully participating in the war effort to the last 
 man and woman, is not justified according to the statements of responsible German officers. 
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  It may well be true that the Finnish soldier is a particularly adept forest fighter and that 
 Finnish troops are in many respects superior to the German troops, for example in hunting 
 down the enemy in the woods, conducting small-scale operations, and adapting themselves to 
 the difficult local conditions. However, the Finns generally tend to avoid heavy fighting, and 
 in the opinion of General Dietl it appears extremely doubtful whether the Finns will be able to 
 cope with a heavy Russian attack which, even though it may not be imminent, is bound to be 
 launched at some time in the future.
56
  
 
 After the resignation of the Finnish President, Field Marshal Mannerheim believed he no 
longer had to honor previous agreements.
57
 Seeing the war was not going to end well for the 
Germans, he negotiated a separate peace with the Soviet Union to preserve his own country's 
freedom. “According to the Soviet conditions of the Finnish capitulation, Finnish territory had to 
be cleared of German troops by September 15, (1944).”58 With German troops having to be 
removed from Finland, the Germans could not maintain pressure on the northern flank, requiring 
the Germans to conduct a withdrawal from the Baltic region, sealing the fate of Estonia and 
Eastern Europe. To explain how fighting on the Narva Front could assist in a German withdrawal, 
it is necessary to look at MS# 151, Fighting on the Narva Front, the Evacuation of Estonia and 
the Withdrawal to the Dvina . 
 Examination of MS# 151 reveals discussion of the German plan for withdrawal. 
Accordingly, the following steps were taken:  
 1. The operation was assigned the code name “Entruenpelung” house-cleaning. All 
 equipment not absolutely needed was moved to Germany. 
 2. A small group of officers, sworn to absolute secrecy, conducted a dry run of the 
 planned operation under the code name “Tannenbaum I”. Direction of the withdrawal and 
 lines of resistance were established on the maps and were reconnoitered on the ground 
 inconspicuously. 
 3. Armeeabteilung Narva designated highways for motorized and horse-drawn vehicles. 
 Bridges are to be reinforced.  
 4. Depots were established for all classes of supply. 
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A withdrawal directly west toward Reval (Tallinn) and the Island of Ösel (Saaremaa) would have 
been the least difficult for Armeeabteilung (Army Group) Narva. The over-all situation however 
necessitated a southwesterly and ultimately a southern direction toward Riga.
59
 
 The second critical reason for the Germans to maintain control of the Baltic region was 
for the use of the Baltic Sea by the German navy as a training ground. While training was 
accomplished in the Baltic Sea by the German navy, the value of the Baltic Sea as a line of 
operation and communication was also significant. According to C.W. Koburger, Jr., in Naval 
Warfare in the Baltic, 1939-1945, “an estimated 50-60 percent of U-boat training was carried out 
in the Baltic.”60 German hopes were being placed in the strategic value the U-boat brought to all 
theaters of operation, only as an unfortunate after thought.
61
 As the situation continued to 
deteriorate on the Eastern Front, Admiral Doenitz recalled in his memoirs written in 1958, a 
meeting he was summoned to on July 9, 1944 with Hitler. Admiral Doenitz stated: 
 I took part in a conference on the deterioration of the situation on the Russian front, to 
 which Hitler had summoned Field Marshal Model, Lieutenant General Friessner and 
 General Ritter von Greim. Hitler asked me what effect a Russian break through to the 
 coast would have on naval operations in the Baltic? My answer was: 
 
 Control of the Baltic is important to us. It is of great importance as regards the import of 
 the iron ore from Sweden which we require so urgently for our armaments, and it is of 
 vital importance to the new U-boats. The most westerly point at which we can close the 
 Gulf of Finland to the Russian fleet lies to the east of Reval [Tallinn]; possession of the 
 Baltic Islands from this point of view is of equal importance. If, however, the enemy 
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 were to succeed in breaking through to the coast further south- in Lithuania, for example, 
 or East Prussia, the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Islands would become worthless from 
 a naval point of view. Enemy naval bases in our immediate vicinity would then constitute 
 a grave threat to our iron ore imports, if they did not, indeed, put a complete stop to it, 
 and would interfere with the training area for our new U-boats. The primary object 
 which, in my opinion, must take precedence over everything else, including even the 
 evacuation of the northern Army Groups, must be at all costs to prevent the Russians 
 from breaking through to the sea. Once they did so, the exposure of the flank of our sea 
 lines of communication to attack from their air bases in Lithuania would make it 
 impossible for us to continue to carry supplies by sea for Finland and the Northern groups 
 of armies.
62
 
 
1.6 THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE:  
 The Soviets traditionally saw the Baltic region as theirs, just as the Russians did dating back 
to the time of Peter the Great and the Northern War against Sweden.
63
 The Baltic countries were 
secretly sacrificed by Germany to the Soviet Union by the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, 
subsequently being occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940.
64
 The Soviets temporary lost control of 
the region for three years as a result of German occupation. With the breakout of Soviet forces 
from the Leningrad pocket in January 1944, reoccupation of "Soviet" territory was possible. At 
this time, the Soviets had every intention of reoccupying the Baltic region and telling their Anglo-
American allies they were keeping the Baltic States. There were two purposes in reoccupying the 
Baltic States, 1) A buffer from the western powers by using Poland to the west; and 2) 
Reorganizing former German occupied areas under Soviet Communism. Josef Stalin went to 
Yalta with these parameters in mind as he insisted on a Soviet sphere of control.   
Strategically, like their western allies, the Soviets had already started to think about their 
place in the post war world at the time of the Leningrad breakout and subsequent campaign 
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through the Baltic. Having suffered significant causalities, the Soviets felt it their right to retake 
what they saw as theirs. They followed this course of action diplomatically through the Yalta 
conference from February 4-11, 1945.
65
 By the time of the conference, the Baltic region was 
back under Soviet control, with the notable exception of the Courland Pocket in Latvia.
66
 The 
Yalta Conference was an opportunity to discuss what was going to be done with the vanquished 
and what role the victors would play in the post war world. Once again, the Soviets had decided 
the fate of the Baltic countries and Poland, this time with their Anglo-American Allies.
67
 
 To understand Soviet operations from breakout of the Leningrad pocket to the attack on the 
“Panther Line” and the final assault on Sinimäed (The Blue Hills) and beyond requires an 
examination of Soviet strategic guidance in relation to tactical actions. For the purpose of this 
examination, the three fights will be treated as two different campaigns, as the campaign goals for 
the Leningrad breakout and the attack on the “Panther Line” differ. The main vehicle for this 
examination is the campaign plans themselves and how they were created as the situation 
developed. As has been discussed, the Soviets began to formulate their strategic plans for 1944 in 
the fall of 1943. Soviet operational and tactical momentum in the fall of 1943 was still focused on 
actions in the Ukraine. As General Shtemenko stated: 
 The main blow, as before, was to be delivered in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper. The task 
 here was to smash Manstein’s armies and split the enemy front by bringing the First and 
 Second Ukrainian fronts up to the Carpathians. According to the plan of the campaign, the 
 earliest offensive (January 12) was to be launched by Second Baltic Front. On January 14th it 
 would be joined by the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Using Stalin’s “Broad Front” Strategy 
 required Soviet Forces to test the Germans everywhere for weaknesses.
68
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1.7 THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN PLANS: 
 At the end of 1943/beginning of 1944, the objective (ENDS) of Soviet forces operating 
around Leningrad was to break the German hold on the city and liberate it. Through the end of 
1943, the Soviets had built the requisite combat power in the Leningrad pocket to execute 
offensive tactical operations (MEANS).  With tactical reconnaissance reports indicating the 
possibility of an early German withdrawal from Leningrad, STAVKA sent the following 
instructions to the Leningrad, Volkhov and Northwestern Fronts on September 29, 1943 to stall 
those efforts: 
According to agent intelligence, which requires verification, the enemy is preparing to withdraw 
his forces, which are opposing the Leningrad, Volkhov, and Northwestern Fronts. 
In connection with this eventuality: 
 1. Intensify all types of reconnaissance and determine the enemy’s intentions. 
 2. Increase the vigilance and combat readiness of your forces. 
 3. Create shock groupings along the likely axes of enemy withdrawal so that they can pursue 
 along his withdrawal routes. 
 4. Create mobile pursuit detachments in first-echelon units and begin an energetic pursuit in 
 the event of an enemy withdrawal. While conducting the pursuit, employ aviation extensively 
 against the withdrawing enemy. 
 Report measures undertaken. 
          Antonov
69
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ENDS
(LIBERATION OF 
LENINGRAD)
WAY
(DESTRUCTION OF 
THE 18TH ARMY)s
MEANS
(USE OF TACTICAL 
BATTLES)
  
Figure 2 
 With these ideas in mind the Army Commanders set their staffs to work to develop the 
methods or (WAYS) to accomplish the desired (ENDS) of the campaign. Figure 2 represents the 
emergence of the first Soviet campaign plan goal. The (WAY) to accomplish the (END) was by 
the destruction of the German Eighteenth Army through the use of tactical offensive actions. To 
accomplish this task, the (MEANS) required the Leningrad Front to attack the left flank of the 
German Eighteenth Army, while the Volkhov Front concentrated on the right flank of the 
Eighteenth Army.  
 Based on the situation, General Govorov of the Leningrad Front created two plans taking into 
consideration an early German withdrawal or the need for a general penetration of the German 
defenses if they choose to stay. The first possibility was code-named Neva 1 and the second 
possibility, Neva 2.
70
  Looking first at Neva 2, Govorov planned to concentrate the actions of his 
armies first on the Ropsha/Krasnoe Selo area to break the German hold on Leningrad. Based on 
the strength of the German defenses, which were stronger in the east around Mga and weaker in 
the west around Oranienbaum, Govorov weighted the 2d Shock Army as the main effort and 
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ordered it to breakout from the Oranienbaum pocket in the west toward Ropsha/Krasnoe Selo in 
the east. The 42d Army was ordered to attack from the south of Leningrad in the east toward 
Ropsha/Krasnoe Selo in the west. The 2d Shock Army and the 42d Army received 80 percent of 
the fire support assets available, translating to an opening barrage of 65 minutes for a total of 
104,000 shells falling on the III SS Panzer Corps and the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions 
at dawn on January 14, 1944.
71
 
 In support of breakout operations in the north and facilitating the attack of Eighteen Army’s 
right flank, the Volkhov Front under the command of General Meretskov had a similar scheme of 
maneuver to the Leningrad Front. General Meretskov ordered General Korovnikov’s “59th Army 
to conduct two attacks: a main attack from its bridgehead on the western bank of the Volkhov 
River 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) north of Novgorod, and a secondary attack across Lake Il’man 
south of Novgorod. The Attacks were to converge west of Novgorod, encircling and destroying 
the German XXXVIII Army Corps, and capturing the city.”72 
 The key factors driving the tactical actions or (MEANS) were the weather and terrain. As the 
terrain in the Leningrad area was either forest or swamp, attacks had to occur during the winter 
months when the terrain was hard enough for cross country movement, if they stood any chance 
of success. Soviet after action reports (AARs) stated Soviet actions in the attacks were slow, 
blaming poor reconnaissance and command and control.
73
 There are a few obvious reasons why 
these two areas were problematic. All of the Soviet fronts involved needed to essentially relearn 
how to conduct an attack after years of fighting an active defense. Good reconnaissance takes 
time to develop. Good reconnaissance also requires commanders and staffs to have well thought 
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out lists of assumptions being confirmed or denied by reconnaissance efforts. The more 
reconnaissance is used, the more friendly intentions are betrayed to the enemy. Command and 
control was made difficult because most communications of the day were done by land line 
telephones, susceptible to the effects of artillery. The key factors creating difficultly in command 
and control of the operation were primarily the troop to task assigned to the mission and a 
violation of the principle of unity of command. To remedy this problem the STAVKA disbanded 
the Volkhov Front effective 2400, February 15, 1944, sending its combat power to the other 
fronts, mainly the Leningrad Front.
74
  
With the completion of the Leningrad breakout and the dissolution of the Volkhov Front, 
the Leningrad Front made painfully slow progress to the “Panther Line” because of the bad 
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This order demonstrates something fundamental about units gaining forces; they almost always gain battle space 
when gaining more combat power. 
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weather, difficult terrain and stiff German resistance.
75
 By the end of February 1944, the 
Germans had also made adjustments to their task organization reflecting the needs of the 
operational and tactical situation. In the far north along the Narva Front, “the Germans toward 
the end of the month had gained only enough strength to tip the scales slightly in their favor. On 
February 24, 1944, General der Infantry Johannes Friessner, who had proven himself in the 
fighting on the Sixteenth Army- Eighteenth Army boundary, took over Sponheimer’s command 
which was then redesignated Armee-abteilung [Army Detachment] Narva.”76 Greater exploration 
into why each combatant adjusted their command and control structures should be of interest to 
the scholar and the professional soldier. Specifically, was the addition or reduction of command 
and control structures commensurate with historical doctrinal considerations of employment?   
ENDS
(LIBERATION OF THE 
BALTIC STATES)
WAY
(BREAKTHROUGH OF 
THE “PANTHER 
LINE”)s
MEANS
(USE OF TACTICAL 
BATTLES)
 
                                                            Figure 3 
The Soviet’s second campaign plan centered on the liberation of the Baltic States. This 
was the stated (ENDS) for this campaign. As demonstrated by Figure 3, the (MEANS) centered 
on the use of tactical battle to achieve the (ENDS). The Leningrad Front’s new campaign plan 
goal was designed to break through the “Panther Line” as the (WAYS) to accomplish the desired 
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(ENDS). Recognizing a breakthrough in the northern part of the “Panther Line” was only 
possible in the winter months because of the terrain and weather prompted the Soviets to plan 
and act quickly. Using the terrain, natural obstacles and weather to the best possible advantage, 
the III. SS Panzer Corps under the command of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Felix Steiner inflicted 
heavy casualties on the advancing Soviets east and west of the Narva River [See Map 2].  
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Map 2: Positions of the III. SS Panzer Corps of the east side of the Narva River 
Tactical actions at the Narva bridgehead drove the Leningrad Front to explore other areas 
to cross the Narva River. Examination of Soviet river crossing doctrine from the period against 
weather data from the year 1944 quickly illuminates reasons why the Soviets wanted to cross the 
Narva River during the winter. As bridging assets were a rare commodity across the entirety of 
31 
 
the Eastern Front, the Soviets needed these assets for more important axes of advance further to 
the south where crossing over ice was not possible. Once the tactical realities facing the 
Leningrad Front became apparent and political pressure was applied from Moscow to conclude 
the liberation of Narva, more tactical pressure was applied to attacking the Panther Position in 
the south.
78
 By late winter/early spring 1944, the Leningrad Front was established on the western 
side of the Narva River, quickly closing on the German positions at Sinimäed. [See Map 3] The 
question that needs to be answered is which combatant benefited more from the battles in the 
Sinimäed area? Was it pride, doctrine or necessity that drove the Soviets to continue the attack 
toward Sinimäed? What did the German technique of trading of space for time allow and how 
well did their plans facilitate their end state?  
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Map 3: Situation of III. SS Panzer Corps in February 1944 
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1.8 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN PLAN:  
Looking at how German operational plans were made requires an understanding of their 
strategic directives. In an affidavit made on November 7, 1945, Halder and Brauchitsch 
explained how directives were written. General staff planners of the three services were 
summoned by Hitler and given the necessary instructions [Richtinien]. Plans were drawn up on 
the basis of these instructions forming the basis of OKW directives called [Weisungen]. The 
Weisungen would generally reproduce the orally communicated Richtinien.
80
 More detail was 
given on September 15, 1945 in a statement to the International Military Tribunal by Field 
Marshal Keitel. He explained how the OKW formulated (via the Führungstab) Hitler’s orders as 
directives to the Armed Forces. There were four general categories Weisungen fell into: 
 
Cat. (a) Regulations (Richtlinien) covering the preparation of military operations. (In essence, a 
warning order for preparation for combat) 
Cat. (b) Directives issued during the course of operations as the result of Situation Conferences. 
(With new information being brought to light, this would be a way to cope with emergence 
resulting from action with the enemy.) 
Cat. (c) Requests for fresh directives (Anweisungen) emanating from the Supreme Commanders 
of the Armed Forces. 
Cat. (d) Directives issued to settle differences of opinion or misunderstandings between the 
branches of the Armed Forces. The Führer’s decision in such cases was imperative as Chef 
OKW had no command authority over the army, navy and air force.
81
  
 
The method of issuing the above categories of Weisungen was as follows: 
 
Cat. (a) Hitler informer Keitel and Jodl (Chef Führungstab) of his point of view and the required 
directives was formulated by Jodl and issued after various readings and corrections. 
Cat. (b) Situation reports were presented daily at noon and in the evening to Hitler by Jodl. If the 
necessity for fresh instructions arose during ensuing discussions, Jodl instructed his deputy 
Warlimont, orally or in writing, to prepare a Führer Weisung. 
Cat. (c) Hitler decided during his Situation Conferences whether requests for instructions should 
be met either orally or by the publication of a fresh directive. 
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Cat. (d) Jodl was informed of opinion ect. Either orally or in writing. After deciding on the 
necessary line of action he reported (via Keitel) to Hitler and explained the reasons for a given 
directive.  
 
Hitler subjected all directives to very critical examinations, both as to content and style before 
authorizing.
82
 
 
German Directive 34 dealt specifically with actions on the Leningrad Front, dated July 
30, 1941.
83
 This directive largely stayed in effect for Army Group North as they continued to 
prosecute offensive operations against the Soviets until January 1944. The key to a more in-
depth understanding of the German retreat is contained in the studies and subsequent operations 
known as “Fall BLAU” or Operation BLUE.84 Examining Fall BLAU will show the German 
operational plans that allowed the Germans to trade space for time from the City of Leningrad to 
the Panther Position along the Narva River (Operation BLAU), operational and tactical 
documents allowing the Germans to hold terrain at Sinimäed (Operations SEEALDER and 
FLAMINGO ) and finally transition to controlling the retrograde of their forces under pressure to 
Latvia using the Marienburg Line outside of Dorpat (Tartu).
85
 Once German forces had retreated 
back to the “Panther Line” and it was clear Finland was about to leave the war, plans were 
secretly draw up for the evacuation of the Baltic. This operation was assigned code-name 
“Entruenpelung” or house-cleaning as discussed previously.86 
Through an examination of Operation BLAU, for the first time scholars and professional 
soldiers can examine how the German Army in the latter stages of the Second World War 
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applied their doctrine of trading space for time using elements of coordination from the 
operational level and vigorous tactical level defensive execution. As the body of this work will 
show, German adherence to doctrine is done in direct opposition to the will of Adolf Hitler and is 
an attempt on the part of the Army Group North to fight as it had been educated and trained to do 
for decades prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. Seeing how the Operation BLAU 
order was written allows all to understand how Army Group North task organized their assets for 
battle along with how they were going to use their campaign plan of Operation BLAU to 
articulate assets in the time and space of the Northern Baltic using the terrain and weather to best 
advantage.  What should also be of interest to scholars and professional soldiers is how the 
Germans quickly transitioned from conducting delay and defend operations to the execution of 
an evacuation. With the evacuation of the Baltic being the desired (END) to preserve manpower 
and equipment for the coming battles, the Germans would give tactical battle as a (MEANS).  
ENDS
(EVACUATION OF THE 
BALTIC STATES)
WAY
(DELAY AND DEFEND FROM 
POSITION A-K
OPERATION HOUSE 
CLEANING)
MEANS
(USE OF TACTICAL 
BATTLES)
 
Figure 4 
 
The (WAYS) would be accomplished through a campaign plan goal which sought to use 
Army Detachment Narva to delay and defend along a series of positions labeled A-K to inflict 
massive Soviet casualties. [See Figure 4 and Map 4] Position A was in the vicinity of the 
35 
 
“Panther Line” and extended to Position K in the vicinity of the Estonian/ Latvian border. In 
actuality, this plan was not fully realized because the Soviets retook Tartu in August 1944, but 
use of the Marienburg Line assisted the Germans with the execution of Operation HOUSE 
CLEARING.
87
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
Map 4: Delay and Defend positions Labeled A-K  
 
1.9 THE OPERATIONAL USE OF PARTISAN FORCES, COUNTER MEASURES AND 
TACTICAL EXECUTION:  
 
A key tenant of this work to be addressed in follow-on chapters will be the Soviet use of 
unconventional forces, as well as the German response. On the 12th day of the German invasion, 
July 3, 1941, Stalin addressed the Soviet nation publicly for the first time.
88
 In this address Stalin 
set forth his initial planning guidance for the use of unconventional forces. During the address, 
Stalin reiterated instructions given to all party officers four days earlier; he called for evacuation 
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and a scorched earth policy in the threatened areas and partisan warfare in enemy occupied 
territory.
89
  
 By January 1, 1944, the Soviets had become masters of the use of unconventional forces. 
Partisans were operating in German rear areas, generally attacking German supply convoys, 
reinforcements or the lines of communication and communication themselves. In addition, 
partisan forces also attacked German conventional force positions. Examining the Soviet use of 
partisan forces through the lens of Friedrich August von der Heydte's, Modern Irregular 
Warfare, In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon allows the student of the art and 
science of war to visualize the use of partisans as an element of the Soviet combined arms effort  
against the Germans.
90
 As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the Soviet method for 
the use of asymmetric force was consistent with the teachings of Marx and Lenin, helping to 
galvanize the moral will of the Soviet people against the German enemy. Use of von der 
Heydte's work shows the unity of effort between conventional and asymmetric tactical objectives 
along with how all units operating on the battlefield can be coordinated through the use of a 
campaign plan. 
  In preparation for the Leningrad breakout the following orders were issued to partisan 
forces operating in the Area of Operations (AO): 
 1. Broaden the centers of popular uprisings in the areas of operations of the 2d, 5th, 7th, 
 and 9th Partisan Brigades. Foment popular uprisings in the Volosovo, Kingisepp, 
 Os’mino, Krasnogvardeisk, Oredezh, and Tosno regions in northern Leningrad regions 
 and in the Porkhov, Pozherivitsk, Slavkovichi, Soshikhin and Ostrov regions in southern 
 Leningrad region.  
  
 2. During the course of the developing uprisings, completely destroy the occupations 
 authorities’ local organs, such as uyezd [large town], regional [mid-sized town], and 
 volost’ [small town] organs and create Soviet administrative organs under armed partisan 
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 protection. Save the population from destruction or transport to Germany and deny the 
 enemy command the opportunity to use the population in the construction of defensive 
 positions. Defend populated points from destruction and disrupt the transport to Germany 
 of grain, livestock, clothing, and other materials. 
 
 3. Intensify combat operations by partisan brigades, detachments, and groups against 
 enemy communications-roads and railroads- with all means at your disposal. Put the 
 Krasnogvardeisk-Luga-Pskov, Krasnogvardeisk-Kingisepp-Narva, Pskov-Slantsy-
 Veimari, Staraia Russa-Dno-Porkhov-Pskov, and Puskin-Dno-Chikhachevo rail lines out 
 of commission for the longest period possible in order to paralyze completely the 
 transport of personnel, equipment, and ammunition for the enemy’s operating armies, 
 particularly during the period of the Leningrad, Volkhov, and 2d Baltic Fronts’ 
 offensives.
91
  
 
 This instruction demonstrates clearly the Soviet High Commands understanding of the 
situation, best addressing the synergy and use of their assets against the problem of supply 
distribution in German rear areas. It is interesting to examine how the tasking of partisan forces 
was written. Central to the instruction is the importance of the people and generating support for 
the movement. Also of interest, is how the Soviet high command gave partisans a priority of 
targets to attack like conventional forces. Finally, the connection of partisan operations to the 
greater offensive demonstrates how their efforts were to be synchronized with the overall scheme 
of maneuver. Scholars and professional soldiers must understand the role of conventional and 
unconventional forces operating in the same battlespace, both in their employment and the 
employment of forces to counter their actions. Understanding the asymmetric threat along with 
use of conventional forces to respond to it was as problematic then as it is today. This work 
continues to shed light on this very difficult problem.  
1.10 CONCLUSION:  
 
 Operational planning requires acute situational awareness of the environment and 
understanding of the enemy at all levels of war. These qualities are born of experience and 
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reflection on times spent in study as well as operating at the tactical level. The role of the 
operational planner is to translate strategic vision into synchronized tactical actions to impose 
friendly will on the enemy. Through the design of a campaign plan, the operational planner links 
strategic vision to tactical actions, thus achieving the desired end state. An examination of the 
Leningrad withdrawal plan is long overdue and this work provides the perfect lens to dissect the 
various components of tactical reality against the combatant's doctrines and general theory for 
war. Understanding the parts of the problem and the questions surrounding the process of 
designing a campaign plan are at the core of this work. By identifying the strategic (ENDS) and 
looking at the (MEANS) available to accomplish the desired (ENDS), the emergent (WAYS) are 
quickly identified in a campaign goal and a plan can be written. Identifying the elements which 
make a situation and being able to quickly get to the heart of a matter allows the planner the 
ability to analyze the core issue of a problem. By understanding the parts that comprise a 
problem, planners are better able to solve it. A planner should not plan an operation without 
understanding how various transportation networks affect supply chain management through his 
friendly lines of communication. Time and space are the two critical factors which determine the 
effectiveness of a plan and ultimately, the success of the plan’s execution. Within the confines of 
time and space, the environment is governed by complications created by terrain and weather. In 
the end, superb strategic vision and excellent tactical execution are not enough to assure victory. 
A nation must win a war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, whether against 
conventional or unconventional foes. Study of past campaigns is the duty of every professional 
soldier, even when conducting them himself. Teaching those campaigns to subordinate unit 
leaders is the duty of every senior. Only through learning about the past and present can the 
professional soldier preserve peace while training for war in the future.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Strategic Ends, the Operational Environment and Doctrine 
 
 Examining the collapse of the German Armed Forces in 1944/45 requires not only an 
understanding of the events leading to the destruction of Germany in the east, but also how the 
plans written enabled that destruction. To understand  how a plan was created, the plan must first 
be considered in the context of time it was written. Examination should focus on the strategic 
ends the plan was designed to serve as well as the means available to achieve the ends. (See 
Figure  1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1
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More fundamentally, the first question to be answered is what is planning? A modern definition 
provided by the United States Marine Corps’ MCDP-5 states, “Planning is the art and science of 
envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about.”93 This quote 
rationalizes planning in the same manner as war itself, as an art and science. The art of planning 
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consists of conceptual and functional planning, while the science consists of detailed planning 
(See Figure 5).
94
 In order to understand the connection of national strategy to the tactics being 
employed on the battlefield, the plan must be understood through the lens of what it was 
supposed to achieve conceptually. How was the plan made functional when flushed out with 
more information? How do units at the tactical level carry out plans through the use of doctrine? 
Finally, what were the details of the plan and can the available assets accomplish the desired 
ends with what is available? While planning is considered a process, the product of planning (the 
plan) Moltke the Elder once said does not survive first contact with the enemy. Planning is not a 
single act “because it involves a number of ongoing, iterative and interdependent activities.”95 
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Figure 5
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Through the process of planning, those doing the planning are seeking to achieve a greater 
understanding of the problem they are attempting to solve.
97
 It only makes sense to understand a 
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problem before attempting a solution, but the second and third order effects must also be 
anticipated with the possible solution. MCDP-5 states: “Planning encompasses two basic 
functions- envisioning a desired future and arranging a configuration of potential actions in time 
and space that will allow us to realize that future.”98 As planners are not able to see into the 
future or fully predict the manner in which the enemy will commit forces, the plan must solidify 
a desired future end state as well as how friendly actions will be arranged in time and space. 
Time and space also relate to why planning is essential in the first place. MCDP-5 states three 
reasons for properly executed planning: 
 1. Planning can be essential to the ability to seize the initiative. In order to seize the 
 initiative, we must be able to anticipate events and act purposefully and effectively before 
 the enemy can. 
 2. Planning is essential to reduce the unavoidable time lag between decision and action 
 on the battlefield, especially at higher levels. 
 3. Planning is essential when situations reach a certain level of complexity.
99
  
 
 While MCDP-5 may seem a distant topic from the Eastern Front of the Second World 
War, ideas relevant to planning presented there provide a framework to understand how a human 
disaster on this scale came about, while also providing a common frame for examining both 
combatants thoughts about planning with an objective eye. What is missing from histories of the 
Second World War is not the discussions from the planning tables or actions at the tactical-level, 
rather, it has been the connection between the two found in an understanding of how the 
campaigns were planned.   
Understanding a campaign plan does not always yield a nation’s rationalization for war in 
the first place, nor will it necessarily show the associated end states or connection to available 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
95
 Ibid,1. 
96
 Ibid, 36. 
97
 Ibid. On page 4 of MCDP-5, the manual describes this as “We should think of planning as a learning 
process-as mental preparation which improves our understanding of a given situation.” What is important is not only 
the learning about the problem, but rather the shared common understanding of the effects the problem creates.  
98
 Ibid.  
42 
 
tactical means.
100
 Inquiries of the German strategic situation in the Second World War typically 
only consider the use of military force on land, while ignoring the use of naval units or air power.  
Joining strategy to tactics requires a campaign plan, a product of planning. As MCDP-5 
states, “Military planning comprises two broad categories- force planning and operational 
planning. Force planning is planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military 
capabilities.”101 In other words, force planning generates combat power from all the strategic 
dimensions (military, economic, informational and diplomatic) to accomplish the task at hand. 
The second category, operational planning is comprised of, “planning for the mobilization, 
deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of military forces to accomplish 
assigned missions.”102 How Germany created its strategic end state for the war in the east given 
intangible factors such as terrain and weather is the focus of this chapter. Commensurate with 
examining the German strategic end state, this chapter will also develop an understanding of the 
combatant's doctrinal force employment considerations along with their development. In 
conclusion, the chapter will close with an exploration of the Soviet end state for the Second 
World War. In understanding the linkage between strategy and tactics, the student of history 
better sees the creation and implementation of the operational art through a campaign plan.
103
 
 To understand how the campaign against Soviet Russia was conceived in terms of 
operational art, it is first necessary to identify the desired German end state for the campaign. 
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With an understanding of what the Germans wanted to gain by invading the Soviet Union, 
students of history not only identify the objectives of the campaign, but are also able to see how 
the elements of national power were applied to facilitate a German strategy for the war in general 
as well as for the Baltic region. In doing so, the student comes to their own conclusion regarding 
the unity of effort between the elements of national power and the end state of the campaign. 
With the identification of the desired strategic end state, the student must then understand the 
means available to the planner at the time in relation to what the enemy was capable of fielding. 
In modern parlance, this is referred to as the force ratio. A common planning coefficient used by 
planners today is a force going into the offense seeks to achieve a 5:1 ratio over the enemy in the 
defense. This lends credence to Clausewitz’s maxim of the defense being the stronger form of 
war.
104
 While the defender is incapable of defending everywhere, the offense is also unable to 
attack with decisive strength everywhere as well, thus the offense looks to achieve local 
superiority at a place of focus to overwhelm the defense.  These considerations must always be 
further examined in time and space.  
2.1 STRATEGIC REASONING AND THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GERMAN INVASION 
OF THE SOVIET UNION: 
 
 The strategy and objectives of a war are determined by the political leadership of a 
nation. The coming  war with Soviet Russia was first written about by Adolf Hitler in Mein 
Kampf in 1923.  
 Present-day Russia, divested of her Germanic upper stratum, is, quite aside from the 
 private intentions of her new masters, no ally for the German nation’s fight for freedom. 
 Considered from the purely military angle, the relations would be simply catastrophic in 
 case of war between Germany and Russia and Western Europe, and probably against all 
 the rest of the world. The struggle would not take place on Russian, but German soil.
105
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While few at the time took notice of his writings or his rants for that matter, in a decade 
he was able to begin expanding the war machine that he would use to attack Soviet Russia.
106
 
Hitler, like Germans of his generation, was deeply scarred by the experience of the First World 
War and the peace which followed.
107
 There were two considerations which found an audience 
with Germans of this generation. The first was the universal truth of fighting a war on only one 
front at a time, and the second was not allowing the German people to starve as a result of 
fighting at the front.
108
 In the late summer of 1939, Hitler shocked the world twice; the first time 
by concluding a Non-Aggression Pact with Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union and by beginning the 
Second World War against Poland on the September 1, 1939.
109
 On account of the first event, the 
world found it incredible that the two socialist states would not only put their difference aside, 
but actively work together. While both were signatories of the 1922 Rapallo Treaty, their 
working relations remained vexed.
110
 For almost two decades, Germany and the young Soviet 
Union had been working together. Both counties were able to find common ground and fault 
with the Treaty of Versailles. The very methods of employment used against Poland by Germany 
were developed in the vastness of Russia, away from the prying eyes of the west. For almost two 
decades, Germany and the Soviet Union exchanged ideas, along with tactics, techniques and 
procedures in the military dimension, while developing trade in the economic dimension and 
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continuing to build diplomatic relations.
111
 Soviet Russia, specifically “Jewish Bolshevism” was 
the true ideological enemy of Hitler’s National Socialism as written in Mein Kampf. 112 In any 
future question of the Soviet Union, the issues of the Soviet regime and Judaism were seen as 
“inseparably linked with the political, military-geographical, and economic motives in Hitler’s 
living-space program and his racial ideas concerning the necessary annihilation of ‘Jewish 
Bolshevism’.113 Hitler’s approach to foreign policy questions of the future saw the problem of 
land, Russia and Judaism through the same lens. To Hitler’s mind, the impending struggle 
against Soviet Russia was also historically determined:  
 We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German 
 movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze to the east. At long last we break off 
 the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-War period and shift to the soil policy of 
 the future. If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only 
 Russia and her vassal border states.
114
 
 
Hitler also wrote in Mein Kampf, “As opposed to this, we National Socialist must hold 
unflinchingingly to our aim in foreign policy, namely, to secure for the German people the land 
and soil to which they are entitled on this earth.”115 The idea of lebensraum or living space along 
with the annihilation of Bolshevism were the ideological underpinning for all plans to invade the 
Soviet Union.
116
 Hitler did not foresee the Soviet Union giving the land to Germany without a 
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fight. In a speech delivered on November 23, 1939, Hitler stated, “The safeguarding of living-
space can be solved only by the sword. A racial struggle has erupted about who is to dominate in 
Europe and in the world.”117 In actuality, not only was it a question of living space for the 
German people which motivated Hitler to draw up plans to invade Soviet Russia, but the promise 
of unlimited resources such as grain and oil.
118
 In Germany and the Second World War, Volume 
IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler sees the living space program as the synthesis of 
military, diplomatic and economic purpose, as Hitler himself defined it in Mein Kampf.  
 His (Hitler’s) living space program contained all the factors which, individually or 
 collectively, figured also in the reflections of military leaders, diplomats, and economists. 
 Expansion of living-space ‘towards the east,’ in Hitler’s opinion, not only promised the 
 safeguarding of Germany’s economic existence within a blockade-proof greater 
 European economy- because of the foodstuffs and raw materials to be found in the Soviet 
 Union- but would also afford an insuperable defense in depth, absolute political freedom 
 of action, and independence from international ties and obligations.
119
 
 
In these terms, “Hitler defined his war aim as the ‘liquidation of Russia’s manpower’ and 
the conquest of the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Belorussia.”120 The question in Hitler’s mind 
was not if he should invade the Soviet Union, but rather when. Hitler was a student of history 
and knew the horrors of Napoleon’s Army in 1812, so how could Germany and Hitler achieve 
what Napoleon could not? After the smashing victories over Poland in 1939, followed by the 
defeat of France in 1940 along with a host of other nations, Germany seemed unstoppable. 
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England had to be defeated next, if Germany was to dominate the continent of Europe. The First 
World War was the single event that formed the schema of every nation’s senior leaders for the 
Second World War. England was still the respected naval power of the world that needed a 
strong partner with a land army on the continent to have a say in continental affairs. While in the 
First World War, France did not fall, Russia eventually did in 1917 with the Bolshevik 
Revolution. In 1940, France fell shaking the paradigm of all global leaders to their cores. Not 
only did France fall, but it did so quickly. The logic of this strategically was if France had been 
removed and the massive Soviet Union was also been dispensed with, then England would not 
have a “sword in the hand” on the continent left to fight Germany with.121 While Hitler and the 
German general staff respected England, it was still acknowledged as the greatest threat to 
German domination on the continent. It was not the prospect of owning the British Isles which 
excited Hitler, but rather the resources of the British Empire. With the elimination of the Soviet 
Union, not only could Germany dominate the resources of the Soviet Union, but it could also 
have a monopoly of those in the British Empire as well without the aid of Turkey.
122
 In the 
minds of the most senior German leadership, the English were the force to be reckoned with.
123
 
While direct methods of German air and naval power were being applied without success to 
England, German leaders continued to plan the invasion of the Soviet Union.              
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As displayed in Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the 
Soviet Union, in writing plans to invade the Soviet Union, England was thought of as the true 
enemy. General Halder, at the time the Chief of the German General Staff and the man most 
responsible to Hitler for the BARBAROSSA plan saw the problem of England and Russia as a 
much bigger global issue.
124
 Based on conversations with Hitler during the initial planning 
phases, he took down the following thoughts in his notebook: 
 Britain’s hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture 
 America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously 
 increase Japan’s power in the Far East. Russia is the Far Eastern sword of Britain and the 
 United States pointed at Japan… Russia is the factor on which Britain is relying most. 
 Something must have happened in London!... With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope 
 would be shattered. Germany then will be the master of Europe and the Balkans. 
 Decision: Russia’s destruction must therefore be made part of this struggle. Spring 1941. 
 The sooner Russia is crushed, the better.  Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian 
 state can be shattered to its roots with one blow. Holding part of the country alone will 
 not do. Standing still for the winter would be perilous.
125
 
 
In Halder’s thoughts, the student of history sees not only confirmation of England as the main 
threat on the global stage, but also how German strategic leaders saw the destruction of the 
Soviet Union as the vehicle to facilitating that end. Also addressed in concept are the ideas of 
time and space for operations against the Soviet Union. Halder foresaw this operation taking 
place in the Spring of 1941 and before the winter, thus defining the timeframe for offensive 
operations. These thoughts would become underlying themes in the BARBAROSSA plan. An 
interesting thought Halder has in relation to the formation of war aims from these notes is 
                                                          
 
124
 Koch describes General Halder as having enjoyed a substantial amount of autonomy in his decision 
making prior to the winter of 1941when he stated, "Until the winter crisis of 1941/42 they, especially the chief of the 
general staff, General Halder, exerted decisive influence in military policy making and on occasions showed no 
hesitation in ignoring or even forgetting about Hitler's orders."See: H. W. Koch, “Hitler's 'Programme' and the 
Genesis of Operation 'Barbarossa', The Historical Journal, 26:4, 891-920.  
125
 Horst Boog and others, Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet 
Union, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History) trans ed. Ewald Osers 
(Oxford, UK: Claredon Press, 2008), 26. 
49 
 
“holding part of the country will not do.”126 Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, 
The Attack on the Soviet Union confirms Hitler’s intention to destroy the Soviet Union in “one 
blow” and how this related to the formation of war aims for a campaign against the Soviet 
Union: 
 The war aims formulated by him (Hitler) on that occasion differed substantially in their 
 spatial dimension from those of the general staff: Hitler, in view of the by then obvious 
 necessity to continue the war against Britain for an uncertain period of time and to 
 prepare for an American entry into the war, did not aim merely at ‘gaining space, but at 
 smashing the Russian state with a single blow.
127
   
 
Ultimately, the argument was the same as it had been since the July 31, 1940 conference where 
Hitler thought the only way to determine hegemony in Europe would be through the demise of 
the Soviet Union.
128
 “The decision on hegemony in Europe would be made in the struggle 
against the Soviet Union as this deprived Britain of her ‘continental sword’.129 The purpose of 
the operation was the annihilation of ‘Russia’s manpower’.130As will be discussed in other parts 
of this chapter, these very thoughts haunted German planners in the execution of hostilities with 
the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. 
 2.2 THE CREATION OF THE GERMAN STRATEGIC END STATE AND HITLER'S 
INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE: 
 As Hitler decided on a course to invade the Soviet Union based on the aforementioned 
reasoning, he also decided the time and space of the operation. Following this chain of logic, if 
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Hitler knew the Soviet Union was the last of England’s swords on the continent and England 
needed the Soviet Union’s manpower, then it followed that Germany should annihilate Russia’s 
manpower. What requires examination is how did these words and ideas of Adolf Hitler’s 
translate in actionable orders by the German Armed Forces and specifically, how did they 
contribute to the creation of Directive 21 and Operation BARBAROSSA.
131
  
Like all operations, BARBAROSSA began with initial planning guidance which was 
continually refined through staff action, conferences, studies and by the political leadership and 
higher headquarters. Most would expect for an operation the scope of the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, Adolf Hitler would have a grand conference to promulgate his initial planning guidance 
along with his thoughts about the desired end state for the operation. There was a meeting and it 
would be more consistent with what military professionals have come to expect. Likely for 
reasons of operational security, the concept was initially only briefed to the most senior officers 
who were needed to discuss the problem. On July 21, 1940, Adolf Hitler was finishing his daily 
situation update with the General Staff Officers. The main topic of the discussion that day was 
the state of operations against England.
132
 After the meeting, Hitler asked Field Marshal von 
Brauchitsch, the Commander in Chief of the Germany Army to remain behind.
133
 It was here 
Adolf Hitler first socialized the idea of invading the Soviet Union with a member of the German 
Armed Forces. Most military plans typically begin in this fashion. It was also in this meeting 
with Brauchitsch that Hitler provided his initial planning guidance for what would become 
BARBAROSSA. There were four items Hitler discussed as follows: 
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 1. The concentration of the attack forces would take 4 to 6 weeks. 
 
 2. The military objective would be the defeat of the Russian Army or at least to seize so 
 much Russian territory that the armaments plants in eastern Germany, particularly those 
 in Berlin and Upper Silesia, and the Romanian oil fields would be beyond the range of 
 Russian air attacks. At the same time the German ground forces would have to advance 
 far enough to bring important production centers of European Russia within striking 
 distance of the Luftwaffe. 
 
 3. The political aims would include the creation of an independent Ukraine and a 
 confederation of Baltic States under German domination. 
 
 4. The Army would need approximately 80-100 combat divisions; the Soviet Union had 
 some 50-75 good Russian divisions in Europe. If the campaign against Russia was 
 launched that autumn (of 1940), some of the German air power committed against Britain 
 would have to be transferred to the East.
134
     
 
What is of particular interest about this initial planning guidance is Hitler concisely 
delivered the desired end state for the future operation BARBAROSSA with consideration given 
to how the military dimension of national power would be used to achieve aims in relation to 
economic and diplomatic dimensions.
135
 This shows thought was given to all elements of 
national strategic power, the question which remained unanswered was how would the planners 
create a synergy of the military, diplomatic and economic strengths in a plan and how would this 
message be articulated through a directive. Based on this initial planning guidance given to Field 
Marshal Brauchitsch, it is clear the German Army was going to be the main effort for the 
impending operation and the German Air Force would be a supporting effort to the Army. 
Regarding the use of military power in the future operation, the planning guidance also reveals a 
serious fault. The planning guidance only talks about the role of the German army and air force 
without any mention of the use of naval forces. The navy being left out of the initial planning 
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guidance was likely an intentional decision, as the BARBAROSSA plan was being written to 
facilitate the fall of England. In this light, it was likely thought by the Germans that the navy was 
already fully committed to the fight against the Royal Navy. The following day after being told 
by Hitler of the desire to go to war with the Soviet Union, Field Marshal Brauchitsch the chief of 
the German Army High Command turned to his Chief of Staff Generaloberst Halder.
136
 
Brauchitsch informed Halder of the meeting with Hitler the day prior and commissioned him 
with gaining situational awareness about the Soviet Union and the disposition of its forces.  
2.3 GERMAN ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION AND THE ENEMY:  
 It is imperative to remember the role of the planner and a military staff in the creation of 
a plan for a commander. Planners and staffs do the research and detailed work of exploring 
problems, while creating potential courses of action to facilitate the decision making of the 
commander. The art of the planner is to take often complicated thoughts of decision makers and 
seamlessly transform them into simple orders. While not all of the information the planner and 
staffs examine becomes part of the final product, which is briefed to the decision maker, the 
products and information are typically shared amongst other planners and staff officers to 
provide a common approach to the problem being explored. Before any planning or examination 
of a problem can take place, the planners and staff doing the work must gather the “tools” they 
need to work. Not only must the “tools” be gathered, but the lead planner must have a “plan for 
the planning.”137 Maps and manuals are amongst the first things to come to the planning table, 
the staff officer most likely to be bringing them is the intelligence officer. To properly 
understand the problem that needs to be solved, the planner must first understand the context of 
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the problem; not only in terms of the objective items, such as the terrain and weather, but also in 
terms of the subjective enemy. Comprehending these factors is not just understanding for the 
sake of understanding, but rather, grasping the effects created by these factors. On a staff, the 
intelligence officer is the best qualified to explain the effects of terrain, weather and the enemy in 
the operational time and space. In June of 1940, Halder as the Chief of Staff turned to Lieutenant 
Colonel Kinzel, who was the Chief of the Eastern Intelligence Division.
138
 Kinzel was tasked 
with providing Halder with a brief on the area of operations (AO) along with the composition, 
disposition and strength of the Red Army. Kinzel delivered the briefing on July 26, 1940.
139
 At 
the same time that Halder sent for Kinzel, he also directed the Chief of the Operations Division, 
Colonel von Greiffenberg to assign a General Staff Officer to begin writing the draft plan of 
action.
140
Halder did what all well trained professional soldiers do, he gained situational 
awareness of the problem he had been tasked to solve before he tasked subordinate staff officers 
with preparing products for the decision maker. In doing so, Halder was better focused on the 
problem he was to have others investigate and better able to focus the efforts of his staff toward 
creating a product, ultimately what the OKW created in Directive 21.
141
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
137
 Having a “plan for the planning” was a term taught in 2009 at the United States Marine Corps School of 
Advanced Warfighting by Colonel Tracy W. King, USMC. The term is describing all of the preliminary work which 
is required before a focused examination of an issue can be fully engaged.  
138
 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet No 20-261Historical Study The German 
Campaign in Russia- Planning and Operations, 1940-42 (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army 1955), 3. 
In examining page 260 of Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, Kinzel 
likely consulted the Military Geography Department for the latest information. He would have again looked at 
“older reports, map and other material.” “It was not possible, however, to obtain accurate information on road 
conditions or other transport facilities beyond what were to be found in the literature.” This statement would lend 
credibility to the possibility of N. Reek’s work, Military Geography of Estonia being looked at by German planners 
during the planning phase for operation BARBAROSSA. 
139
 Ibid, 4. 
140
 Ibid, 3. 
141
 To see Directive 21 in full, see: Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet No 20-
261Historical Study The German Campaign in Russia- Planning and Operations, 1940-42 (Washington D.C.: 
Department of the Army 1955). Bernd Wegner wrote in The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia 
1941-43, "... Directive 21 represented a superficial compromise between two fundamentally incompatible 
operational ideas. On the one hand, the Army General Staff believed that Moscow as the operational objective 
should have absolute priority. Its capture would mean the elimination of the political and administrative nerve center 
54 
 
 After Lieutenant Colonel Kinzel had briefed Halder on the terrain to be expected in 
Russia and gave an idea of what to expect from the Soviet Armed Forces, Halder drew some 
vague conclusions. These conclusions were drawn based on what he had heard from Kinzel and 
the initial planning guidance Hitler had given to Brauchitsch on July 21, 1940. Based on these 
two factors, Halder had some very tough prerequisites to meet. The first and most major problem 
was mobilizing a force large enough in four-six weeks, while finding an assembly/staging area 
for mobilization that would not draw Soviet attention. The art of mobilizing an army for action 
was something every German General Staff officer studied in his courses. Students at the 
General Staff Course spent hours reading and listening to lectures about the work of Moltke the 
Elder and the manner in which he mobilized the great Prussian Army for war with France in 
1870.
142
 If the lessons were not learned directly from the readings of the great Moltke himself, 
then officers of Halder’s generation would have learned them from the work of 
Schlieffen.
143When describing Schlieffen’s seminal work, Cannae, Generaloberst Hans von 
Seeckt stated in his work, Thoughts of a Soldier that, “No catchword (Cannae) has done us more 
harm than this. It is a typical example of the way in which the truth in a catchword is 
perverted.”144 While Seeckt was discrediting the way many of his time used Schlieffen’s work as 
an excuse not to think while treating each problem of tactics in the same way, meaning from the 
front and flank; Seeckt was not against the teachings of Schlieffen regarding concentration. All 
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officers of Halder’s generation knew the great maxim of Moltke the Elder, “Concentrate on the 
battlefield the scattered detachments” or “move separately, fight together.”145  
 Based on the situational briefing presented by Kinzel, Halder came to the following 
determinations prior to meeting with Colonel von Greiffenberg’s assigned General Staff Officer 
regarding offensive operations against Russia; “An attack launched from assembly areas in East 
Prussia and northern Poland toward Moscow would offer the best chances for success. After the 
seizure of Moscow the Russian forces defending the Ukraine and the Black Sea coast would be 
compelled to fight a series of battles on a reversed front.”146 With these thoughts, Halder would 
receive Generalmajor Marcks on July 29, 1940 in Fontainebleau.
147
 Marcks was the Chief of 
Staff of the Eighteenth Army, which had recently been assigned to the East with the task of 
defending against a possible Soviet attack.
148
 Historians have often wondered why Marcks was 
picked to be the lead planner for what would become BARBAROSSA. 
                                                          
145
 Alfred von Schlieffen, Cannae (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1936), 
38. 
146
 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet No 20-261Historical Study The German 
Campaign in Russia- Planning and Operations, 1940-42 (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army 1955), 4. 
A “reversed front” in this case refers to German forces penetrating Soviet positions and encircling Soviet forces 
while other German forces positioned themselves between the Red Army and Moscow. This meant that Soviet 
forces would have to fight through German encirclement to have contact with their capitol.  
147
 Ibid. In comparison with the Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet 
Union which states, “Marcks initially regarded the creation of a point of main effort on the southern sector of the 
front-the operational group Kiev- as the most obvious solution. Halder, on the other hand believed that the basis 
indispensible for that plan, Romania was rather uncertain, and that the existence of the river barriers of Dnestr and 
Dnieper argued in favor of a shift of the point of main effort of the attack.” See Horst Boog and others, Germany 
and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt 
(Research Institute for Military History) trans ed. Ewald Osers (Oxford, UK: Claredon Press, 2008), 258-259. 
148
 Ibid. 
56 
 
Picture 1: General Marcks  
The likely answer is Halder and his inner staff had already come to the conclusion that 
Eighteenth Army would likely be a subordinate main effort for the impending attack. From this 
point of view, it made great sense to have the Chief of Staff from the unit most responsible for 
the attack’s success to plan the operation. A natural handicap Marcks would have unwittingly 
carried with him to do this planning was seeing this problem from his own unit’s perspective and 
being bounded by his own experience and rationality for ways to solve the entire front. With his 
assignment from Halder, Marcks prepared his study on the Russian problem.  
 The Marcks Study provides the student of history or the military professional a look into 
the next step into the evolution of the BARBAROSSA plan. This often misunderstood study was 
originally a 23 page document Marcks submitted on August 5, 1940.
149
 Marcks begins the 
document by explaining the objective of the campaign in the first paragraph. Marcks wrote: 
 The objective of the campaign was to defeat the Russian armed forces so that the Soviet 
 Union could not threaten Germany in the future. German troops would have to seize all 
 territory west of the line Rostov-Gorki-Archangel to eliminate the danger of Russian 
 bombing attacks on Germany. 
 
 From the military-economic view point Russia’s most valuable regions were the food and 
 raw-material producing areas of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin as well as the 
 armament-production centers around Moscow and Leningrad. The industrial areas of 
 Asiatic Russia were not greatly developed. The principle objective was Moscow, the 
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 nerve center of Soviet military, political, and economic power; its capture would lead to 
 the disintegration of Soviet resistance.
150
 
 
Analysis of this simple opening statement reveals several interesting thoughts requiring further 
inquiry. While Marcks echoes the initial planning guidance which Hitler delivered to 
Brauchitsch on July 21, 1940 and Brauchitsch no doubt conveyed to Halder the following day; 
Marcks’ study provides no connection in the opening statement to the true purpose of the 
operation, which was the destruction of England. What was the reason of England not being 
included? Was Marck’s not told that England was the reason for the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, or more likely was he told to leave England out of his work? While leaving England out 
of initial Russian planning may have simplified things for those who were planning the future 
operation against the Soviet Union, for planners assigned to other plans at the strategic level, the 
question of operational priority and nesting of operations became a question.
151
 Planners are 
always competing for the same resources, such as manpower, firepower or transportation to 
make plans feasible. In the case of the plan Marcks was charged with creating, the operation was 
going to be resource intensive. This requires a serious question, if an operation takes the vast 
majority of 2/3’s of the total available land and air forces; at what point does England cease to be 
the reason for the Soviet invasion? A question Marcks had to ask himself in the course of 
drawing his study is what would be lost from other theaters of war by the conduct of an operation 
against the Soviet Union. Certainly Marcks would have asked himself at some point where the 
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manpower and material were going to come from? These sorts of questions amongst staff officer 
help guide discussions with decision makers regarding mission priorities. 
 Another important factor which is drawn from Marcks’ opening statement on the 
objective demonstrates where the lines of operation for the campaign were going to be physically 
on the ground, along with how far the German forces must drive to meet the requirements set by 
Hitler of not having German factories in range of Soviet bombers. The lines of operation are 
correctly justified by giving economic reasons for the directions of march as well as the limit of 
advance. Identified were economic areas of interest, such as the Ukraine and the Donets Basin. 
Taken collectively, Leningrad and Moscow represented industrial centers which were capable of 
supplying arms and equipment to Soviet forces, while the Ukraine and the Donets Basin were 
capable of sustaining those forces and the population.
152
 These locations represented target areas 
for each axis of advance.  
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Map 5: Marcks’ Plan for the Invasion of the Soviet Union   
Based on his experience and knowledge of the terrain, Marcks identified the effects of 
terrain for the campaign in the following words on the first two pages of his study:  
  To the north and west of Moscow was screened by huge forests and swamps which 
 extended from the White Sea past Leningrad through Vitebsk to a line Kobrin-Slutsk-
 Kiev. The Pripyat Marshes, forming the southern part of this forest and swamp area, 
 divided the western border region of Russia into two separate theaters of operation. The 
 most extensive forests were between Leningrad and Moscow and in the Pripyat Marshes. 
 The intermediate area was crossed by main highways extending from Warsaw and East 
 Prussia via Slutsk, Minsk and Vitebsk to Moscow. South of the Pripyat Marshes were the 
 lightly wooded regions of eastern Poland and the Ukraine. The terrain was favorable, but 
 mobility was limited by the scarcity of good roads. Only one main east-west highway via 
 Kiev and by the Dnepr River constituted a major obstacle.
153
 
 
 Once Marcks had explained the general scheme of the Soviet defensive forces, he 
expounded on their disposition on the ground. Marcks had a ground-centric view of the possible 
Russian defense, as he said very little about the role the Soviet air force or navy would have in a 
60 
 
possible campaign. Marcks wrote the following about the disposition and concentration of Soviet 
ground forces and the role the air force and navy would have in the defense of the Soviet Union: 
 The main concentrations were in the Baltic States in the north and the Ukraine in the 
 south. In general, the Russian troops in the west were about equally divided between the 
 areas north and south of the Pripyat Marshes with a reserve force around Moscow. It 
 would be assumed that the same disposition would hold in any war with Germany. 
 Whether appoint of main effort would be formed in the north or south would depend 
 upon political developments. In all probability the troop strength in the north would 
 exceed that of the south. Once the Russian lines had been pierced, the Red Army, being 
 spread over a wide front, would no longer be able to coordinate its maneuvers and would 
 be destroyed piecemeal.
154
 
 
The picture being painted by Marcks was the Soviet flank forces in the north and the south 
would be strong, as these flanks would be anchored to water obstacles in the north along the 
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea in the south. The Soviets also recognized the strength of the Pripyat 
Marshes as a natural obstacle and wanted to use it to help protect Moscow at the center. To 
Marcks, it made sense for the Soviets to place their reserves at what he saw as their center of 
gravity, Moscow. This would afford it protection and offer the possibility of counter-attack. In 
light of these thoughts, the proposed German scheme of maneuver made sense. A northern 
German army attacking toward Leningrad, thus securing the left flank of the main effort advance 
toward Moscow, would avoid the Pripyat Marshes by keeping them to their right flank while 
attacking quickly using an excellent transportation hub to attack north. In doing so; the northern 
German army would be cutting the Soviet line of retreat back to Moscow by pressing Soviet 
forces into the Baltic Sea, while continuing the attack toward Leningrad.
155
 Lines of operation 
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would be long, but a mobilized ground force leaving out of well-developed East Prussia could 
make it easier.  
As the main effort thrust and attack on the Soviet center of gravity, Moscow was the 
crown jewel the Germans wanted to take from the Soviets. The Germans believed because of the 
highly centralized natural of the Soviet military, the taking of Moscow in conjunction with the 
destruction of their forces in the field would be more than the Soviet system could take. In other 
words, if the Soviet command and control structure was to collapse in Moscow and Soviet field 
commands were being crushed while asking for permission or waiting for orders from higher 
headquarters, collapse was imminent. To bring collapse about, Marcks thought the troop strength 
in the north was likely to eclipse that of the south and left flexibility in his study for political 
developments to facilitate what he saw as inevitable. Regardless, in the final analysis, the Soviet 
armed forces and Moscow needed to go in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet state.  
Regarding the Soviet air force, on page 4 of his study, Marcks thought they were a threat 
to be taken seriously.
156
 Marcks saw the role of the Soviet air force as something that would be 
used to interdict German traffic on the roads, making friendly movement more difficult. Marcks 
saw this as a way to remind other planners the German Army needed more anti-air capabilities 
before attacking the east. These two thoughts would lead German air planners to consider their 
own role in the coming campaign. Their argument was in order to support ground forces, more 
than just air superiority, but rather, total air supremacy was required.
157
 This was a part of the 
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larger intellectual discussion the German Luftwaffe was having regarding its role in relation to 
the army.
158
    
Regarding the role of the Russian navy, Marcks also explains on the fourth page of his 
Study what he thought of Russia’s naval capabilities and how he expected them to be used in the 
coming campaign. Marcks saw the Soviet surface and subsurface fleets the equal of the German 
High Seas Fleet.
159
 Interestingly, Marcks makes a significant comment regarding the possibility 
of Russian vessels interrupting the flow of Swedish iron ore coming to Germany through the 
Baltic Sea.
160
 He predicted the Soviets would achieve this through the use of submarines and 
mine warfare. For Germany, Swedish iron ore was a significant economic factor in 1940 and any 
future prosecution of the war depended on it.
161
 Also a priority made by Marcks was the capture 
of Baltic Sea ports. Marcks felt if these ports fell into German hands the situation of the Red 
Banner Baltic Fleet would be hopeless, as it would be confined to ports such as Leningrad which 
freeze in the winter. These Baltic ports could also become a major source of German sustainment 
for forces operating in the Baltic States. In this area of the document, Marcks also stated the 
Soviet navy needed to be eliminated from the Baltic Sea in order to prevent it from connecting 
with the English fleet and gaining a source of supplies.
162
  
 In terms of the operation itself, Marcks conceptualized the operation to be a four phase 
operation, once forces had been mobilized and deployed to their starting positions prior to the 
commencement of hostilities. Marcks explains the four phases of the operation in terms of time 
and space: 
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 Phase 1. In the initial phase of the operation the Russians would likely fight delaying 
 actions over a distance of 400kms until they reached their prepared positions. The 
 German infantry divisions would take three weeks to cover this distance. The panzer 
 divisions would have to advance rapidly and penetrate deeply so the Russians would be 
 unable to man a continuous defense. The issue of the entire campaign would depend on 
 the success of the armored thrusts. 
 
 Phase 2. The fight for the forest areas and the river courses would dominate this phase. 
 The depth of this zone was about 100 to 200kms. It would take two to four weeks to cross 
 it. At this stage, the German forces would either achieve a decisive breakthrough or 
 destroy the previously shattered Russian forces individually.  
 
 Phase 3. Moscow and Leningrad would have to be seized and the drive into the eastern 
 Ukraine initiated. The distances were 400 and 300kms respectively. This phase could 
 only be executed after the second phase depending on the condition of the railroads, the 
 serviceability of the tracked and wheeled vehicles and the degree of success achieved. If 
 the Russians were beaten, a few armored or motorized divisions would have to keep them 
 off balance and to seize Moscow and Leningrad and thrust deep into the eastern Ukraine. 
 This would require one to two weeks, if sufficient tanks and motor vehicles were 
 available. If, however, the bulk of the Red Army was still capable of offering organized 
 resistance, the start of the third phase would have to be delayed until sufficient supplies 
 were brought up to support the continuation of the offensive. In this case it might be three 
 to six weeks, depending on the time needed to generate supplies.  
 
 Phase 4. This phase would see the Germans pursuing the Russians to the Don, the Volga 
 and the Severnaya Dvina. The distances to be covered were 400kms in the south and 
 800kms in the center and the north. After the Germans captured Kharkov, Moscow and 
 Leningrad, the Soviet command would have lost control over its forces but complete 
 occupation of the territory acquired during this phase would be possible nor necessary. 
 Motorized forces and rail-transported infantry would be responsible for this part of the 
 operation. The time needed for this phase of the operation was estimated at two to four 
 weeks.
163
 
 
 In the writing of these four phases, Marcks was going to have to make assumptions and 
predictions, two things most planners do based on their experience. One assumption Marcks 
made was the Soviets would fight using delay and defend tactics, in the same manner the 
Germans thought of them. Planners often have to have a model of how the enemy will do 
something in order to share this understanding with others. In making this prediction, Marcks 
was acknowledging the Soviets would use the traditional Russian defense of trading space for 
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time in the same manner Alexander I did against Napoleon in 1812. It is also clear in phase one 
that Marcks believed the success of the operation and the deep armored drive need to capitalize 
on the initial strategic, operation and tactical surprise achieved when the operation began.
164
 The 
Germans needed to be prepared to take the initiative away from the Soviets in the initial hours of 
the campaign, not letting go until Moscow was seized.    
Marcks had demonstrated more thought about “joint” issues than most typically give him 
credit for. But Marcks’ planning was only conceptual, meaning it lacked the detail to be of any 
use in reality. Other planners from the German air force and navy had to add more flesh to the 
skeleton of this plan. Plans considering items such as terrain and weather move plans from the 
conceptual level to the functional by adding required details. Planners must not only understand 
how terrain and weather affect military operations, but how to plan to use their effects to 
advantage. Understanding how terrain was formed instructs planners on potential uses in 
offensive and defensive operations. Throughout the course of the war, both the Germans and 
Soviets developed their understanding of the conditions of terrain and weather, while they 
continued to refine their tactics to incorporate these understandings. A critical portion of the 
coming German operational plan for retrograde in the Baltic relies heavily on understanding the 
effects of terrain and weather.   
2.4 TERRAIN: DEFINING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
 As no other factor instructs combatants more than terrain as it relates to the space in 
which battle is joined, it is first prudent to examine terrain through the lens of the military 
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professional. Before the current age of technology, military professionals were much more in 
touch with the dangers and possibilities afforded by terrain. The strategic, operational and 
tactical levels each carry with them different considerations related to terrain. For an operational 
plan to be valid, it must consider grander issues of terrain in relation to the strategy being 
pursued, while having a total appreciation for the tactical level situation. Generally speaking, 
strategic-level considerations of terrain center on land masses in relation to the bodies of water 
that surround them. The northern front from Leningrad to the western edge of Estonia is 
comprised of the coastline of the Baltic Sea in the north. The eastern portion of the northern front 
is dominated by terrain mainly comprised of swamps, forests, small lakes and roads of small 
width. The southern area of the northern front is also covered with small lakes, forests, swamps, 
but lacks any significant road structure. The western area of the northern front is comprised of 
forests with more significant road infrastructure then the other parts. To better understand how 
the northern front was formed as a land mass, it is necessary to scientifically examine the 
geographic history of northern Russia and Estonia.  
In ancient times the land mass of northern Europe was shaped by the glaciers of the ice 
age.
165
 While glaciers did most of the work, it was the wind and rain that caused erosion and 
refined the terrain over the course of years.
166
 The isthmus of Estonia is defined by a current 
work on the Estonian geography as “generally narrow, but varying in width (6-28 km) with the 
mesa running from the border of Kõrvemaa from Sagadi east towards the Narva River (126km). 
The southern border at Alutaguse is dominated by swampy depressions created by glaciers. The 
widest area (28km) of the mesa is Jõhvi elevation (in line with Ontika-Jõugu) and Alutaguse’s 
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most northern point is at Oru and Vaivara.”167 Once across the Narva River, “the mesa in general 
is higher in the western part around Vaivara where it is 68 meters above sea level, while 
becoming lower in the east at 30-34 meters above sea level on the west bank of the  Narva River. 
From the smooth mesa, noteworthy knobby protuberances of moraine (the deposits of rocks, 
sand and clay left by melting glaciers) rise at Jõhvi to an elevation of 79 meters and at Sinimäed 
(84.6 meters). These are the highest natural elevations in the mesa” (See Map 9 for the general 
area).
168
  
In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries several countries took an active interest in learning 
more about the physical geography of the Baltic region. Contained in a document uncovered at 
the Estonian National Defence Academy in Tartu, Estonia, there is evidence making it 
abundantly clear the Estonians knew the Russians and Germans knew more about their terrain 
than they did.
169
 This important and extensive work entitled “Estonian Military Geography” was 
written, compiled and edited by Colonel, later General Nikoli Reek in 1920-1921.
170
 A little 
know figure outside of Estonia, Reek was central to the Estonian military reform effort following 
the Estonian War of Independence.
171
 This 144 page document explains what was known about 
Estonian physical geography up to 1921 and who the main contributors were. Reek did not act 
alone in the creation of this document. Reek makes it clear in the document’s introduction he 
tasked students of the Higher Command and Staff Studies Course, (or senior General Staff 
Officers going through the Estonian War College) to assist in the collection of information 
relating to Estonian terrain. This brilliant action had two significant positive effects: first, 
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students would look at the same pieces of terrain through experienced military eyes which could 
better relate the significance of the terrain to others like themselves and secondly, leverage the 
experience of officers who were certainly educated in the use of the Estonian landscape from the 
First World War and Estonian War of Independence.
172
  
In the first sentence of the document Reek states, “All authors writting about Estonian 
geography agree there is not enough material written in Estonian about our homeland. Many of 
the most important works have yet to be written, because they could not be appreciated at the 
higher levels.”173 What this statement exposes and is continously expounded on throughout 
Reek's work,  is how much of what was known about the physical georgaphy of Estonia was 
only good for either school childern or tactical-level leadership. Reek reconized the need for a 
document which made use of strategic and operational considerations regarding terrain. The 
available litature was not sufficient for the needs of General Staff Officers working at the 
strategic and operational levels of war. Continuing to highlight the fact other countries knew 
more about Estonia then they did, Reek said, “In German one can find many important works 
written about the Baltic states, including works on Estonia. However, the German publications 
are old, while newer works are published abroad making them difficult to obtain.”174 Reek 
continued to expand on this point by explaining,  
This is the situation with general Estonian geography. It is even worse with Estonian 
 military geography. The Russian and German General staffs have secret publications on 
 the Batlic countries and one can find data on Estonian military geography, but the data 
 from those sides is enilightened to suit either the German or Russian General Staffs from 
 their perspective. On the other hand, data which concerns the state and economics are 
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 completely aged. Thirdly, names and descriptions do not coorleate to names in Estonian. 
 Fourth, the works are difficult to obtain because they are secret.
175
 
 
What was not a secret was how Reek compliled his document and how the “Professor of 
the Military Art, Professor Baiov” had been instrumental in his efforts to provide material and 
instruction to student of the Estonian Military Academy.
176
 Many of the works written in Baiov’s 
time were not written with military application in mind, requiring Reek to point out, “this 
material in scope is good for military academy courses, but not the higher courses. The 
differences are understandable and for this reason I was compelled to attempt a concise work on 
the subject entitle Estonian Military Geography.”177 In the introduction of the document Reek 
exposes ten works influencing thoughts about Estonian geography up to 1921. The ten sources 
and authors used in conjunction with Reek’s work were as follows:  
 1. Russian Professor Baiov (Experiences on Estonian Military Geography).   
 2. Russian Professor Baiov (Overview of the Petragrad Military District)  (Top Secret).   
 3. Russian Professor Baiov (Pilot’s Guide to Baltic Sea Navigation). 
 4. Kupfer, Baltic Landscape, 1910. 
 5. Tornius, The Baltic Providences and the Finnish Gulf, 1918. 
 6. Estonian Abteilung 1920 Road map Latvia and Estonia (German General Staff), 1918. 
 7. J. Konts. Baltic Geography Study (work) Book, 1921. 
 8. G. Wilberg (Harjumaa County), 1921. 
 9. M. Kampmann Estonian Homeland Part 1, North Estonia, 1919. 
 10. J. Jürgens Geography Textbook Economical Geography, 1920.
178
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Analysizing these works in the context of the Second World War, only 20 years later, it is 
apparent both German and Soviet planners were influenced by these works and the work of 
Reek. Both the Soviet and German armies, along with their planners had access to these 
documents and understood their wider meanings in terms of their own experiences from 
operating in Estonian territory during the First World War.  
Certainly Soviet military planners refined their understanding of Estonian terrain after the 
occupation of the Baltic States in 1940 as part of the Ribbentrop/Molitov Aggrement.
179
  A most 
important tool of the planner and the commander alike is the map. Throughout the ages, military 
professionals have relied on two dimentional representations of complex three dimentional 
terrain by the use of maps. To understand what was known by Soviet military planners in regards 
to the terrain of Estonia at the begining of the war, a Soviet operational level military map dated 
July 10, 1941 was examined.
180
 Contained in the marginal information, located at the bottom of 
the map, there were a few interesting facts. The geospatial information regarding the grid lines 
used on this 1:500,000 scale map were created in 1935; while the political bountries used on the 
map were from 1936. Located on the far right side of the map is a reference to the map being 
produced in 1939. This evidence shows a few things. In the first place, based on the production 
date (1939), this map was produced for the expected invasion of then independent Estonia. This 
thought is soldified by the map’s representation of the orginial Estonian boarder with Russia, 
being along the Luga River in the north and generally 15 kilometers east of the Estonian city of 
Narva in the south. This boundary was established at the conclusion of the Estonian War of 
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Independence.
181
 Second, the Soviet Union had access to maps which were updated since the 
Estonian War of Independence.  
To understand how Soviet military maps were produced it was necessary to consult a 
collection of after action comments from the Soviet General Staff dated September- October 
1942.
182
 To obtain information regarding border territories, a special unit was organized within 
the Soviet Military Topographic Directorate. Regarding geospacial information, “the primary 
mission of field units of the military topography service consisted of providing the border 
territory of the USSR with ranging documentation of fortified areas by means of geodetic points 
and surveys.”183 The Narva area and the isthmus between the Baltic Sea and Lake Peipus in 
Estonia were a traditional area of focus for all major combatants since the time of Peter the 
Great, thus the Russians had ammassed significant information regarding the area’s defensive 
possibilities. 
 In January 1915, Hilaire Belloc wrote an article for The Geographical Journal entitled 
“The Geography of the War.”184 While the article was written to explain events occurring at the 
commencement of the First World War on the Western Front in 1914, it provides some useful 
ways to look at terrain in the strategic and tactical senses, while observing offensive and 
defensive considerations.  Belloc stated, “There are two main aspects of the way in which natural 
features affect the movement of armies.”185 In essence, Belloc explains how terrain forces the 
actions of armies in terms of offensive and defensive movements based on aspects of the terrain.  
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Offensive and defensive operations in terms of terrain are relegated to natural lines of 
advance for offensive operations and natural obstacles for defensive operations.
186
 Like the flow 
of water following the least path of resistance, armies do the same. As significant land forms 
allow or restrict movement, armies must follow suit. Military professionals refer to these “paths 
of least resistance” as avenues of approach.187 An avenue of approach determines the size of unit 
that can move through the terrain. An opposing army wanting to stop the movement of an enemy 
force must establish a defensive position from which he can use the effects of his direct and 
indirect fire support assets along with physical presence to stop an enemy advance. This is part 
of the reason why armies always want control of the “high ground.” An army in a defensive 
posture will seek a natural obstacle or series of natural obstacles or “defiles” allowing them to 
stop offensive movement with their massed direct and indirect fires.
188
 Thus, defensive terrain 
provides natural obstacles necessary for the defense to be the “stronger form of war.”189 Belloc 
identifies five “strategic” obstacles that offer defense against the advance of an enemy army. 
These obstacles are ranked from least to greatest difficulty; rivers, forests, hill country, desert 
and marsh lands. In the area of Leningrad to the Baltic, all but desert terrain is something that an 
army in the attack must contend with. Looking at the strength of each obstacle, Belloc described 
rivers as never a “permanent” obstacle but a “very valuable temporary obstacle.”190 Advancing 
or retreating from Leningrad into Estonia, both armies were required to cross three rivers. A 
point raised in Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign is practically all streams and rivers of 
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the Soviet Union flow from north to south, though a few flow in the opposite direction.
191
 The 
Narva River begins in the south at Lake Peipus flowing north through the city of Narva to the 
Baltic Sea. From the east to west, the Luga and Plussa Rivers flow from north to south. All three 
rivers are generally within a total distance of 10 kilometers of each other.
192
 
 When the distance of the rivers from each other is considered in time and space while 
compared against the distance and tasks required of the Soviet Army to deploy fully from 
defensive positions in the vicinity of Leningrad into a general assault, close examination is 
required. After the Leningrad breakout, the Soviet Army was required to breach a significant 
German defense which had been occupied for over three years, continuing the attack into the 
three rivers. The distance of the rivers from each other is significant when it is considered what 
engineer assets were required for the Soviet Army to cross a river against the amount of space 
available to stage, cross and consolidate units after a river crossing. Further complicating the 
crossing of these three rivers, like most rivers in European Russia, the west bank is higher than 
the east bank.
193
 This was a consistent advantage the Germans had in their retreat out of the 
Soviet Union. Looking at maps of the Leningrad to Narva area, leaders at the strategic and 
operational levels of war could be easily lulled into thinking there are no significant problems for 
the tactical-level leader to overcome with regard to elevation between the west and east banks of 
these rivers. This causes an even more severe problem, because the rivers lack significant 
elevation on either bank, water collects on the surface of the ground causing swamps. Along the 
Baltic coastline, the soil composition is the other main contributing factor to the formation of 
swamps. As a result of the terrain and the water table, the ground quickly soaks up water and the 
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terrain is unable to move it.
194
 When the task organizations of the armies is examined in 
conjunction with the composition of the soil and the amount of space required, it is not difficult 
to understand why the Germans were able to frustrate Soviet attack formations with relatively 
small formations. In addition to rivers and swampy conditions, both armies had to contend with 
the natural strength of the forests.  
 Hillaire Belloc when writing on the issue of forests in 1915 said, “It is a more serious 
obstacle for a reason which, like so many things concerned with the elements of strategics, 
modern people miss it because they are used wholly to artificial conditions, and almost wholly to 
conditions of peace.”195 In essence, forests and swamps constitute “no go” terrain for most 
modern armies comprised of mechanized or motorized assets, leaving them to seek offensive 
action only along roads as the line of advance. The Germans and Soviets also employed many 
carts and sleds drawn by horses. Being unable to find suitable areas to graze, fodder had to be 
transported to the front, taking up valuable space aboard trains and trucks. When roads or lines of 
advance meet a significant piece of elevation in a hill or mountain, an army in the offense should 
expect to find the enemy. While nature provides several obstacles for an army to exploit such as 
forests, the strength of a defensive position is further enhanced with the use of manmade 
obstacles. It is also prudent to consider the effects of man-made obstacles in terms of strategic, 
operational and tactical thought. 
 When planning offensive or defensive operations at any level of war, planners must 
always consider man-made infrastructure along with the effect it has on operations. For example, 
it is generally advisable for large mechanized or motorized forces to avoid cities, as urban 
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combat swallows armies, as the Germans and Soviets learned at the monumental battle of 
Stalingrad in 1942/43.
196
 When planners consider nature terrain together with manmade features, 
a fuller picture emerges of what is possible for an army regarding the use of the time and space 
available. While nature shapes the terrain, man builds infrastructure in key defiles to protect 
himself or to expedite the movement of forces and commerce. The combination of natural and 
man-made obstacles form avenues of approach as well as defensive positions. A force in the 
offense which can use an avenue of approach or line of advance (also referred to as a line of 
operation) with more tempo, or speed over time, in conjunction with overwhelming mass will 
likely overcome a force in the defense. However, a force in the defense which can wisely 
chooses natural defiles enhanced by man made efforts can take the initiative away from the 
offense, destroy combat power and thus make the offense susceptible to counterattack and 
destruction. This is what Carl von Clausewitz meant when he described the defense as “a shield 
of comprised of well directed blows.”197 The “well directed blows” are the counterattack force 
which the defense uses at the decisive moment in time and space to destroy the enemy. The 
transition from the defense to the offense must occur in the same areas available to the enemy. 
Nature provides planners with significant options for conducting military operations. In addition 
to obstacles, the weather associated with the change of seasons can take otherwise impassible 
terrain during one time of year and transform it into an avenue of approach. Closer study of how 
weather effects terrain is necessary. By focusing specifically on how military planners can 
correctly use this scenario to their advantage, better understanding of the conditions of 1944 are 
created.  
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2.5 WEATHER: HOW SCIENCE AFFECTS THE ART OF WAR 
Many scholars and military professionals only associate the effects of weather on terrain 
and men in the tactical sense. By failing to consider how weather effects the strategic and 
operational environment in terms of terrain and infrastructure, the ability to mobilize, field, 
operate and sustain a group of large formations cannot be fully appreciated by planners. No 
credible scholar or professional soldier would deny the conditions of the Eastern Front in the 
winter were anything but horrible. What is of particular interest is the lack of literature on the 
subject, certainly of the conduct of military operations in relation to the climatic conditions. One 
of the few works on the subject was a pamphlet issued by the U.S. Army. Effects of Climate on 
Combat in European Russia was originally published in February 1952.
198
 The 79-page 
document covered the important points of the climate in European Russia, but the document did 
not provide the details required by operational-level planners in the event the Cold War became a 
shooting war. Planners must consider the effects of climate and weather on operations being 
conducted or risk the destruction of their force. A plan created when the weather was cold which 
fails to consider climatic changes in the time and space available will be catastrophic to an army. 
The study of weather is not typically a subject of interest to professional soldiers until 
they are subjected to weather’s effects. Like terrain, a failure to understand weather can spell 
defeat very quickly. Facets of climatology are of interest to historians and professional soldiers 
alike. Sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, temperature, wind speed and precipitation all have an 
effect on planning, as well as the execution of operations. Ultimately, weather effects decision 
making at all levels. Knowing the answers to scientific questions can provide historians with a 
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clearer picture of why events happened as they did. This picture is not reliant on the memories of 
common soldiers or officers, but rather scientific instruments and records. To better understand 
decisions made at the planning table or on the battlefield, all should first strive to understand the 
factors driving the decisions. Positioning of the sun in reference to the terrain is a key factor 
when examining the placement of a defensive position. An important question to consider is 
what time did the sun rise and set during the fighting? Knowing this information allows us to 
explore the decisions leaders made against the historical record, collectively evaluating their 
results against objective science.  
Another important factor related to the sun is the temperature during the fighting. Only 
recently have military professionals begun to appreciate the effects of weather and temperature 
on the human body, particularly while conducting military operations. Certainly during the 
battles of 1944 when men carried only one canteen, soldiers on both sides suffered tremendously 
from heat related illness, forcing commanders to consider the issue because of the loss of combat 
power.  Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate weather in terms of climate and available daylight for the 
early part of the year in 1944.  
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 DATA COLLECTION TIMES  
 07.12  13.12  21.12  AVG  
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TEMP  -3.0°C  -2.2°C  -8.0°C  -4.4°C  
WIND SPEED  1 KPH  1 KPH 1 KPH  1 KPH 
DIRECTION  WNW  NW  W   
AVE HUMD  3.3°C  2.8°C  2.3°C  2.8°C  
REL HUMD 
(%)  
90%  71%  93%  85%  
STATION INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED AT: TIIRIKOJA (ON 
LAKE PEIPUS) LAT: 58° 52’          LONG:  26° 57’  
INFORMATION COLLECTED BY: ALLEK VALDUR 
***TIMES ARE PER LOCAL ESTONIAN TIME ZONE. IF USING IN 
GERMAN PLANNING SUBTRACT ONE HOUR FOR BERLIN’S TIME 
ZONE. 
IF USING FOR SOVIET PLANNING ADD ONE HOUR FOR 
MOSCOW’S TIME ZONE.  
 
200
 
Figures 6 and 7                                                             
 
2.6 PHYSICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS:  
 Planners are able to connect the physical effects of terrain and weather to planning 
considerations of support operations in time and space through nodes and modes of 
transportation. In order to effectively plan an offensive or defensive campaign, planners must 
seriously consider the time and space requirements to move men and material from point to 
point. A physical network analysis or (PNA) is a planning tool used today which allows planners 
to better understand the various hubs available to ground, sea and air facilitating throughput of 
supplies and reinforcements. Conducting a PNA should be an objective look at the capability a 
facility provides, remembering that capability can be used equally by friendly or enemy forces 
with the same result. Common considerations for all forms of transportation are the security of 
the lines of communication and staging area space. Both considerations are addressed by 
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planners in terms of troops to the task. In other words, how many men and in what formations 
are required to secure the rear area or a facility to ensure consistent resupply operations.    
A survey of documents located in the Estonian National Archives reveals an excellent 
view of what was known about Estonian facilities prior to the first Soviet occupation in 1940. 
These documents discuss dimensions of facilities, loading space available and the composition of 
runways. To gain insight into some of the capabilities of the Baltic region, the U.S. Department 
of the Army commissioned study MS# 232 or Conditions of the Railways in the Baltic Countries 
During the Advance of Eighteenth Army to Leningrad in the late 1940s.
201
 This study not only 
discussed the condition of the railways, but also the bridges and roadways and how they were 
used to move men and material in late 1941. These facilities would go largely undeveloped as 
the Germans continued operations into 1944.
202
 This study is pertinent when combined with ex-
ante sources related to the condition of the roads, sea ports and air fields located in the Estonian 
National Archives. This information is essential to determining the throughput potential of 
facilities and understanding the time and space required to move men or material.
203
  
2.7 RAILROADS:  
From its invention through the mid 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, railroad revolutionized the 
ability to mobilize and send men and material to theaters of war quickly. The Soviet occupation 
of the Baltic in 1940 saw most of the standard gauge track, the track most common in Europe, 
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torn up by the Soviets and replaced with broad gauge track.
204
 Broad gauge track was the track 
system common to the Soviet Union .                                   
With the vast majority of German supplies coming out of East Prussia, the Germans were 
able to use well developed double set tracks to quickly move men and material out of German 
mobilization areas. During the advance of the German Eighteenth Army, the Soviets damaged a 
few minor bridges along their route of egress. However, these actions did nothing to slow the 
German advance. Where bridges crossed natural obstacles for railroads, typically they also 
crossed in the same location for a road.
205
 Before 1940, most rail lines to Riga from the south 
were standard gauge. When German forces secured Riga, they gained a major freight and 
passenger hub which connected to several points in Estonia. As the Germans continued their 
advance, they employed a Railway Engineer Officer whose duty it was to facilitate maintenance 
through the host nation. The Railway Engineer Officer found many men throughout the Baltic 
the Soviets had used to lay broad gauge track. These same men “volunteered” to relay standard 
gauge.
206
 When Eighteenth Army reached Estonia, it was tasked with continuing the attack to the 
northeast by first securing Tartu, then continuing to attack toward Narva. Rail tracks in this area 
were also standard gauge. The Germans quickly discovered the western part of Estonia was 
mainly narrow gauge track. While converting standard gauge to broad gauge was difficult for the 
Soviets because the rail bed would have to be expanded, the same was true of German 
conversion of narrow to standard gauge. In Tallinn, the Germans found broad gauge equipment, 
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such as locomotives and cars which they pressed into service along with the host nation support 
to run them.
207
 
 While the Railway Engineer Officer was responsible for the maintenance of the track, the 
Army Transportation Officer was responsible for the schedule and timing of train movements 
within the area of operations. Due to a lack of phones, tracking movement along the routes was 
difficult. As a result, the Transportation Officer could often only provide a guess on where men 
or material were along the route, based on the time the train left. Another significant challenge 
was the space available at major hubs to transfer and stage men and material for movement to 
their next destination. Early on, the further north the Germans were in Estonia, the more frequent 
the changes of trains from standard gauge to broad gauge.
208
 Men and material would have to be 
“transloaded” or what is called today “cross leveled,” from one train to another. They were 
staged and accounted for in a marshalling area, then moved to another train to continue their 
journey to the front.
 209
 This time consuming process could take days, if the right equipment or 
manpower were not available. Most of the time, despite their best efforts, the Germans found this 
to be a very time consuming and inefficient process, even in the later years of the war.   
2.8 ROADS:  
Overly, roads in the Baltic region during the Second World War were what is referred to 
today as “unimproved” surface roads;  meaning they were not covered with pavement or 
concrete. Roadways in major cities were paved, but as forces moved out of the cities, roads 
quickly turned to dirt. Speaking on the condition of the roads in Estonia, according to MS# 232, 
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“The condition of the roads was hopeless. There was nothing but deep sand which turned into 
mud whenever it rained.”210 Dirt roads were typically small in width, not being designed for the 
heavy traffic an armored formation would send through an area. Also, a common feature of 
Baltic roads was having a drainage ditch on both sides of the road. This made getting off the road 
quickly difficult in the event of air attack. Dirt roads presented two significant problems for 
planners with regard to the weather: 1) the slightest amount of rain could make them impassible; 
and 2) once a road was destroyed by usage, crews would have to be employed to repair them 
before they could be used again. After the initial drive to the north, the Germans found 2) more 
difficult than 1). Manpower was a consistent problem and as the war progressed, it only became 
worse. Summertime road usage also created significant challenges. A dry road being used by a 
large formation in the Baltic could be expected to produce a dust signature which could be 
followed from the air. As a result, the preferred technique was to move at night.  
2.9 PORTS: 
 The Baltic nations have always had a rich tradition of using the Baltic Sea as a line of 
communication. With many quality deep water ports along the coast, military and commercial 
traffic in the Baltic Sea flourished for centuries. The major mainland ports in the region were 
Königsberg, Memel, Libau, Riga, Pärnu, Tallinn, Narva and Leningrad. What makes each of 
these ports a piece of key infrastructure is not only the throughput capacity, but also the 
distribution facilities of roads and railways to move material to the front. Operating out of 
Königsberg and ports further to the west, the Germans easily gained and maintained control of 
Memel and Libau. From operations conducted in the Baltic region from the First World War, the 
Germans had excellent working knowledge of these areas and understood how to gain control 
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quickly.
211
 The crown jewel of the region in terms of port facilities was Riga. Riga was 
geographically secured by the Courland peninsula to the west and could secure ships with shore 
based anti-ship batteries once inside the Bay of Riga. As the First World War taught the 
Germans, using the Bay of Riga and Riga itself first required the neutralization of Soviet 
positions in the Baltic Islands, particularly the main island of Saaremaa with the Sõrve peninsula. 
Thus, the German Navy was dependent on ground forces to secure the Estonian north and west 
coasts along with the Baltic Islands before the port of Riga could be used. During the German 
drive north in 1941, the decision was made to first secure the city of Narva and continue 
attacking east toward Leningrad before clearing back toward the port city of Tallinn and the 
Baltic Islands.
212
  
 
                                        Picture 2                                  
213
 
As demonstrated by this pre-war picture, Tallinn had a significant port facility, but more 
importantly the infrastructure in terms of roads and rail heads to move material quickly to the 
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front. (See Picture 2)
214
 It took additional effort before the Germans could take full advantage of 
the port of Tallinn. There were two roads, one leaving Tallinn to Tartu in the southeast, and 
another leaving to Narva in the east. In addition, each of these roads had a railroad running close 
by. With the port located in the north, airfield in the south and rail and road hubs in the center, 
Tallinn was an ideal solution for German problems of distribution to the front lines. (See Picture 
2/Figure 8)  
 
                      Figure 8               
215
 
With total control of the ports, the Germans were able to increase their war material 
throughput to support combat operations. As has been discussed, it is also important to remember 
German war industries were dependent on Swedish iron ore being transited across the Baltic Sea. 
Securing additional ports in the Baltic region better allowed for the safe passage of this vital 
resource.  
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2.10 AIRFIELDS:  
 As aviation was still a rather new phenomenon at the start of the Second World War, 
Baltic air-fields were substandard for the use of “modern” air forces. Much like the roads of the 
region, air-fields were mostly made of dirt and susceptible to the effects of weather until 
improved. Airfields could be found in many of the larger cities and were most likely to be 
improved using a concrete surface. Recent document from the Estonian National Archives 
demonstrate before the war the Estonians were developing their throughput capacity at the 
airfield in Tallinn.
216
 As demonstrated by Figure 5, this airfield was more than sufficient at the 
beginning of the war, and the location of the airfield in relation to the rest of the city made it 
ideal for growth.   
 
 
                                                                      Figure 9                                   
217
 
                                                                                      
All air fields, regardless of construction, suffered from the same problem of throughput 
generation and sustainment like the other types of transportation. Sufficient ground personnel 
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were required to offload planes and cross level equipment to trucks once on the ground. This also 
required sufficient space to store items waiting to be transported forward. 
 Aircraft of the period were limited in range, necessitating forces to have air fields closer 
to the front. However, the closer to the front aircraft were, the more susceptible they are to 
interdiction and destruction from the air. Being closer to the front meant shorter turn-around 
times for aircraft to refuel and rearm getting them back into action quicker. Another advantage of 
having aircraft closer to the front from a planning perspective was planners could better 
coordinate air actions with their ground. This allowed for better synchronized actions against the 
enemy. Information presented at these meetings allowed air planners to explain to ground 
commanders the capabilities and limitations, not only of the aircraft and the facilities, but also 
the rates and amounts of time needed for aircraft to support ground actions. A disadvantage of 
airfields being close to the front was the need for extra security to prevent an enemy 
breakthrough along with additional anti aircraft assets to protect the air field.  
In the case of fighting around Leningrad and Narva, the Germans could generate sorties 
from Tartu in the south and Tallinn in the west. The Soviets had many more options closer to the 
front in the vastness of Russia. The location of German fields required aircraft to operate at their 
maximum range to support ground actions. The danger of operating in this fashion was aircraft 
had a very narrow window to support ground actions before needing to refuel, reducing their 
flexibility and responsiveness. During the course of the war, communications improved between 
the ground and air, but it was still far from optimal. The totality of all of these planning 
considerations allowed planners to define and understand the physical nature of the operating 
environment and construct operational plans which were capable of joining strategic end states to 
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the tactical means available. It is now prudent to explore the combatant's doctrine and their 
development for actions in the Second World War.    
2.11 DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENT AND 
THE INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP:  
 
THE GERMAN VIEW OF DEVELOPED DOCTRINE:  
The doctrinal concepts of German ground force employment used in the Second World 
War were largely based on German experiences from the First World War and interwar years.
218
 
The two most important concepts developed from the First World War were defense in depth and 
stormtroop tactics.
219
 Having reached the zenith of their wartime development in 1918, the key 
lessons the Germans learned from their experiences in the trenches were to tactically do more 
with less manpower. They needed to better economize their forces and use weaponry, such as the 
machine gun to its fullest capability. The final result desired for German strategy was to return to 
the traditional German view of war provided by Fredrick the Great. Wars were again to be “short 
and lively.”220 The doctrine, equipment and subsequent employment of German ground, naval 
and air forces reflect this thought in the development of German strategy. Their strategy was 
faulty and no amount of tactical prowess could help Germany fight a war of attrition against the 
Soviet Union.   
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Trading space for time and inflicting the maximum amount of causalities while delaying 
and defending against the enemy did indeed helped reduce friendly causalities. The Germans 
were able to capitalize on the strength of the tactical defense allowing the enemy to reach his 
culminating point. Finding the enemy culminating point was facilitated by a reorganization of the 
battlefield. The model below forms the basis for how the Germans would conduct a tactical 
defense in 1944. 
 
 
The Security Area:  
 
The Advanced Positions (1-5 Kms). Provides early warning, deceives the enemy as to the 
location of friendly main positions and forces the enemy to deploy his formations early. Friendly 
units are not to be decisively engaged. Forward elements use supporting arms (Arty/Air) and 
smoke to break contact before the position is untenable. Cavalry moves to the Rear Area to 
rearm and to reconstitute as a mobile reserve. Infantry rejoins parent units in the Outpost 
Positions and continues fighting.    
 
The Outpost Post Positions (5-10 Kms). Provides the main defenses more time to finish being 
built and further deceives the enemy as to the location of the main defenses (One infantry  
regiment, one cavalry battalion and two artillery battalions in support). 
 
The Main Battle Area (MBA): Begins at the rear positions of the Outpost Positions, continues 
through the Main Line of Resistance and ends at the beginning of the Rear Positions (10-20 
Kms). The MBA is organized and dispersed in depth to increase friendly fire on enemy targets 
while reducing the attacker’s ability to mass fire (Two infantry battalions in the line and six 
artillery battalions in support). 
 
The Rear Area: Begins at the end of the MBA and ends at the Division’s rear boundary (20-30 
Kms). The Rear Area houses the Division Headquarters, the counterattack (CATK) force, 
Division Schools, training/rehearsal areas and logistic support nodes (One infantry regiment is 
the CATK force and three 155Arty  battalions in support).
221
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ADVANCED 
POSITION
OUTPOST 
POSITION
MAIN BATTLE 
AREA
MAIN LINE OF 
RESISTANCE
REAR AREA
17 KM
30 KM
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxx
XX
X
XX
X
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
9 10
1 32 654
7 8
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
31 32 33
34 35 36
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Notes: 
1. Infantry units placed by subordinate unit leaders in zone.
2. Organization taken from the Hartness Report, dated 25 November 1936, National Archives, MID 
File 2277, B-44.
RGT
AA
(CATK)
XX
DIV
CSSA
37 38 39
DIV  SCHOOLS/
TRAINING AREA
0-5 KMs
5-10 
KMs
(until 
0 hr)
10-15 
KMs
20-25 
KMs
25-30 
KMs
15-20 
KMs (24-
48 hrs)
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      Figure 10 
The execution of the defense would generally flow as follows: 
Concept of Execution:  
Defensive operations of the Division (Rein) are executed in three phases:  
a.) Counter-reconnaissance and security operations from the Advanced Position and Outpost 
Position (preparation) (48-24 hrs then 24-0 hrs): Units destroy the enemy reconnaissance 
effort and Advanced Guard in zone before breaking contact.  
b.) Executing the defense in the Main Battle Area (shaping) (0-24 hrs): Relies heavily on 
organic indirect and artillery fire support assets. Units fix or destroy enemy Main Body in 
zone.  
c.) Operational counter-attack from the rear area (decisive) (24hrs-comp): Defense destroys 
enemy in the MBA, CATK force facilitates follow-on operational motorized CATK by 
tactical penetration.  
 
The main effort of the defense in depth was the counter attack.
223
 Once the enemy had 
reached their culminating point, fresh stormtroops could be used to create a tactical penetration 
of the weakened enemy defenses or cut the enemies lines of retreat. Creating a tactical 
penetration allowed for an operational breakthrough by follow on forces. 
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Little exists on the doctrinal employment of German maritime power from the Second 
World War. Throughout most of the Second World War, the German navy’s focus of effort was 
the strategic use of the U-Boat in the North Atlantic against allied shipping.
224
 The German navy 
in the Baltic Sea performed two main purposes: 1) to offensively mine Soviet ports and 2) 
interdict Soviet resupply efforts and Soviet surface and subsurface threats. Defensively, the 
German navy concentrated its patrolling effort on the security of ports and merchant vessels 
operating along the German strategic lines of communication (SLOCs).
225
 These forces suffered 
considerably at the hands of the Soviet navy in the Gulf of Finland.
226
 During the fighting on the 
Leningrad, Narva and follow on fronts, Army Group North relied heavily on the German navy 
for resupply and evacuation efforts.
227
  
The German air force at the beginning of the Second World War was largely considered 
the finest air force of its day.
228
 With the limited range of its platforms, it was a tactical air force 
whose primary mission was to support the German army. This function it performed well 
throughout the war, but this was not enough to win. As a result of faulty strategic employment, it 
was tasked with winning the Battle of Britain in conjunction with the German navy. Chiefly as a 
result of unsynchronized actions and British radar, it was decimated beyond repair before the 
invasion of Russia. Continuing to suffer tremendous losses throughout the Russian campaign, by 
function of organization and as a result of enemy action, it quickly lost air superiority to the 
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larger and massed Soviet VVS.
229
 As Soviet Armies surrounded German ground forces, for the 
first time in history, the idea of aerial resupply was tried in 1942.
230
 
In the end, all German strategic efforts were crippled by indecision or poorly made 
decisions on the part of Adolf Hitler. Hitler’s strategic policy of not giving ground once taken by 
German forces was in total contravention to German employment doctrines.
231
 By refusing field 
commanders requests to allow withdrawal, cost the German Army men and material it could not 
replace. As a result of strategic failure, excellent tactical actions on the part of many could not 
compensate for the actions of one. As German tactical doctrine called for centralized command 
and decentralized execution, heavy losses made it impossible to train men capable of executing 
auftragstaktik in concert with the increased need caused by causalities.
232
 Hitler's insistence of 
holding every last inch of ground in the defense eliminated individual initiative for the lowest 
tactical level, creating centralized execution; while Hitler's interference in tactical matters was 
creating an environment of centralized command. This was the total opposite of the German 
leaders education.  
   
2.12 THE SOVIET VIEW OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT: 
 
Like German officers of the post First World War period, officers of the Red Army 
debated the ideas along with the merits of a strategy of annihilation verse one of attrition. Each 
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school of thought was fueled by the experiences of officers from the Russo-Japanese War, First 
World War and Russian Civil War of 1918-1920. Most were influenced by the writings of Lenin. 
The debate came to a head in 1926 at the Military Academy of the Main Staff of the RKKA.
233
 
Championing the school of annihilation was Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky. A deep and 
critical thinker, Tukhachevsky authored several works of military thought during the interwar 
period supporting the strategy of annihilation or destruction.
234
 An equally deep and critical 
thinker was the chief proponent of the school of attrition, Alexandr Andreevich Svechin. The 
author of Strategy, Svechin appears to have been the first to use the phrase “operation art,” found 
in a series of lectures from 1923-24 at the Military Academy of the RKKA.
235
  
The 1926 debate ended in favor of Tukhachevsky and the annihilation school, but not 
without input of Svechin’s thoughts influencing future doctrine.236 As described by Kipp, 
Svechin’s “own approach to military art and theory could be described in the same fashion in 
which he characterized the German military historian Hans Delbrück: a combination of Hegelian 
dialect with historical materialism.”237 Also of interest was Svechin’s approach to the use of 
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history in the development of strategy. He stated: “Strategy reflects systematic reflection on 
military history. Failure to utilize historical insights could only lead to disasters. Isolation from 
the historical base is as dangerous for the strategist as it is for the politician.”238   
Moving forward from the debate, Tukhachevsky sought to consummate his thoughts on 
strategy and tactics by updating existing Soviet military doctrine. The evolution of Soviet 
military doctrine begins with Field Service Regulations 1925 (PU-25), which could be best 
described as an attempt to get the Soviet Army to operate in a common way. These regulations 
were a fair attempt to make progress, but are viewed by historians as “highly tentative because 
the ideas presented were new and not well developed.”239  
Next in the Soviet chain of development was Field Service Regulations 1929 (PU-29). 
The significance of this document, albeit very tactical in focus, was for the first time the Soviets 
articulated their thoughts on mechanized and motorized operations, a key component of their 
Deep Battle concept.
240
 As the primary author of Field Service Regulations 1936 (PU-36), 
Tukhachevsky sought to encapsulate the Soviet High Command’s vision for modern war, 
describing the manner in which the Red Army would operate in the future.
241
 The essence of 
Deep Battle was to use the weight of combined arms to attack an opponent in depth, seeking to 
use speed and tempo generated by mobile and mechanized forces to cut enemy lines of operation 
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and communication. This was the embodiment of Tukhachevsky’s vision for a strategy of 
annihilation.  
Neither Tukhachevsky nor Svechin would survive Stalin’s purges of the 1930s, but their 
ideas would in an evolved form. Their ideas were first tested against the Finns in 1939, ending 
with terrible losses and serious questions. Stalin blamed the losses in Finland on “traitors” such 
as Tukhachevsky and Svechin without taking the time to evaluate whether Soviet forces were 
trained and equipped to execute the doctrine as it was written. War serves as the true test of a 
written doctrine, calling for periodic evaluation. Most doctrine written and practiced during time 
of peace is found wanting when tested against the realities of war. Regardless, the thoughts 
found in PU-36 formed the corner stone doctrine Soviet forces took into the conflict with 
Germany in 1941. As the war evolved, so too did Soviet thought with regard to doctrine. As 
explained by Earl Ziemke in Moscow to Stalingrad, Decision in the East: “In the summer of 
1943, the Soviet forces abandoned the blitzkrieg tactics they had employed in the previous 
winter campaign and took up the “cleaving blow,” a less sophisticated and inherently more 
ponderous mode of conducting operations, but one vastly more reliable in the hands of Soviet 
commanders and troops.”242 The cleaving blow was still an operational form of attacking in 
depth, seeking to cut off large formations of Germans and destroy them in pockets.  
To complement this strategy, the Soviet navy and air force were subordinate in their 
efforts to the Red Army. To support breakout operations from the Leningrad pocket in January 
1944, the Red Fleet was “organized into three battle groups: one built around the old battleship 
Marat, including two destroyers and a gun boat; another centered on the old battleship October 
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Revolution with three cruisers and two destroyers and a third smaller group including four 
destroyers and three gun boats.”243 The purpose of the ships was to provide naval gun fire 
support to forces breaking out of the Oranienbaum pocket. The Soviets also employed 
submarines to great effect in the Baltic Sea, mining German ports and sinking unprotected 
German supply ships.
244
 In addition to ships, the Red Fleet had 313 aircraft to support maritime 
interdiction operations of German merchant shipping or support the ground scheme of 
maneuver.
245
  
The key difference between the German and Soviet approaches to the employment of 
airpower is found in the weight of effort the Soviets applied in direct support of the ground.
246
 
Massing their aircraft, the Soviets would first gain, then maintain air superiority and begin 
attacking ground targets with massed aircraft to achieve effects. For the breakout of the 
Leningrad pocket, the 13
th
 Air Army in support of the operation consisted of the latest bombers, 
(Tu-2s, Il-4s, Pe-2s), updated versions of the IL – 2 Shturmovik, and Yak – 9 and La – 5 
fighters.
247
 Like the German employment of close air support, the Soviets had difficulty 
coordinating the effects of their fires with actions on the ground, often inflicting casualties on 
their own forces.  
Doctrinally, Soviet forces were as prepared for war as the Germans, the difference was 
the Germans practiced their doctrine of war as they trained to execute it before the war during 
times of peace. The Soviets were no less responsive in modifying their doctrine then other armies 
of the period; in fact, they were more responsive in the field at the lower levels. The trouble was 
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Stalin and the STAVKA. With the Soviet command structure as centralized as it was, 
subordinate commanders were afraid to act without permission from higher headquarters, thus 
Stalin and the STAVKA made many decisions affecting operations without full knowledge of 
the situation.   
2.13 THE SOVIET WAR AIMS AND STRATEGY 1944: 
As strategy is informed by politics, specifically foreign policy, it is prudent to examine 
Soviet foreign policy at the outset of the Second World War to establish a frame of reference for 
what changed over the course of the war. As the Soviet Union was invaded, their initial policy 
was largely reactionary. As stated in the first volume of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945,  “The 
main task of Soviet foreign policy was to ensure the optimal international conditions for 
organizing resistance to the enemy, the future liberation of enemy occupied territory and total 
defeat of the Nazi aggressors.”248 As the external arm of diplomacy, foreign policy further 
wanted, “to ensure that the bourgeois states already fighting Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy 
became as reliable as possible allies of the USSR.”249 In essence, Soviet foreign policy could be 
reduced to three items in 1941. They were: 
 1) The opening of a second front to relieve the Soviet forces fighting on the Eastern 
Front.
250
  
2) To prevent attacks by states that were maintaining neutrality in Germany’s war against 
the USSR, such as Japan, Turkey and Iran.  
3) To render all possible assistance to the peoples of Europe languishing under the yoke 
of Nazism in order to bring about their liberation and restore their sovereign rights.
251
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With these concepts in mind, Joseph Stalin articulated the war aims for the Soviet Union 
in a declaration delivered on July 3, 1941. Stalin stated, “To bring about the speediest and most 
decisive defeat of the aggressor and assemble devoted (Soviet) strength and resources for the full 
accomplishment of the task.”252 Included in this task was the subordinate thought of post war 
organization after the extermination of Fascism. To work with the Western Allies, Stalin saw it 
as a necessity to build an Anti-Hitler Coalition, if he was going to gain relief from the German 
onslaught with the use of a “second front.”253 As the war progressed through the difficult years 
of 1942 and 1943 and after repeated requests to the Western Allies to open the second front 
against Germany, Stalin had finally broken the German will to attack and the Soviet Union 
regained the initiative for offensive operations. By late 1943 the Soviets felt confident in their 
ability to survive without a second front; they now saw an opportunity to break Germany once 
and for all while establishing themselves as the dominant power in Europe. It was clear to Stalin 
that he could only deal with the Germans or the Western Allies from a position of strength at the 
negotiation table. The first verbalization of Stalin’s post war desires to the Western Allies was 
seen at the Tehran Conference in late November, 1943.
254
  
As Soviet sources portray, the war goals of the Soviet Union in 1943/44 were largely 
unchanged from what Stalin had said in 1941. In a General Order dated May 1, 1944 Stalin said 
the following with regards to the political and military goals of the Soviet Union, the goals were, 
“to clear the Soviet land from Fascists and restore state borders of the Soviet Union in all 
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directions from the Black to the Barents Sea, to chase the wounded beast back into his lair and 
finish him off, and to free our brother poles, Czechs and other allies in Eastern Europe.”255  
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
 
Figure 11 
Stalin’s words had shaped the Soviet campaign plan for 1943/44 and how the war was to be 
brought to an end. Per the Soviet Official History of the Second World War, the campaign plan 
would place the massive weight of the Soviet offensive against German forces on a “broad 
front.” Below was how the Soviet broad front was to look;  
 Soviet leadership intended to start the offensive with Leningrad and Karelia front 
 operations on Karelia neck and in South Karelia. Crushing the enemy in this area would 
 inevitably force the enemy to withdraw part of forces from the central part of the Soviet-
 German front as well as force Hitler’s partner Finland to leave combat. Leningrad and 
 Karelia front operations should have been immediately followed by the crushing blow of 
 four fronts in Belarus. By the time Hitler’s government would have concluded that main 
 efforts of the Soviet army was concentrated exactly in this place and would have moved 
 his reserves from the south. At this time, it was planned to commence decisive attack of 
 the 1
st
 Ukraine front forces in the direction of Lvov. Meanwhile, it was planned to hold 
 forces of the army group “North”, prevent them from helping their neighboring army 
 group “Center” from right flank. After defeat of the enemy Soviet government would 
 have been able to start active offensive operations in Balkans, Baltic countries and far 
 north.
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Judged by this statement, the offensive operation planned for the break out of Leningrad 
would be a supporting effort attack in order to enable the successful destruction of German Army 
Group Center. In doing so, the Soviets would accomplish all of their goals, destruction of the 
enemy, as well as the investment of the Baltic States or to the Soviet mind, the reestablishment 
of the Soviet prewar borders. To solve the problem of Leningrad and carry out the breakout as 
planned, the Soviets needed leaders who understood the challenges of the Leningrad front. A key 
source of Soviet tactical continuity to the Leningrad problem from the initial days of operations 
was General of the Army I. I. Fediuninsky. In November/December 1941, Fediuninsky was the 
commander of the Soviet 54th Army in the vicinity of the city of Volkhov, just to the east of 
Shlissel’burg [See Map 1]. Fediuninsky quickly recognized many tactical level issues and 
actively sought operational level methods of coping with the many dilemmas. General 
Fediuninsky would record his observation and reflect on the actions of late 1941 throughout 
1942 while the eyes of the world began to focus on a small city on the banks of the Volga River 
named Stalingrad.
257
 The Germans were fighting the series of Soviet “Verduns,” first in 
Stalingrad in 1942/43, then at Kursk in 1943, just as the Soviets wanted.    
 No where in the East was this war of attrition more obvious than the Leningrad Front. In 
P-035, The Retrograde Defensive of Army Group North During 1944, German Generalleutnant 
Oldwig von Natzner referred to these battles as, “the large-scale battles of attrition, fought on the 
pattern of the “Todesmuehle von Verdun” [Death mill of Verdun,] in World War I, came to an 
end only after the unusually high losses had made continuations of the battle impossible, even 
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according to Russian standards, or if the break-through had been successful.”258 In the war of 
numbers, which both side knew too well from their past experiences, the Germans couldn’t hope 
to trade soldiers with the Soviet Union. How did this tactical level reality play into the larger 
Soviet Strategy?  
 As most matters of Soviet strategy were decided by Stalin, it is necessary to examine 
what Stalin understood about Leningrad and how these thoughts helped form decisions toward a 
strategy to free the city and fulfill his desires for the post war period.  As a strategic leader, Stalin 
had a greater appreciation for the operating environment of Leningrad then most scholars give 
him credit for. Examining the fourth volume of Stalin’s Collected Works, Stalin explains the area 
of then Petrograd from his experiences during the Russian Civil War. In an interview with the 
Pravda News Paper printed July 8, 1919, Stalin concisely explains Petrograd, in terms of avenues 
of approach and how to capture the city. It matters little if Stalin arrived at these conclusions 
himself or a military professional assisted him to his understanding. Stalin had 22 year between 
1919 and 1941 to reflect on these military lessons, while he continued to learn the broader pieces 
of economic and diplomatic principle comprising strategic thought. The following depiction 
provided to a writer from the Pravda, while a tactical look at the terrain surrounding Petrograd, 
certainly provided significant background to Stalin’s understanding of the military problems he 
faced again in Leningrad, 1941. Stalin stated: 
 The approaches to Petrograd are those points, proceeding from which the enemy, if he is 
 successful, may surround Petrograd, cut it off from Russia and finally take it. These 
 points are: a) the Petrozavodsk sector, with Zvanka as the line of advance; objective- to 
 envelop Petrograd from the East; b) the olonets sector, with Lodeinove Polve as the line 
 of advance; objective- to turn the flank of our Petrozavodsk forces; c) the Karelian sector, 
 with Petrograd as the direct line of advance from the North; d) the Narva sector, with 
 Gatchina and Krasnoye Selo as the line of advance; objective to capture Petrograd from 
 the Southwest, or, at least, to capture Gatchina-Tosno line and envelop Petrograd from 
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 the South; e) the Pskov sector, with Dno-Bologove as the line of advance; objective- to 
 cut off Petrograd off from Moscow; and lastly, f) the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, 
 which offer the enemy the possibility of landing forces west and east of Petrograd.
259
  
 
Understanding lines of operation run both ways, meaning towards friendly lines and the enemy, 
the Soviets planned the attack to liberate the City of Lenin. The next chapter examines the 
German campaign plan (Operation BLAU) that was developed to stop the Soviets attacking 
down the access labeled “d)” or the “Narva sector” by Stalin.260 
2.14 CONCLUSION:  
Joining ends to the means to find the ways is the operational art, but finding the ends first 
and determining if they are a fitting reason for war in the first place is of the utmost importance. 
War and planning for war are art and science, as both directly relate to obtaining objectives held 
by the enemy in time and space. The ultimate questions all planners ask those who make 
decisions are first, what is important to you and why, followed by the second question, what 
effort and resources are you willing to lose to accomplish the end state. Hitler’s planners did this. 
Strategically, the answer was England at the expense of the Soviet Union, along with anything 
and everything being expended to achieve victory. Using the indirect approach of attacking the 
Soviet Union to defeat Great Britain sounded excellent in theory, but in practice, more 
unavailable assets and manpower were expended which, when lost over time could not be 
replaced. Germany simply could not afford a two front war. When a supporting effort costs more 
in term of resources and manpower than the main effort, as was the case with the Soviet Union, 
England is no longer the main effort. Bringing plans from the conception phase of planning to 
the functional phase and having the situational awareness of problems with a plan are not 
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enough. Solutions must be sought and found in order to continue planning efforts into detailed 
planning. Planning does not take place in a vacuum; there must be unity of efforts between those 
who support and those who are supported. The planner is not the commander; he can only help 
the commander to a better informed decision. Without proper staff work the possibility of a 
commander making an informed decision are greatly reduced. The character of the planner must 
be strong to voice an opinion of reason or truth when the commander is not seeing the problem 
holistically, but rather emotionally as was the case with Hitler. In the case of the invasion of the 
Soviet Union it was not a flawed plan, poor tactical leadership or any other factor which doomed 
a generation in the Soviet Union; it was the officer’s responsible for planning and executing that 
lacked the character to stand up and speak their minds,  as German general staff officers were 
trained to do.
261
 While the problem of character is largely an intangible quality resident in the art 
of war, the tangible aspects of terrain and weather dominate the science of war.  
 The following understatement comes from Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia: 
“That victory remained beyond reach was not due to climate alone, but in great measure to the 
fact that the German war potential was not equal to supporting a global war. The Wehrmacht was 
weakened by climatic conditions, and destroyed by the overpowering might of enemy armies.”262 
While this statement captures a valid conclusion for the purpose for which it was written, it fails 
to consider the totality and gravity of the situation from the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels in time and space. Weather alone will only demoralize an army, making the conduct of 
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operations difficult due to a lack of light or precipitation. Adverse weather in conjunction with 
poor terrain creates a series of different issues for planners whether conducting offensive or 
defensive operations.  
 It is clear war relies on art and science equally. While the employment of troops in battle is an 
art, it is the sciences of the weather and the terrain which have the greatest influence on 
operations. Operational level planners must consider the terrain and the weather in terms of 
climatic conditions along with avenues of approach to determine throughput capacity. Their plans 
must take into consideration not only the time and space they are currently occupying, but also 
that same time and space should they be forced to remain there longer then desired. The Narva 
Isthmus along with the areas of Russia which include the Luga, Plussa and Narva Rivers are some 
of the most difficult pieces of terrain in the world for a well trained army to negotiate. Planners 
conducting offensive or defensive operations must take into consideration not only the conditions 
while they are planning, but also the conditions during execution and consolidation on the 
objective in the future. Operational planners must thoroughly understand the nodes and modes of 
communication available to them to conduct and sustain operations. Through the use of a physical 
network analysis, planners are better able to examine the nodes and modes of communication 
against the weather of the operating environment in regards to the time and space available for 
operations.   
 Time and space are the chief concerns of force employment from the strategic to the tactical 
level of war. Having a doctrine for the conduct of war based on theory helps to organize the force 
in time and space.  Forces must not only use a pre-existing doctrine when the situation calls for it, 
but they must recognize emergence and communicate necessary changes laterally across the 
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force. Combatants  must also communicate these changes to higher for the force to learn and 
adapt to the enemy. Only a force that is open minded and willing to observe and communicate 
need changes can be qualified as a learning organization and stand a chance of winning at every 
level of way. Doctrine is not dogma, but it guides the means to the ends through the operational 
ways.        
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Initial Victories Followed by Indecision and Loss: The German 
Operational Plan for Withdrawal in the North 1943/44 (Operation 
BLAU). 
 
 The connection of a nation’s strategy to the resources it places in the field to accomplish 
national goals are the domain of operational art. Understanding a nation’s desired end state for 
war, along with a commensurate understanding of the means available to accomplish the desired 
ends facilitates an examination of the ways available to accomplish the ends through a nation’s 
campaign plan. As war is a dynamic and fluid social phenomenon, rarely do nations begin and 
end a war with the same desired end state. While there is little doubt a nation waging war desires 
to win, the manner in which they pursue the end of final victory leading to the restoration of 
peace may evolve based on the opponent being fought. The articulation of end states and changes 
are found in the operational campaign plans armed forces write to link their tactical means to the 
desired strategic ends.  
As explained by MCDP-5, Planning, conceptual planning is the repository of national 
strategy, while functional planning informs the operational level of war.
263
  The campaign plan is 
thus the functional plan and the medium of communication which links the desired strategic end 
state found in the conceptual plan to the means available described in the detailed tactical plan. 
In essence, the campaign plan, as a functional plan, is the conduit and means of communication 
of a nation’s vision for the art and science of war.  
 After the German summer offensive of 1943 had been stopped at Kursk, the Soviets took 
note of the fact that German Army Group South was on the verge of collapse. While the Western 
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Allies were fighting a determined German defender in Sicily and examining ways to gain access 
to the Italian mainland, the Soviet Union had destroyed massive amounts of German war 
material and manpower which had become nearly impossible for Germany to replace.
264
 While 
Stalingrad was devastating to the German war effort in the east, it was the loss at Kursk which 
truly signaled Germany’s end. While the losses directly affected Army Group South in terms of 
manpower and material, it was the other Army Groups, in particular Army Group North, who 
were also placed in a precarious position. As Germany was engaged in a war on two fronts, 
manpower and material could not be readily withdrawn from one front and moved elsewhere 
quickly without Allied interference.
265
 The ability to break contact with the enemy at the tactical 
level and mobilizing the combat power for another front was difficult and could not happen 
quickly under favorable conditions. Taking raw manpower from Germany or the occupied 
territories was not an expedient measure either, as many men were not yet trained for front line 
service. This left only one viable option, if Germany needed manpower and material quickly 
which was already formed, train and equipped to accomplish a similar mission, the other Army 
Groups who were less decisively engaged needed to lose capacity to the Army Group who was 
the main effort.
266
 Such was the situation for Army Group North. Throughout the years of 1942 
and 1943, Army Group North continued to feed the demand signal of the other Army Groups. 
Generalleutnant Oldwig von Natzmer characterized the problem of losing Army Group North’s 
tested combat power as follows, “the loss of combat-experienced soldiers and the strong 
intermixture with foreign (Latvian, Estonian, Spanish, and so forth) troops and inexperienced 
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units represented a considerable reduction in fighting (combat) power.”267 Natzmer continued to 
demonstrate Army Group North routinely lost combat power without replacement when he 
expounds on a report made by the Army Group North Commander from November 16, 1943: 
 1. I report the following: 
 
 a. Eighteenth Army has made available seven divisions, two battalions, artillery, Tiger 
tanks, mortars and assault guns since its victorious third defensive battle south of Lake Lodoga. 
  
b. In accordance with the order dated November 13, 1943, the 5th Mountain Division will 
also be transferred without replacement. 
 
c. By order of the Führer the army is to hold its present line. However, the army is no 
longer in a position to cope with the situation in case of strong enemy attacks. 
 
 2. Request permission for a personal report to the Führer to acquaint him with the 
situation of the army and consequences which the transfer of the 5th Mountain Division will 
have.
268
  
 
 On the surface, the statement of November 16, 1943 by the Army Group North 
commander demonstrates little more than a subordinate commander highlighting to higher 
headquarters the dangers of stripping more combat power away from his command. This was 
also a clearly a request for a commander-to-commander conference to change Hitler’s mind. In 
essence, this statement is the army group commander’s argument to gain reinforcements in order 
to fulfill the requirement levied by Hitler to hold the current position as ordered without saying 
the situation was lost. There is however more to this statement. As the documents contained in 
the holding of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland demonstrate, efforts for planning 
a time phased Army Group withdrawal had been underway since August of 1943. These 
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planning efforts were initially referred to as a “study,” to hide there true purpose from Hitler, 
later be known as “Fall BLAU” or Operation BLUE.269  
 When the planning effort of Army Group North in “Fall BLAU” is compared against the 
problem of Soviet combat power opposite it, the commander’s argument and need for urgency in 
a decision are made clearer.
270
 Losing combat power without replacement is a serious dilemma 
for a commander who had already written a “study,” read plan, to accomplish the most difficult 
of military missions, an orderly withdrawal under intense enemy pressure. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the operational environment through late 1943 
on the Eastern Front and the impact felt on the Leningrad Front. Most importantly, this chapter 
will eliminate several long standing questions by introducing detailed understanding of what 
information comprised a German campaign plan, along with how it was written. How did events 
of the first two years on the Leningrad Front and the environment of the post Kursk offensive 
period contribute to Army Group North’s need to create study “Fall BLAU?” Was “Fall BLAU” 
originally called a “study” to disguise the appearance of a planning effort to withdraw forces 
against Hitler’s will or was it a hybrid plan/justification for the argument to conduct such a 
withdrawal? In light of the circumstances being presented to Army Group North, how did the 
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plan translate the tactical reality of being severely outnumbered into an operational plan which 
allowed for a near seamless trading of space for time in harsh terrain and under extreme 
difficulty? Did this withdrawal suit the manner in which German officers were educated and 
trained? Did the younger generation of officers have an education that complimented or violated 
the experiences they gained during the war? Was there a gap between senior officer 
understanding their visualizations of the battlespace based on their education, and did this gap 
make them unable to communicate to a younger generation of officers with a different 
experience of war along with a different style of education? Finally, in the examination of “Fall 
BLAU,” an effort will be made to understand how German staff work at the various levels of 
command functioned in light of a despondent strategy. How did organizations provide mission 
sets, guidance and intent to subordinate level commanders? Effort will be expended to show how 
“Fall BLAU” when looked at by the various levels of subordinate command, “nests” elements of 
guidance and intent into a cogent plan to be executed in the time and space of the Leningrad 
Front.   
3.1 THE YEARS OF INVESTMENT ON THE LENINGRAD FRONT THROUGH LATE 
DECEMBER 1943: 
 Based on initial planning for initiation of hostilities against the Soviet Union in June 
1941, Army Group North was to act essentially as “supporting effort 1” to enable the “main 
effort” in Army Group Center to envelop and secure Moscow.271 Due to astonishing early 
German tactical level successes, Hitler continued to issue guidance through strategic directives to 
shift the main effort to Army Group North to take Leningrad, while continuing to close the 
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distance to encircle Moscow.
272
 Forces were then reallocated from Army Group Center to 
facilitate the success of Army Group North. While Germany had not suffered a serious setback to 
date, the Russian winter was about to set in, and Germany’s luck was about to run out. On 
November 29, 1941, Hitler returned to his Headquarters in East Prussia, the Wolfsschanze, to 
find, in the words of Earl F. Ziemke, “the rarest kind of news thus far in the war: German troops 
were retreating.”273 The first strategic setback for the German plan to invade the Soviet Union 
occurred at Rostov, in Army Group South’s zone of attack.274 By November 28, 1941, the Soviet 
South Front under the command of General Cherevichenko reported twenty-one Soviet divisions 
against III Panzer Corps at Rostov.
275
 On the other hand, the German corps commander, General 
der Kavallerie Eberhard von Mackensen, had reported several weeks earlier, before the last 
advance began, that his two divisions, the “Leibstandarte” (1st SS Panzer Division) and the 13th 
Panzer, were short on everything and down to a half to two-thirds their normal strengths.
276
 
The question that needs to be answered is why were the reports of General Mackensen 
disregarded and how did this foreshadow things to come in the future? It is not possible that the 
reports or the situation of a Corps Commander would go unread or unknown by his immediate 
higher headquarters for three weeks. Once the reports were read by a higher headquarters, the 
salient points relating to a significant degradation, or loss of combat power would have had to 
been communicated to the strategic level from the operational level for a senior decision maker’s 
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understanding and subsequent action.
277
 Meanwhile, General Mackensen at the corps level and 
his commander at the army level, General Bernard Kleist, were the men with the most immediate 
need for a decision. In the absence of orders, they acted in the finest tradition of the German 
Army and without approval of orders, ordered a retreat. Kleist made a tactically sound decision 
and frankly, given the situation in front of him, the only one that made sense. Kleist was acting 
to save his men in the field by finding defensible terrain around the Mius River, 45 miles west of 
Rostov.
 278
 Kleist was trading space for the time he needed to get his units logistically ready for 
action again. In light of superior Soviet combat power, it was in Kleist’s best interests to find 
terrain where his units could defend from with less combat power, while the necessary repairs to 
equipment were made. Sound operational decision making informed by tactical circumstances 
allowed Kleist to make the decision he did. Hitler however did not appreciate the logic of this 
retreat from the strategic perspective. In Hitler’s mind, the retreat from such a strategically 
important area such as Rostov was bound to be a moral victory for the Soviet Union, and thus 
something Hitler could not afford.
279
  
When Rostov is viewed from Hitler’s perspective, the gravity of the situation becomes 
clear quickly. What other situations on the Eastern Front or the Western Front helped form 
Hitler’s thoughts on Rostov and why did Hitler assign such strategic emphasis to this location? 
More importantly, how would the events at Rostov become a sign of things to come when 
Germany would have to deal with like situations in the future? A partial answer to these 
questions can be found in Halder’s war diary. Not only does Halder’s war diary talk of the 
situations from other areas, it provides some idea of the atmosphere Hitler created by his 
                                                          
 
277
 Evidence these reports were read exists in the form of actions taken by German Headquarters and 
battlefield front visits to assess the situation for themselves. 
278
 Ibid. More information regarding the order to retreat from Rostov can be found in Pz. AOK 1 Pz. 
Armeebefehl Nr. 40, 30.11.41, Pz. AOK 1 19194/5 file of the NARA holdings.  
111 
 
presence and interactions with subordinate staff and commanders. The period of the November 
29-30, 1941 is a very telling point of departure  examining the strategic significance of Rostov.   
On November 29, 1941, based on previous reporting from Rostov, Halder stated the 
following, “the numerically weak forces of First Panzer Army had to give way before the 
concentric attack launched in very great strength from south (here apparently a main effort), west 
and north. On the morning of 29 November, SS “Adolf Hitler” (1st SS Panzer Division) was 
taken back into the new defensive position west of Rostov; the withdrawal of 16th Motorized 
Division was still in progress.”280 Halder continues with a comparison to the other armies in 
Army Groups South, Center and the 16th Army from Army Group North. Halder makes mention 
of the “rapidly changing picture” in Africa and posits no prediction for the outcome. Following 
his description of the situation in Africa, Halder records his thoughts of a phone conversation 
with Field Marshal Fedor von Bock of Army Group Center. Halder writes; “Phone conversation 
with von Bock concerning the allegation that army group lacks definite objectives (Goering’s 
unconsidered opinion). Army group knows exactly what it is after. However, if the current attack 
on Moscow from the north is unsuccessful, he fears the operation will become another Verdun, 
i.e., a brutish, chest to chest struggle of attrition.”281 What Halder recorded was the field 
commander, in this case Bock, knew what should be done based on the situation he had in front 
of him, while Berlin was no longer clear because of competing requirements from other areas. 
This brief snapshot demonstrates the German strategic leadership was disjointed 
regarding the mission and objectives of Army Group Center, while Bock understood clearly. 
Even while Bock’s Army Group Center continued toward its object, making progress toward 
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Moscow through attacks against the northern portion of the Moscow line; the following day, 
November 30, 1941, Army Group South was again in Hitler’s sights.282 Halder begins his entries 
of November 30, 1941 with brief explanations of the situations in Army Groups North and 
Center. As Halder stated,  
 Today’s great worry is in Army Group South. This does not apply to Sixth and 
 Seventeenth armies, which repelled the usual attacks. It refers to First Panzer Army, 
 against which the enemy has launched an enveloping attack in such overwhelming 
 strength that army reserve (14th Armored Division) had to be committed on the very day 
 it reached its new position in the withdrawal.
283
 
 
In the next paragraph of Halder’s diary insight is gained into how Hitler’s “extreme agitation 
over the situation” forbid the withdrawal of First Panzer Army “to the Taganrog-Mius-mouth of 
the Bakhmut River, and demands that the retrograde move be halted.”284 Instead of the logical 
conversation regarding Army Group South’s problem between a senior and subordinate, Hitler 
“browbeat Brauchitsch into trying to get Rundstedt (Commander of Army Group South) to delay 
executing Kleist’s order.”285 Regarding the order, Halder states, “Field Marshal von Rundstedt’s 
reply was that he could not comply with the order and asked that either the order be changed or 
he is relieved of his post.”286 At 04.00 on December 1, 1941 Halder states, we receive three 
teletypes from the Führer: 
 1. Addressed to von Rundstedt: He is relieved of the command of army group.  
 2. Addressed to von Reichenau, transferring to him the command of Army Group South 
 with the mission to halt the retreat of First Panzer Army, take all necessary measures to 
 bolster up the panzer army, and strike as soon as possible for Voroshilovgrad from the 
 sectors of 49th Mountain Corps and IV Corps. 
 3. Addressed BdE, directing him to move at once by rail and as far forward as possible, 
 up to forty PzKW IIIs and PzKW IV each, for 13th, 14th and 16th Armored divisions. 
287
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According to Ziemke, on December 2, 1941, “Hitler left East Prussia by air for Kleist’s 
headquarters in Mariupol on the Black Sea.”288 Hitler then stopped in Poltava where he picked 
up Reichenau. Together they continued to the front to “visit” Kleist along with the commander of 
the 1st SS Panzer Division Obergruppenführer Josef Dietrich.
289
 Dietrich was an “old fighter,” 
meaning he was one of those who had been a body guard for Hitler in the early days of the party, 
also participating in the fighting of 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Thus, the opinion of Dietrich was 
important to Hitler, even though Dietrich was far from an experienced military professional and 
was generally considered a party lap dog by men of equal grade and position in the German 
Army.
290
 In the end Hitler’s “visit,” was nothing more than a fact finding tour and something 
which caused more problems at the front than it solved. All of the decisions were already made 
about the retreat of Army Group South, while the Soviets continued to prepare for the 
counterattack against Army Group Center at Moscow.  Ultimately, Hitler’s actions of fixation on 
Army Group South enabled the Soviets the ability to continue to planning and successfully 
counterattack Army Group Center on December 6, 1941.
291
 Tactical level interference by Hitler 
violated the German tactical doctrine for the employment of forces and forever marred attempts 
of professional soldiers to fight formations as they were educated and trained to do for the 
remainder of the war. Recognizing the German fear of another Verdun, the Soviets bought time 
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over the winter to reallocate forces from other theaters of operation to fight a prolonged war of 
attrition that matched the Soviet ideals found in Leninism.
292
 
While attacks were underway against Army Groups South and Center, the Soviets 
explored possibilities for attacking Army Group North. The Soviets always recognized the 
danger of the Germans making contact with Finnish forces and how this would spell disaster for 
Leningrad.
293
 The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb 
believed, “the Russians were beginning to see a chance to not only retake Tikhvin but to liberate 
Leningrad, which would constitute a substantial political and military success for them.”294  This 
attack could certainly only assist Soviet forces fighting at Moscow. As Glantz explains, the 
STAVKA had two purposes in conducting an attack against the area of Tikhvin. Those purposes 
were;  
 First and foremost, to save Leningrad by destroying the German forces at Tikhvin and 
Volkhov and restoring communications between Leningrad and Moscow via the Tikhvin-
Volkhov railroad.  
 Second, it tried to tie down as many German forces as possible along the northwestern 
axis in the interest of the Moscow defense.
295
 
 
Soviet analysis of the Leningrad situation, like most other problems, was reduced to a math 
problem. In late November 1941, the 54th, 4th and 52nd Soviet Armies consisted of “17 rifle and 
2 tank divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades and 2 tank brigades, and 3 tank and 2 ski 
battalions.” All together, this Soviet force was 192,950 strong. German forces operating in the 
area consisted of 10 infantry, 2 motorized, and 2 panzer divisions operating between Lakes 
Ladoga and Il’man. German forces were operating around 60% strength, numbering around 
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120,000 men with 100 tanks and assault guns supported by about 1,000 artillery pieces of 
various calibers.
296
 While the numbers indicate an advantage to Soviet forces, the tactical reality 
on the ground was far worse than anyone in Berlin was willing to admit. On December 5, 1941, 
“The temperature dropped sharply to -22 degrees F, and on the next day to -32 degrees F. The 
extremely cold weather had a crippling effect on the troops, especially since they had been 
poorly fed for weeks due to supply difficulties and because their clothing gave inadequate 
protection against the cold.”297 The weather conditions greatly informed how any operation was 
going to be conducted, along with the effect it would have on combat power.  
 Based on the disposition of available combat power, STAVKA ordered the 54th, 4th and 
52nd Armies to crush German forces operating in the Tikhvin salient, thus failing to accomplish 
the two stated goals for the campaign.
298
 The Soviet attack would fail to liberate Leningrad, but it 
did support Soviet forces in their bid to break the German hold on Moscow by capturing Tikhvin 
on December 10, 1941.
299
 The Germans would abandon Tikhvin during the evening of 7/8 
December. In the mind of Field Marshal Leeb, German units were grossly undermanned and 
underequipped for what was being asked of them, so these forces needed to be withdrawn or lost. 
Hitler did not want to accept the fact the Tikhvin operation had failed. While Hitler gave 
permission to withdraw from the city, the city was to remain in the range of field artillery until 
more forces could be found to continue the attack.
300
 While defending the Tikhvin salient was 
out of the question to Leeb, forces would be withdrawn in an orderly manner to prevent a route. 
This allowed German forces to trade space for time in the same way Leeb had written about in 
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his 1938 work, Die Abwehr or The Defense.
301
 According to P-114a, The Campaign Against the 
Soviet Union in the Northern Sector of the Eastern Front 1941-1945, Generalmajor Mueller 
Hillebrand, a staff officer in Leeb's Headquarters, explains that, “Field Marshal von Leeb saw no 
further possibility of exerting any effective influence on the Russians in the Tikhvin area in the 
foreseeable future. For this reason he desired to use the unavoidable withdrawal to the swamp 
line and, if necessary, to the Volkhov (River), in order to obtain forces for an attack designed to 
broaden out the corridor at Schluesselburg.”302 The withdrawal from Tikhvin is a prominent 
occasion to showcase Hitler’s desire to maintain total control of the situation, while reducing the 
operational and tactical level commander’s ability to decide to nothing. Leeb’s desire to 
withdraw to the so called “Swamp Line,” approximately 37 miles away to the southwest of 
Tikhvin, was in Hitler’s mind out of the question.303  Generalmajor Mueller Hillebrand explains 
how interference from the top levels of command crippled the efforts of subordinate 
commanders when he writes; 
 There was far too much interference in the top levels of command with Army Group 
 North. This finally went to the extreme of involving tactical details, such as a question of 
 the attack by the 291st Infantry Division after 3 December and in the decision of the 
 withdrawal from Tikhvin. These details were decided in the highest levels of command. 
 This meddling would inevitably result in an atmosphere of a lack of confidence, 
 although, in any event, there was no doubt about the accomplishments of commanders 
 and troops. The gulf between top levels of command and subordinate staffs was apparent 
 as is indicated by the frequent use of the following words in directives; “Der Führer had 
 directed that…,”  or similar words. This was designed to give the directive special 
 emphasis; however, it frequently betrayed the effort of the person giving the directive to 
 disassociate himself from its contents.
304
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The underlying theme of Hillerbrand’s statement is found in an order from Hitler dated 
December 16, 1941. In this order, Hitler finally approved the withdrawal from Tikhvin, but in a 
new language which did not coincide with the German practice of defensive doctrine in 
development since the end of the First World War; nor in a manner consistent with Leeb’s The 
Defense.
305
 The order read, “it will be the task of the army group to defend this (the new) front to 
the last man, not yielding another step, thus maintain the blockade of Leningrad.”306 A question 
that should interest scholars and professional soldiers is what was the logic of Hitler’s order? 
Hillerbrand answers the question with the following; 
 In the face of reversals at several points along the eastern front, Hitler believed that he 
 could force his armies to hold their positions at all cost through the issue of strict orders 
 to that effect. The order of December 16th was therefore followed by others with this 
 same line of thought. A “basic Hitler order” of December 30, 1941 demanded that every 
 foot of ground be defended to the last man, and he forbade the abandonment of even the 
 most makeshift position without fighting to retain it. On January 8, 1942 a further Hitler 
 order rejected “the false idea” that Russian aggressive strength could even for a short 
 time be impaired through a voluntary withdrawal, and he allowed the abandonment of a 
 position only when the defenders, through lack of ammunition or food, were no longer 
 able to stand and fight.
307
  
 
 Unlike other orders where the subordinate commander had the latitude to execute an 
order in away consistent with the situation, “Hitler insisted on the literal execution of these 
orders. The commander in chief of the Fourth Panzer Army was dishonorably discharged from 
the Army on January 8, 1942 because he ordered a local withdrawal involving some of his 
troops, without having received permission to do so. Army Group Headquarters and all 
subordinate commands were thus to a large extent deprived of freedom of action.”308 German 
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commanders would continue to struggle and lose against Hitler’s idea of defending to the last 
man throughout the war. In essence, the struggle between the German tactical and operational 
level commanders against their strategic leadership was a debate of how German forces were 
manned, trained, equipped and doctrinally employed against overwhelming odds.
309
  
Thoughts regarding defensive tactics of late 1943, early 1944 are contained in P-082, 
Study of Tactics Employed in the Russian Campaign. This report was submitted by the late 
Generaloberst Hube to Hitler in April 1944 and explained the differences between defensive and 
delaying tactics.
310
 At the heart of this debate is the German tactical through strategic disconnect 
existing since December-1941. By the later stages of the war, Generaloberst Hube had correctly 
deduced German forces at the tactical through the strategic level could not be in receipt of the 
same order, meaning to all be on the defense and hold to the last man.
311
 Hube was trying to 
convey his argument through military theory, but Hitler was a practical man who was not 
militarily educated enough to understand the logic of Hube’s argument. The connection between 
military theory and doctrine, along with the relationship to actions on the ground were connected 
in the following statement from Hube; 
 After we had lost the initiative in the East in 1943 in spite of launching one major 
 offensive and many counterattacks, we were compelled to change over to defensive 
 operations along the entire front. We took up defensive positions and tried to hold 
 whatever terrain was still in our hands. The preservation of our fighting strength was only 
 a secondary objective. Against the incessant Russian attacks along the entire front 
 throughout the year, the field forces almost invariably were given the same order: tactical 
 and strategic defensive, holding at any cost, without taking into consideration the 
 situation of the adjacent unit.
312
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Hube was linking his understanding of the tactical and strategic defensive back to the 
theoretical works of Goltz. Goltz is of course a direct link to the theories of Clausewitz and 
figured prominently in the education of several generations of German officers. In P-082, Study 
of Tactics Employed in the Russian Campaign, scholars and professional soldiers can easily see 
the connection of Hube’s argument to the works of theory of Goltz and Clausewitz. In Goltz’s 
Conduct of War, he asserts it is possible to be on the strategic and tactical offensive at the same 
time, because an army which is strategically advancing will have to bring the enemy to battle 
tactically at some point to win.
313
 Goltz continues by saying, “On the other hand, we might 
permit the strategic offensive to be followed by the tactical defensive, by allowing the enemy to 
become the aggressor on the battlefield after having advanced to meet him.”314 This statement by 
Goltz is a direct correlation to the “defense is the stronger form of war” from the work of 
Clausewitz.
315
 Many want to reduce these thoughts to a literal statement, because on face value, 
no army would ever advance into tactical level actions to assume a defensive posture. What 
would be lost from an immediate dismissal of this statement is the utility of reality which comes 
from the practice of combat. It is impossible for an army to remain in the strategic offensive 
indefinitely; the army will eventually reach a culminating point. As was correctly stated by 
Goltz, “it is impossible to calculate in advance where the culminating point of the offensive will 
lie.”316 Goltz defines the idea of the culminating point in terms of the enemy, not friendly combat 
power when he says, “the latter (combat power) depends upon the losses sustained by the 
opponent during the course of operations on account of battles, combats, marching, or want and 
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disease.”317  The idea of the “culminating point” is an important point of discussion, because it 
allows the defensive force the opportunity to counterattack when the enemy is at his weakest, or 
as Hube quotes from Clausewitz in his position paper to Hitler, it makes the enemy susceptible to 
“the shining sword of retaliation” in a counterattack.318 What is being recognized in a 
culminating point is the transition of combat power from the defense to the offense. Goltz looked 
specifically at the problem of transitioning combat power from the strategic defensive to the 
tactical offensive when he considered Willisen’s Theory of War.319  
The argument Hube was trying to convey to Hitler regarding how strategic and tactical 
orders could not be the same was better expressed by Goltz in Conduct of War when he said, 
“With a combination of strategic and tactical defensive we arrive at complete passivity, which 
not only awaits the movements of the enemy’s armies, but also the attack on the field of battle, 
and is satisfied with the repulse of the enemy.”320 Goltz derived this thought from the work of 
Willisen. As stated by Goltz, “Willisen, in his Theory of War, has arranged all the possible 
practical results in a scheme which shows what may be expected from the several combinations 
in case of victory or defeat.”321  These thoughts were arranged in the following chart,  
Vital forces: (a) Strategic defensive 
and tactical defensive. 
(b) Strategic defensive 
and tactical offensive. 
(c) Strategic offensive 
and tactical defensive. 
(d) Strategic offensive 
and tactical offensive. 
Results there from- Complete absence of 
a decision. 
Victory on the field 
of battle without 
general results for 
the campaign or war. 
General situation 
favorable for a 
victory, which, 
however, is without 
results because the 
fighting (combat) 
power of the enemy 
Destruction of the 
enemy, conquest of 
his territory. (a) In case of 
victory: 
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in not impaired. 
(b) In case of defeat: One’s own 
destruction and loss 
of the country. 
Retreat with 
intention of 
resuming the 
offensive. 
Avoidance of the 
consequences 
through favorable 
strategic position.  
Temporary 
abandonment of 
enterprises 
undertaken.  
            
322
 
The highlighted portion coinciding with (b) explains the strength of the strategic defensive and 
the tactical offensive as discussed by Hube and is the heart of his argument to Hitler through the 
value of the counter attack. In Hube’s mind, recognition of the Soviet culminating point and a 
German counter attack could not be accomplished through a ridged defense as Hitler insisted, but 
by adherence to the German tactical doctrine of the “elastic defense” dating to the experiences of 
the First World War.
323
 What Hube describes in P-082 is the essence and intellectual framework 
for the German campaign plan written to stop or slow the Soviet breakout from Leningrad.  
3.2 THE GERMAN PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE LENINGRAD AREA AND 
THE WITHDRAWAL TO THE BALTIC STATES:   
 After the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, the German tactical units on the Eastern Front no 
longer had any delusion of far reaching offensive operations as during the opening days of the 
war. With clear understanding of Hitler’s intentions to defend to the last man and faced with the 
reality of an impending Soviet attack in force on all fronts; German commanders in Army Group 
North examined possibilities for how they would defend against what they knew was going to be 
coming soon. Throughout the remainder of the late summer and into the early fall of 1943, Army 
                                                          
322
 Ibid. In a desire to ensure students of the art and science of war did not look at this chart as an expedient 
or a coefficient without real planning, Goltz included the following warning in conjunction with the chart, “In the 
domain of the art of war such mathematical calculations are somewhat dangerous; they might be the cause of false 
expectations and of treacherous confidence.” 
323
 Department of the Army, MS# P-082 Study of Tactics Employed in the Russian Campaign. (Carlisle, 
Army War College: Foreign Military Studies Department 1950), 9. or see: Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of 
Doctrine. The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War (Leavenworth, KS: Command 
and General Staff School, July, 1981). 
122 
 
Group North issued a “Study” name Operation BLAU on September 2, 1943.324 This “study” 
examined the problem of retrograding forces in heavy contact in the time and space of the 
Leningrad Front. This unprecedented examination of a German campaign plan as a (way) 
demonstrates not only the art of connecting the strategic German (ends) to their tactical 
(means), but it also allows scholars and professional soldiers to examine the science of planning 
multiple movements of several significant forces in contact through time and space.  
3.3 THE FORMAT AND STYLE OF "STUDY" OPERATION BLAU 
325
:  
The format of this order looks very much like what professional soldiers would expect to 
see today.
326
 In fact, in many ways this product is far superior in terms of capturing the problem 
simply for decision makers to understand, as well as tying an intellectual framework to a doctrine 
for the employment of forces. As this study was written in a field environment, the quality of the 
product as a document or the graphics were exceptionally neat and fit all of the stereotypes 
associated with the German general staff officers who produced it.   
The signed copy of the study consisted of an “executive summary,” a table of contents, 
the study itself, two appendices and three enclosures.
327
 Maps and overlays were included in the 
enclosures of the study for the purposes of orientation. In all, the “executive summary,” base 
study and attachments comprised 26 pages of text with several maps and overlays to illustrate the 
plan.
328
 The “executive summary” or plan’s introduction, was a two page explanation of the 
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study detailing the purpose and tasks to be accomplished by the subordinate units, followed by a 
distribution list of who was to receive the study.  The executive summary served the same 
purposes it does today; it allows senior officers who do not require detailed knowledge of the 
plan to have some general situational awareness of what the study entailed. The study was a top-
secret document. The first three pages of the study provide preliminary remarks and tasks to 
subordinate units, along with the general idea of how the withdrawal was to be conducted. The 
study was followed by an operations order which was more specific and should be considered 
the heart of the study. The first sentence of the operations order establishes the purpose for the 
operation, followed closely by the three phases of the operation and a detailed explanation of 
German movement in time and space. After several pages of detailed instructions, the annex for 
the clearance of battle space begins with the attached maps and overlays.  
3.4 THE CONTENT OF STUDY OPERATION BLAU: 
(A) ROLLBAHN-STELLUNG
LENINGRAD
(A-1)
(A-2)
(A-1)
(A-2)
(B)
(B)
(C)
(C)
(C)
(D)
NARVA
SITUATION FOR ARMY GROUP NORTH Ia FROM NOVEMBER 14, 1943
GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES FOR WITHDRAWAL MOVEMENT
(A)
See Graphic 1 (BOXED AREA) for Time/Space Considerations 
of German Plan Operation BLAU
 
Map 6 
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As is the case with all plans and orders, there must be a stated purpose for the proposed 
operation. The purpose of the study was found as a “bottom line up front” statement as the first 
sentence of the executive study. It reads, “In the following study and annexes are transmitted the 
plan of withdrawal of Army Group North to the “Panther Position.”329 The “Panther Position” 
was the Narva River from the Baltic Sea in the North through Lake Peipus in the south [See Map 
6].
330
 In essence, the Panther Position was the modern day border of Estonia. The study of 
Operation BLAU was so secret, commanders were instructed to “confront all rumors of the 
operation and crush them with the sharpest rejection.”331 A constant theme throughout the study 
is maintaining as much deception and secrecy as possible, to mask German intentions from the 
Soviets as well as from Berlin. A side effect of gaining secrecy was the need for additional time 
to plan laterally, thus restricting the efforts of planners to fewer members on planning teams. The 
executive summery continued by tasking the army and other subordinate headquarters to 
examine key tasks and respond to Army Group North’s Headquarters by September 15, 1943, so 
planning could be completed. For subordinate Armies, the following tasks were to be examined: 
  1.) Time/phase flow of the proposed withdrawal movement. (e.g., how would the 
 subordinate armies plan to withdraw their subordinate units across the time and space to 
 reach the Panther Position.) 
 2.) Use of any freed up combat power. (e.g., as a result of the proposed army withdrawal 
 plan, would any combat power be freed up for other taskings. While not stated, but in 
 essence, a reserve force for counter attack.) 
 3.) Positions and arrangement of forces in the Panther Position once reached. 
 4.) Positions along the rearward withdrawal route of the Armies in sector. 
 5.) Position of Army Headquarters (i.e. location of command and control to facilitate the 
 movement of the Army.). 
 6.) A survey and report of all explosives that would be needed to fulfill the priority of 
 destruction while conducting the withdrawal. How many mines would be required in the 
 defense?
332
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The Army Group Headquarters had four tasks, with two sub parts to examined by 
September 15, 1943. The tasks were as follows: 
1.) Order of services and time required to fulfill the following subtasks:  
 a) The evacuation of the population from the area to be used by the Army Group for the 
 withdrawal. 
 b) The production of a 25km destruction zone or “engagement area.” [See Figure 12]  
 
 2.) Position of the limit of rearward movement. 
 3.) Positions for the establishment of Headquarters (during the retrograde to facilitate 
 command and control). 
 4.) Quantity of explosives and mines needed by type for (demolitions and counter 
 mobility) work in old Russia.
333
 
 
Outpost SectorMain Battle SectorRear Area Sector
Soviet Recon Effort
Leningrad
Lake Peipus
Panther Position (Line)
Panther Position (Line)
Narva German Front Line
25 Km Destruction Zone
(Engagement Area)
40 Km Destruction Zone
For German Engineers
Urgent Measures Phase
(S-Day)
Clearance Phase
(R-Day)
Movement Phase
(B-Day)
75 Days Total
Figure 12: Depiction of Withdrawal  Plan Using the Study of Operation BLAU 
From Army Group North
German Planning Factors:
Urgent Measures Phase = S-Days
Clearance Phase = R-Days
Movement Phase = B-Days
Clearance and Movement Phase = 75  Calendar Days Total
Essence of  German Plan: 
Trade Space for Time
Panther Position (Line) 
coincides  with the 
Narva River and 
Lake Peipus
 
 
 Before continuing with the content of the Army Group study for Operation BLAU, it is 
necessary to conduct a limited task analysis of the executive summary. This executive summary 
was designed to focus the efforts of subordinate commands and the headquarters onto the 
problem of withdrawing the Army Group in the time and space determined by the enemy and the 
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terrain. What the commander of Army Group North was asking his subordinate elements to do 
was create an engagement area in “old Russia” to facilitate the tactical level destruction of Soviet 
forces. By gaining efficiencies in manpower through the use of terrain in coordinated defensive 
positions, the Germans could form a reserve for the purposes of counter attack. This was an 
option Army Groups on the Eastern Front had not had for some time.
334
 Summarily, the 
subsequent study for Operation BLAU should be looked at as a mechanism to bring Army Group 
North back into line with established doctrinal defensive techniques, those of elastic defense 
which was discussed earlier.
335
 While the German strategic leadership was contributing to the 
problems of the operational level commanders, the operational level could facilitate the success 
of the tactical level by creating engagement areas through choke points, thus allowing German 
forces local superiority of numbers with a counter attack force to deal with the coming massive 
Soviet attack out of Leningrad.  
The disposition of German combat power through the engagement area, along with the 
quantities of explosive and mines being asked for would shape the engagement area, allowing 
the commander the ability to decide where to employ the counter attack force to greatest effect. 
Through the use of the reconnaissance and engineering efforts, the Germans would seek to fix 
the Soviet advances tactically from the front in the engagement areas, while searching for a 
Soviet culmination point. It is perhaps better thought of as a series of German engagement areas, 
vice only one. Once the Soviets had demonstrated significant weakness, the Germans would 
launch a counter attack into the Soviet flank seeking to achieve decisive results [See Figure 13].  
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Figure 13: Example German Withdrawal
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To set the conditions for a series of tactical engagement areas required vision and 
understanding of the terrain to the minutest detail. This sort of understanding also required 
knowledge of the disposition of the civilian population. 
Of suspect interest is the German desire to evacuate non-combatants from what would 
become the German engagement area. While humanitarian thoughts played some role in why the 
Germans would not want non-combatants in the area, there were much better reasons. As the 
mission was going to be a retrograde under contact, the Germans predicted the already bad roads 
would be swamped with German mechanized and motorized units executing their scheme of 
maneuver.
336
 The Germans certainly did not want non-combatant traffic flooding the already 
stressed roads. Other interesting thoughts are contributed by MS# D-057, Relations between 
German Forces and the Local Population in the Zone of Operations on the Eastern Front.
337
 
When discussing the idea of civilian migration, the report explains Russian civilians could, 
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“cover hundreds of kilometers and place a heavy burden on the roads. It became necessary 
therefore to bring order to these movements.”338 As monitoring the lines of communication was 
difficult enough, the Germans knew partisan forces would be operating and hiding amongst the 
civilians as they transited battlespace. There is little doubt the commanders and staff of Army 
Group North were concerned with the partisan threat.
339
 Moving the population out of the 
proposed engagement area made defensive operations more manageable and enemy targets 
easier to identify.  
In the preliminary remarks of study, the time for carrying out the operation along with the 
reasons for these times are given. As stated by the study, “The experiences gained previously 
from Eastern Front operations had yielded strategic movements of the Army Group should be 
carried out with consideration to terrain and weather factors.”340 The times of year identified for 
the execution of the movement were the beginning of November until the end of February as one 
option, along with the beginning of June until the end of September as the other.
341
 The study 
explains in the second paragraph, “in the case of an Army Group withdrawal to the East Wall 
(Panther Position), the following areas are essential to be held, Latvia and part of Estonia.”342 
What is not explained well in words is which part of Estonia did the Germans envision holding? 
When the intent of the wording is compared to the overlays and maps, the picture becomes clear. 
The Germans were going to delay and defend to the Panther Position, then they would begin 
defending towards Latvia. This would make the best use of the natural obstacles defining the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
337
 Department of the Army, MS# D-057, Relations between German Forces and the Local Population in 
the Zone of Operations on the Eastern Front.(Carlisle, Army War College: Foreign Military Studies Department 
1947).This short report of nine pages was completed on May 12, 1947. The author of the report is unknown. 
338
Ibid, 8-9. 
 
339
 As mentioned in the introduction of Plan BLAU, German staff officers were concerned with the 
contents of the plan falling into the hands of the partisans. See: NARA T-311, Roll 76, Frame number 7099661. 
340
 Ibid. 
341
 Ibid. 
342
 Ibid. 
129 
 
German withdrawal route. In terms of space, this turns everything before the Narva River in “old 
Russia” into an engagement area.  
The next thing which had to be decided on was how to clear the population from the area 
the Germans planned to use as the engagement area. This was essential to reduce the amount of 
civilian traffic that could interfere with the planned retrograde. Specifically, the study called for 
25 kilometers to cleared in front of East Wall, as a destruction zone or engagement area to fight 
the enemy.
343
 This concept fit well with the third major paragraph of the study which addressed 
the need to use combat power freed up as a reserve force to act as a counter attack force in the 25 
kilometer destruction zone.
344
 In the fourth paragraph, the study estimated 1.4 million people 
needed to be cleared, while only 600,000 of the 1.4 million needed to be evacuated.
345
  What the 
study does not state, is who the Germans desired to move out of the area, vice who was being 
evacuated. To find answers to these question required an examination of documents related to 
the relocation of ethnic Germans from the Baltic along with a group of Finns who lived on the 
East side of the Narva River in the 25 kilometer destruction zone. These Finns were known as 
the Ingerman and were generally located around the area of Gattsehina.
346
 Regarding the ethnic 
Germans, the Reich ordered all “Volksdeutche” or ethnic Germans, living in the area occupied 
by Army Group North to be resettled.
347
 Movement by train was authorized. [See Rail Diagram] 
The Ingerman living in the Gattsehina area were addressed in a correspondence named Az.222, 
dated August 31, 1943. This memo identified the need to relocate the Finns living in the area 
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while the German Finnish Relocation Commission was being established in close coordination 
with the German Foreign Office. Relocation of the Ingerman was to occur no later than October, 
1943.
348
 Based on these documents, it is clear the Germans wanted to clear the engagement area 
by the end of October in anticipation of attack. What did the cleared space for the engagement 
area look like and how were the Germans planning on controlling the retrograde to prevent it 
from becoming a route?  
The amount of time required for the retrograde to the Panther Position was set for 75 days 
from the beginning of the operation to the conclusion of actions in the positions along the 
Panther Position.
349
 The last sentence of the study described the quickest the operation could be 
conducted was 28 days [See Figure 12].
350
 Attached to the study was an Army Group operations 
order, which in the first page flushes out the specific timeline and names of the phases associated 
with the retrograde operation [See Map 6]. Generally speaking, the withdrawal was to occur in 
three phases. The three phases were the Urgent Measures Phase, Clearance Phase and the 
Movements Phase. Each of the three phases carried a generic timeline and was driven by enemy 
action. This made the timeline event driven and receptive to unanticipated enemy actions. The 
Urgent Measures Phase began almost immediately. From the German perspective, this would not 
have been the all out attack of January 14, 1944, but rather the Soviet reconnaissance units 
probing the German lines trying to determine German composition, disposition and strength. 
These probes would provide the Germans indications and warning necessary to begin, while the 
Germans would take prisoners from whom they could divine more accurately the Soviet 
intentions for attack. Solid reporting of Soviet indications and warnings would inform S-Day. 
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Once the commander chose to proceed to the Clearance Phase, the first day of clearance would 
begin as R-Day. Once R-Day had been assigned, the last S-Day would be assigned to allow for a 
smooth transition from S-Days to R-Days. The third and final phase was the Movement Phase. 
For this phase, the first B-Day was also assigned by the commander. [See Force Flow Diagram] 
The Clearance and Movement Phases were both programmed for 75 days in total.
351
  A detailed 
description is provided for the tasks associated with each phase. It is critical to point out that no 
major retrogrades of German combat power were to take place until the Movement Phase. The 
Urgent and Clearance Phases would today be considered “shaping operations” while the 
Movement Phase would be considered the “decisive phase.” This did not mean the enemy was 
not going to be engaged in the first two phases; rather he would be shaped through German 
reconnaissance and engineer efforts while maneuver forces were situated.  
Examining the tasks by themselves doesn’t tell the full story. Taken together with the 
Pioneer Annex, the picture of the tasks comes into focus. Annex 1 of the base plan was the 
Pioneer or Engineer Annex. Stated clearly, 16th Army would be responsible for Latvia and 18th 
Army would have Estonia.
352
In conjunction with the Urgent Measures Phase, there were 14 tasks 
commanders were expected perform, while taking a holistic look at the enemy situation and 
using the time available to develop engagement areas through the use of engineering efforts, 
such as the destruction of bridges and the development of obstacle plans.
353
 In difference to the 
base order, the pioneer annex states the “destruction zone” or engagement area was to be 40 
kilometers from the Panther Position [See Figure 12].
354
Priority of engineer destruction was 
categorized into two categories, actions to be carried out during R-days (or in conjunction with 
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actions in the Clearance Phase) and conclusive measures, meaning items needed up to the last 
minute which needed to be destroyed with the movement of the last German troops out of an 
area.
355
Annex 2 in the Pioneer Annex had six priorities for destruction in descending order, they 
were: 
1. Roads and canals (big and small). 
2. Roads in close proximity to swamps and dams through the use of time fuze 
(meaning while the Soviet we advancing into the area to cause causalities and 
confusion). 
3. Civilian infrastructure, such as electric plants, saw mills and dock yards. 
4. Water pump to make drinking water. 
5. Any living spaces. (Use of time fuze was authorized). 
6. Any water craft not being used for the evacuation of non combatant persons.356  
 
The Germans were so determined to maintain secrecy in their destruction of key items; 
instructions were given to initiate explosions only with artillery barrages to cover the noise of 
detonation. All engineer efforts were to be closely linked to reconnaissance efforts underway in 
sector.
357
 
By directing these actions through the Base Operations Order and the Pioneer Annex at 
the Army Group level, Army Group North along with 18th Army was operationally shaping the 
enemy into the numerous tactical engagement areas, thus taking away the Soviet advantage to 
mass. This also allowed the Germans better coordination of tactical-level direct and indirect fire 
weapons. This technique made the best use of limited German assets, while providing a scheme 
of maneuver that made the maximum use of formations to slow an enemy advance, while having 
some uncommitted combat power to counter-attack into the flanks of Soviet formations. In this 
manner, the Germans were economizing their efforts to best accommodate the conditions of the 
time and space of their operating environment, thus fitting the sciences to the art of tactics. In the 
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Clearance Phase, in addition to the removal of the non combatant population, commanders were 
to adhere to five separate annexes which would aid future shaping of the battlespace for the 
enemy’s arrival. These five annexes were: 
Annex 1: Clearance 
Annex 2 Pioneer (Engineer) Status 
Annex 3 Reporting of Significant Events  
Annex 4 Railroad Status 
Annex 5 Logistics
358
    
 
 Finally in the Movement Phase of the order, exact information was provided, which 
brought the plan from conceptual strategic planning to operational functional planning. The order 
instructed Army Group force flows to reach the Luga position (in essence 15-25 kilometers from 
the Panther position) by the 30th B-Day with a closure date on the 75th B-Day. [See Figure 12] 
Thus, 45 B-Days (Movement Phase days) were to be used to attrite Soviet forces in the 
Destruction zone (engagement area) 25 kilometers in front of the Panther Position as originally 
instructed.
359
 The order then shifts focus to the timeline for 16th and 18th Armies relative to 
positioning on the ground. For 16th Army the following key points were provided on page 8 of 
the operations order: 
 The movement of 16th Army was to begin on the 40th B-Day and was to be carried out in 
close coordination with elements of Army Group Center to the south. (This was done to 
prevent Soviet force from exploiting a seam between Army Groups.) The order to begin 
the movement was to commence only with an order from the Army Group North 
Commander.
360
  
 
Army Group North specified two locations in particular where 16th Army was defending in 
strength on the ground. They were: 
 In the C-Line [See Map 6]: 
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o Between the old line of resistance (HLK) and Dolovo Lake 
o At the route leading east on Dedovitschi and on both sides of the Petrovo (River) 
o At the route of Staraja Rusa, Ssolzy and the area around Vagljady 
o In Schimsk 
 In the C-1 Line [See Map 6]: 
o In Loknja 
o In the area of Dedovitsehi 
o At Dno361 
 
Instructions to 18th Army also began on page 8 of the order and carry on to the 9th page. In 
comparison to the orders issued to 16th Army, 18th Army’s instructions were much more 
controlled. They stated: 
 The start of the movement of the Army will begin on the 6th B-Day from the “A Line” 
(labeled as the Rollbahn) position [See Map 6]. The plan also explained the routes and 
the combat power associated with the movements to the various positions. Specified were 
three main routes for westward movement in the 18th Army Area of Responsibility 
(AOR); 
o The Ljuban-Luga Route 
o The Leningrad-Luga Route 
o The Leningrad-Narva Route362 
 
To facilitate the destruction of items in the 18th Army sector, the Pioneer Annex stated 35 
engineer units would be surged into the 18th Army’s sector beginning on September 20, 1943.363 
In the Narva area, the Germans envisioned 10-12 divisions of combat power for follow-on 
operations. In the final pages of the order, the actions expected of the German air force and the 
navy were given. Each service in the area was subordinate to the commander of the Army Group 
North for employment and unity of command purposes. Each service had four tasks. The air 
force tasks; 
1. Provide airborne reconnaissance to the Leningrad and Oranienbaum area to provide the 
ground commander indications and warnings of impending attack. Along with this task 
came the implied task of interdicting enemy actions were local air superiority allowed. 
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2. Provide flak units to key intersections and vital bridges. (While it is not said here, the 
reason was to provide an anti-air capability while also providing extra firepower for 
stopping Soviet armor). 
3. Provide Close Air Support (CAS) and interdiction capability in the Leningrad and Narva 
Bay areas. 
4. Assist rear guard elements in breaking contact from the enemy while conducting 
withdrawal operations.
364
 
 
To the navy the following tasks were assigned: 
1. Extra patrolling when the weather was poor. (To prevent surprise attacks.) 
2. Provide Naval units to rivers and lakes. 
3. Provide coastal artillery in Estonia to defend shipping. 
4. Provide clearance of the noncombatant population from Narva-Jõesuu to Reval (Tallinn). 
 
While the tasks provided in the Army Group North order were sufficient for the land force, 
the tasks did not allow the air force or the navy the flexibility to do the other implied tasks 
common to their special functionalities. Simply stated, as a result of doing the specified tasks per 
the Army Group North order, they had little to no combat power left for other taskings.
365
 While 
the services had ideas of how their war time employment substantiated their employment 
paradigms, there was no time or command relationships to allow for experimentation. As the 
other services were in a command relationship of direct support to the Germany Army, the army 
employed them in support of their scheme of maneuver. The Germans would never find the time 
or resources to change their service paradigms before the war ended, but certainly the United 
States and others observed in the German’s mistakes. 
3.5 COORDINATING THE ENDS AND MEANS WITH THE WAYS:  
Understanding Army Group North’s plan through the study Operation BLAU allows scholars 
and military professionals to understand the scientific aspects of the German art of withdrawing 
combat power while trading of space for time in accordance with established prewar doctrine. 
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While the Germans had grown far beyond prewar doctrine, the principles of how a defense in 
depth was conducted were rooted in pre-war doctrine; firstly in the education of those who 
executed the plan, but also in the manner in which the defense in depth was executed. These 
factors form the basis of 18th Army’s plan based on Army Group North’s Operation BLAU 
study.
366
 Before examining the plan, it is prudent to examine the composition of 18th Army as 
they were planning this operation. The diagram below shows the combat power of 18th Army at 
the time the plan was written.  
51 Copies                           Troop Arrangement 18th Army Date 9.9.43
Copy    Ia Nr 3738/43 g.Kdos
Corps Under the
control of the 
Army
Divisions
18
303 2 2
9.
Lf W
Korps
III. 
10.
58
L
126 170 250 
sp
11 24 24
Pol
LIV.
225 215 61 21 290 254 69 5
GJ
212
XXVI. XXVIII. I.
121 1
12.
81 132 96 227
13.
500 g F.R.520
18th Army was comprised of 6 Corps: 
3rd LW FK: 2 Divisions
L A.K.: 4 Divisions
LIV A.K.: 4 Divisions
XXVI A.K.: 9 Divisions
XXVIII: 6 Divisions
I A.K.: 2 Divisions
27 Infantry Divisions in Total
• These division were never at strength
•Unit were always being moved around 
The units you plan with may not be the
ones you are going to be fighting with. 
How does the plan adjust? 
367
 
The plan in support of Operation BLAU for 18th Army itself is 14 pages and captures the 
projected movement of 18th Army in retrograde by unit (down to the division level) and B-Day. 
The 18th Army plan was a base order with 14 annexes of maps and overlays. This document was 
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signed on September 9, 1943.
368
 According to this document and in accordance with the order 
from Army Group North, the 6th B-Day consisted of, “the execution of the third phase,” or the 
Movement Phase and was to act as the beginning of the retrograde operation to the Panther 
position.
369
 It is important to note, units were moving prior to the 6th B-Day. This would have 
been allowable by Army Group North, as the commander would understand the subordinate units 
commander’s need to move units within his own battle space to facilitate the timeline of the 
Army Group plan. In order for units to be arranged in depth in sector, there had to be movement 
to build proper engagement areas. To use classical military thought of the period, as German 
officers would have been trained to think of the problem, shows a strategic concentration in 
reverse. An army and certainly an army group requires many trains to move the quantity of gear 
they have no ability at this stage of the war to replace. The fact is, the science of withdrawal is a 
logistical problem as much as an operational problem. [See Rail Diagram] To move this gear 
quickly required the use of trains to arrange the gear in time and space as the plan required. As 
the roads were not dependable, the education of Moltke the Elder on the strategic use of trains 
paid the German general staff officer dividends. Below is a German train map of the region 
demonstrating the throughput capacity for the reconstitution of German equipment on the rail 
lines of communication. These thoughts were figured into the overall plan to reset German 
forces. 
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Mga
Gattschina
Volossovo
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Djvenskaja
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(Gridorova) 
Legend:
= Railway
= Railway Linkage
= Army Linkage
Gdov
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Dno
Frame 099550
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Semrino
 
                                          Rail Diagram                      
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According to 18th Army’s plan, the 1st- 5th B-Days would have the “254th, 290th, 227th, 
61st and 215th Infantry Divisions holding the main line of resistance (HLK),” then beginning to 
move to the 1st retrograde position as needed.
371
 Subsequently the second position was defined 
from: 
Northern edge of Ssigalovo - eastern edge of Kissino - eastern edge of Ivanvo – 
Northern edge of Ivanvo - on both sides of Baahn Lesje (River), to Netschepertj – 
Northern edge of Wojtolovo – to the north edge Sachoshje -  to the Northern edge 
Woskressenskoje.
372
 
 
The Mga position was to be manned on the right by the German 5th Mountain Division, in the 
center by the 61st Infantry Division and on the left by the 215th Infantry Division.
373
 Units were 
responsible for connection to the units on their flanks to ensure there were no seams. On the 3rd 
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B-Day at 12.00, the Mga position was to be collapsed fully with the withdrawal first of the right 
corps wing with the 121st and 212th Infantry Divisions (Both with XXVIII. A.K.), then the left 
flank in the Kelkolovo heights beginning on the 4th B-Day. The 4th through the 6th B-Days saw 
the withdrawal from the Mga position to the Rollbahn or highway position occurring in three 
phases. On the 4th B-Day after movement, the right was to be occupied by the 254th Infantry 
Division, the center the 290th and the left by the 227th Infantry Division. Contact on the right 
flank would be made with 1st Infantry Division (XXVIII A.K.) and on the left flank with the 
24th Infantry Division (LIV A.K.).
374
 On the 5th B-Day began the 2nd phase out of the Mga 
position with the 5th Mountain Division, 61st, 215 and 225th Infantry Divisions moving to their 
secondary positions.
375
 On the 6th B-Day began the 3rd and final phase out of the Mga position. 
German planners at 18th Army envisioned by 12.00 on the 6th B-Day the 254th Infantry 
Division would complete its march to A-1 by the 7th B-Day on the right flank, the 290th Infantry 
Division would be established in the center and the 227th infantry Division would be established 
in the Nikolaus position on the left flank. The SS Police Division was to act as a Corps reserve 
behind the Rupprecht position in the vicinity of Szablino.
376
 At the end of the 6th B-Day, XXVI 
A.K. was to have full command over the LIV A.K. sector and the withdrawal would continue.
377
 
In essence, units were being tasked to defend in the vicinity of the “Rollbahn position” position 
from the 6th- 11th B-Days while other units formed in positions along the A-1 position. 
378
 On 
the 12th B-Day units would begin the withdrawal from the Rollbahn position in the following 
sequence: 
1st Phase; 12 B-Day: Road intersection secured through Tossno by 290th Infantry Division. 
                                                          
374
 NARA T-312, Roll 919, First Frame 9103374. 
375
 Ibid. 
376
 NARA T-312, Roll 919, First Frame 9103375. 
377
 Ibid. 
140 
 
2nd Phase; 254th Infantry Division moves to and occupies the third line of resistance. Strong rear 
guards from the 290th, 227th, 24th, and the 11th Infantry Divisions remain under the leadership 
of the 227th Infantry Division.
379
 Routes of march over designated lines of communication are 
also given. This is done as a control feature, not only to identify what friendly units that have 
retrograded, but to also determine the rate of enemy advance. Items which needed to be 
completed before an area could be cleared were movement lanes needed to be closed in obstacle 
belts before the Soviets learned were the lanes were, rails, bridges and other things needed to be 
destroyed in accordance with the priority of destruction assigned in the pioneer annex. Here 
again, a detail which normally goes unnoticed by a casual reader of history. Having centralized 
command and control with decentralized execution is what allows this plan to function; this is 
the true essence of Auftragstaktik.  
 Through the 13th and 14th B-Days, units continued to fight down to the A-1 defensive 
position. The 14th through the 17th B-Days saw units of 18th Army defending the A-1 position 
with advanced elements beginning their movements to A-2.
380
  From the 20th through the 25th 
B-Days, units assumed the defense of the A-2 positions.
381
 Movement from the A-2 position was 
scheduled to begin on the 26th B-Day.
382
  
 In Frame 9103381, some general considerations were made about the time requirements 
for the withdrawal operation. “The most favorable time of year for the withdrawal was the winter 
months because movement of the heaviest vehicles, even in the snow was possible. In the muddy 
season, the air threat is sever as roads tended to become swamped with heavy volumes of 
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traffic.”383 Special “Bottlenecks” were identified “between the H.K.L. or Main Line of 
Resistance and the Rollbahn, In Ssologubovka, Mga, Nurma and Tossno in the XXVI A.K. 
Sector, and in Nikolskoje and Szablino in the LIV A.K. Sector.
384
 Further detail was provided for 
choke points between positions. As follows: 
2) Between the Rollbahn and A-1 [See Map 6] 
in Tossno, Lissino, Pegi, Mereedesstern and in Annolovo, 
3) Between A-1 and A-2 
in Mina and Pishma, 
4) Between A-2 and B 
in Kurowizy - Siwerskaja, Roshdestweno, Jaschtschera, Mschinskaja and Luga.
385
 
 
On Frame 9103384, 18th Army listed the planned headquarters positions during the 
withdrawal in the following manner [See Map 6]; 
1.) H.L.K. and Mga position: 
Until 4. B. – Tag  Netschepertj, Lager Marienburg, 
2.) A- Position (Highway Position): 
 from  5. -11. B – Tag   Lissino-Korpus, 
3.) A 1 – Position:  
 from 12.- 16. B- Tag   Siwerskaja,  
4.) A 2 - Position: 
 from 17.  -25. B – Tag  Mschinskaja,  
5.) Luga – Position: 
 from 26. B - Tag   Ropti, south Luga, 
6.) C 1 – Position: 
 from  30. B- Tag  Bolschoje, 
7.) Area of Pleskau   Lipno
386
 
 
In essence, units that defended in the Rollbahn position would move directly to the A-2 
position under the cover of units in A-1 positions. When the Soviets would give chase thinking 
units were routed, they would come across a German obstacle belt and find themselves fighting 
in another engagement area against heavy direct and indirect fires. This maneuver is difficult and 
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requires units to pass through an active defense with a Soviet force closing on them quickly. 
Seeing this scheme of maneuver graphically depicted as in Graphic 2, helps explain why the 
order seems so scripted, instead of the Auftragstaktik or mission type orders military 
professionals have come to expect from German folklore. This scientific scripting allowed the 
Germans to tactically, in a local sense, achieve effects on the Soviet flanks. Judged by the level 
of difficulty of the operation and the fact that many junior men without experience would be 
executing the order for the first time, it made good sense for the operations order to be heavily 
scripted to facilitate more coordinated tactical actions. What is evident is the tactical level 
education of the planners who wrote both plans, both of which are tactically focused on stopping 
a Soviet advance not on logistical movement. Both the Army Group North and 18th Army plans 
acknowledge without words the universal truth; the art of strategy and tactics is useless without 
the science of communicated operations. Plans at every level must compensate for the human 
elements, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The fact of the matter is in an 
uncertain environment, combatants try to limit the amount of things which can be left to 
interpretation. Ultimately, the best laid plans chance of success rests on the backs of 18 and 19 
year soldiers; no matter how skilled or experienced, they are human and prone to error. They 
fatigue, tire and make mistakes. One side had measures in place to prevent major incidents based 
on human error; while the other could do nothing more than drive the attack.  
The best graphic depiction of the German withdrawal plan was found in frame 
9103401.
387
 This document was dated September 29, 1943. On the top of the page, is the German 
18th Army Corps in sector, underneath the corps is the subordinate divisions. On the left side of 
the page are the B-Days and on the right side of the page are the phased positions of the ground. 
In the center, the chart shows the status of each unit during the withdrawal and if the units was 
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static or moving. This document captures the essence of the German science of operational art in 
a manner which is still instructive to planners today.
388
 [See Force Flow Chart below]   
Anlage 11 zu XXVI. A.K. Ia Nr. 23/43 g. Kdos.Chefsache vom 29.9.43 
LIV. XXVI. XXVIII  
B 11. SS-POL 24. 225. 215.  61. 227. 290. 254. 5. 
GEB 
69. 212. 121. 1.  
1.             HLK   
2.          HLK      
3.                
4.                 
5.               
6. HLK Res             
7. HLK Res              Highway 
Position 
8. HLK Res              Position 
A 
9. HLK Res               
10. HLK Res               
11. HLK Res               
12.                A 1 
Position 
13.                 
14.       A 1        receive 
position 
behind 
A 1 
15.                
16.       A 2        receive 
position 
behind 
A 2 
17.       A 2         
18.       A 2         
19.       A 2         
20.    A 2           A 2 
21.    A 2            
22.    A 2            
23.    A 2            
24.    A 2            
25.    A 2            
26.               Receive 
Position 
27.               Luga 
Position 
28.                
29.                
30.                
 Gr 
Kleffel 
XXVIII. XXVIII. XXVIII. Army Gr 
Kleffel 
C Army Army C  Army     
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As the Force Flow chart demonstrates, the planning was done for the worst case scenario 
of having only 28 days to conduct the full movement. In the time-restricted scenario the Germans 
certainly had, planners typically only have time to examine the most dangerous course of action. 
This is prudent planning. Plans once written and acknowledged by the commander typically sit 
on the “shelf” or in the “pigeon hole” waiting to be brought into action. Often times, senior and 
subordinate commanders will continue to reassign units without acknowledging the impact on a 
particular planning effort. A prominent example of this phenomenon can be demonstrated 
through a comparison of the task organizations for 18th Army at the time of the signed plan in 
September of 1943 and of January 1944.  
 
Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  6.1.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091152
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
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XXXVIII
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other 
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II./Gr.Rgt. 391
I./      “       399
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securities -
and order 
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Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  6.1.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091152
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
Divisions:
6 Attached to 
other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities -
and order 
troops
XXVI. 113
NORTH
254.227.67 121.212.
XXVIII. 24
Span
Legion 12.
21.96.
13.
XXXVIII.
30
r.A.583.28Jg.
1.
2
Lett .  
Reports directly 
to 18th Army:
2
HgH
Argb
303
18 2
15 Inf Div
1 Jg Div
1 K Gr
1 Frw Leg
1 SS Nordld
2 Br
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What is quickly noticed in comparison is the loss of the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th 
Mountain Division. Not only were these units highly experienced combat units, but much of the 
success of the Plan for Operation BLAU rested on the positions these units were holding for 
continuity on the German flank positions. Without being continuously revisited, plans are 
nothing more than one time good ideas that satisfy only a particular snap shot in time. Plans must 
evolve with the battlefield and be brought off the shelf periodically for the commander to be 
informed of techniques being used to mitigate the risk of executing a particular option or course 
of action. Plans must always be updated to be valid.  
3.6 CONCLUSION:   
 To articulate command and control in time and space requires a simple campaign plan, 
thus making a campaign plan that which joins the strategy of the political ends for war with the 
tactical means. The campaign plan acknowledges the art of creativity along with the science of 
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numbers in actuality. The place where art meets science is found in military doctrine. Armies 
that deviate from the established patterns of norms found in their doctrine are in fact 
improvising, but in an informed manner, leaving units on the left and right no ability to predict 
the next move of the center.  
 When Hitler established the “to the last man” defense as a method of defending the gains 
made on the backs of the German soldier, he failed to take into account the gravity of the 
situation faced by his subordinate commanders. The bias of action in German tradition lay with 
the commander; it was he who was empowered and responsible to act. Those at the front knew 
the reality Berlin did not want to acknowledge. As Hitler continued to take more and more 
decision making authority away from his able subordinate commanders, commanders did what 
was natural and continued to look for ways to fight the battle of numbers they knew the Soviets 
would fight. When Hitler’s need for total control is combined with the mentality of senior 
German Generals, who only want to avoid a Soviet Verdun; years of German land defensive 
doctrine had to be used to allow the survival of 18th Army along with Army Group North. Use  
of combat enablers such as the air force and the navy were needed to help accomplish strategic 
end states in a joint fashion, rather in a disaggregated fashion. Evidence of this is clearly seen in 
these planning efforts. 
 Examination of late German planning efforts such as Operation BLAU at the Army 
Group and 18th Army levels yields a very different understanding then traditional thoughts on 
the subject. It is clear both planning efforts recognized the gravity of the foreign as well as 
domestic strategic situations and were written to connect not only the strategy to available 
tactical means, but Operation BLAU also acknowledged the necessity to drive the German army 
back into their tactical doctrine it was forced to discard by Hitler's decisions. Based on the 
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disposition of forces, it is also clear the German planners understood the Soviet strategic aims as 
envisioned by Stalin. Both German plans were a method of operatically answering the 
unacknowledged strategic reality of the coming Soviet breakout attack at Leningrad, while acting 
as a forcing function to make German tactical units conform to their prewar land doctrine. 
Integration of the air force and the navy was the clear weakness of German planning efforts. 
Both organizations were subordinate to the tactical needs of the theater of war, rather than being 
allowed to serve the strategic purposes for which they were so badly needed. Instead of attacking 
the strategic flanks of the Soviet Union, both the German Air Force and Navy were being put 
against low level tactical missions where they could not mass enough combat power to achieve 
needed results. Fulfilling their specified tasks per the plans did not allow either organization the 
flexibility needed to fulfill their intended purposes.  
 German planning succinctly tied theory to science and produced a usable and practical 
product. It is clear that late German plans were quite scripted to account for the difficulty of the 
operation they were conducting as well as to compensate for the inexperience of the troops 
tasked with executing these difficult missions. German operational plans had a clear science of 
numbers that tied Operational Art to the strategic art and science as well as the tactical art and 
science. The German plans supporting Operation BLAU were clearly functional plans informed 
by conceptual planning and designed to inform detailed planning at the tactical level. It is also 
clear that German mission type orders were thought of in the plan by allowing the tactical 
commander the room on the ground to place his unit where he thought they needed to be, but the 
plan was general enough to allow for the necessary redundancies accounting for the Soviet 
independent will, albeit very predictable. The plans created by both Army Group North and 18th 
Army both supported the commander’s intent of conducting a retrograde action that supported 
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strategic goals while it set the lower tactical commanders up for success with resources they had 
available to execute their assigned mission.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Art and Science of Breakout Attack: The Soviets Attack into 
the Teeth of BLAU  
 
 An enduring truth of war is strength of a position is predicated on two things; the will of the 
defender to hold the position while resisting attack and the strength of the position’s flanks. 
Another truth of defensive operations is the defense chooses the location where battle is to be 
joined.  Examining these thoughts allows a student of history to connect the art to the science of 
war by linking the moral/mental human desire of holding a position to the physical constrains 
presented by the piece of ground chosen by the defense. As these parameters govern the art and 
science of war, the principles and the conditions of war discipline those who plan the conduct of 
tactical battle.
392
 Successful armies function well as a result of adherence to prescribed doctrine; 
the same armies continue to be successful by learning and transmitting lessons observed from 
both what they themselves have observed of their own performance and what they learned from 
the enemy. Successful armies are further defined as successful by how well they are able to 
integrate their lessons observed at the lowest tactical level of war into the operational conduct of 
war. Not only must an army accurately recognize its own capabilities and limitations, but also 
those of their enemy. As war is a highly competitive environment for time, the army better 
prepared to validate lessons observed at the lowest tactical-level changes their standard operating 
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procedures to more accurately reflect the conduct of war stands a better chance of success in the 
immediate course of the battle. This is the functioning of a successful learning organization; 
students of history have the opportunity to learn from successful as well as unsuccessful 
examples.
393
   
 Collectively, these factors form the lens of examination for this chapter. With the strategic and 
operational level conditions met on other parts of the Eastern Front by December 1943, the Soviet 
Union was in a position to conduct a breakthrough attack against the German defensive lines at 
Leningrad. By conducting their attack against the German defenses, the Soviets could recognize 
their first operational goal; the end of the Leningrad siege through overwhelming offensive 
action. In order to recognize this first goal, the Soviets saw the use of tactical combat power 
directed against the German 18th Army, with the aim of separating and fragmenting it from 16th 
Army as their bid for operational success. Once German positions were broken in Leningrad and 
the offensive was underway, the Soviets then had to be able to dominate any German attempts to 
disrupt the movement of additional German forces in time and space. Here the connection 
between the operational ways and tactical means available becomes clear. What must be made 
clearer is how the Soviets wanted to articulate available tactical level combat power in the time 
and space to accommodate available conditions; thus joining tactical means to the desired 
strategic ends state.  
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In essence, the Soviets needed to anticipate German defensive actions resident in Plan BLAU and 
be prepared to counter them. The Soviets understood the German methods of defending in depth 
after fighting for years on all fronts. They understood, because they fought using the same 
tactics.
394
 The logic is clear; to attack and destroy a defense in depth requires another force to 
attack in depth. A tactical penetration must be followed by an operational exploitation.  
 Fighting by attacking in depth is a realization of articulating tactical level combat power in 
time and space with the goal of seizing multiple tactical objectives near simultaneously achieving 
the fulfillment of the operational objective. The goal of attacking in depth should be focused on 
attacking to destroy the enemy holding the terrain through the use of combined arms or to isolate 
the enemy through the use of combined arms to attack an enemy holding more significant pieces 
of terrain.
395
 While abstract as a concept of the art of war, the science of attacking in depth is an 
interesting problem of transition from operational mobilization of a force to the articulation of the 
same force in the offensive against multiple objectives in the same time and space. As the terrain 
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and weather are constant scientific factors both combatants must contend with, they are also the 
most responsible for dominating the concepts of time and space.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the conventional tactical actions and means the 
Soviets had available at the end of 1943 to conduct a successful breakthrough attack to the 
"Panther Line," while examining the German flexibility of Plan BLAU. The method of 
examination will be driven by what happen chronologically in time and space to satisfy the 
scientific aspects of war, while the art of war will be evaluated through the decisions leaders made 
to influence tactical actions at various times during the breakout. Thus, by linking the tactical 
decisions of the forces to the time and space of the tactical level, scholars and professional 
soldiers have the ability to learn from an examination of how the combatants saw the use of 
conventional tactical means articulated through their campaign plans to achieve their desired 
strategic ends either through breakthrough attack or defense.  
4.1 SOVIET SHAPING ACTIONS PRIOR TO JANUARY 14, 1944:  
 As the German campaign plan BLAU examined in the previous chapter demonstrates, it was 
no surprise to the Germans that the Soviets were planning another breakout attempt from 
Leningrad. Unlike previous attempts to break the German hold on the city, actions in other places 
of the Eastern Front had significantly weakened the German grip by December 1943. Attempts to 
coordinate decisive action with the Finns in the north had not yielded the results the Germans 
intended.
396
 The first question the Germans had to answer was what did the Soviets have for 
combat power to breakout? General der Artillerie Herbert Loch describes not only the size of the 
force, but where the Germans felt the main effort attack was going to take place. He states: 
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 According to the information obtained by the German command through reconnaissance, the 
 enemy had assembled thirty divisions, three brigades, five ski brigades, ten armored brigades, 
 eight armored regiments, two armored battalions, and numerous other units in the area 
 opposite the sector held by Eighteenth Army, in addition to the twenty-five divisions, nine 
 brigades and nineteen machine gun battalions committed to the front line. Toward the 
 beginning of January 1944, the forming of the enemy points of main effort could also be 
 clearly observed. It took place in the sector east of Novgorod, south of Leningrad and in the 
 area of the Oranienbaum pocket.
397
   
 
Based on the amount of force required to initiate any large-scale offensive, there are inevitably 
indications and warnings presented to the enemy. Despite the best efforts to create surprise, forces 
must be positioned prior to launching major operations. In fact, offensive operations generally 
require a force to seize pieces of terrain in order to conduct larger offensive operations. Such was 
the case for the Soviet breakout from Leningrad.  
 According to German intelligence records from Army Group North, the first half of January, 
1944 saw continuous Soviet combat activity being used to shape the battle space in preparation 
for the massive attack of January 14th.
398
 The Operations/Intelligence Summary or OPSINTSUM 
for January 13, 1944 was complied only hours before the massive Soviet breakout attack the 
following day. The information was hardly timely to provide German decision makers with a tool 
to assist them with providing tactical level command and control, but these reports are instructive 
in providing scholars and professional soldiers with a record of the events leading up to Soviet 
attack. Along with proving an exact picture of what German commanders were being presented 
by their staffs. The report for January 13, 1944 was two pages in length and was broken down by 
enemy actions according to German corps sectors. It was sent up the chain of command at 12.30 
hours on January 14, 1944. The Corps reported the following activities for January 13, 1944: 
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 XXXVIII.A.K.: Artillery fire in the area of Chutyn and Kretschewizy.  Lively 
 interdiction fire in the middle and northern sections of the 28th Jg. Infantry Division. 
 
 XXVIII.A.K.:  1 enemy assault unit per friendly unit in Mischelowo (13th Luftwaffe 
 Field Division) and in Korodynja (121th I.D.) remained unsuccessful. 
 
 XXVI.A.K.:  Enemy movements in mutual directions in front of Poretschje (212th I.D.) 
 with 200 men as well as in the area of (227th I.D.) with 260 men were fought. 
 
 LIV.A.K.: In the area of the 225th and 24th I. D. field artillery was falling.  Interdiction 
 fire livelier than the days before.  11th I. D. rejected enemy assault on the left flank. 
 
 L.A.K.: In 170th I. D. sector the 2d Army Shock troops were unsuccessful, in company 
 strength south of Werch and Koirow and were rejected.  A further enemy attack was 
 smashed before it could be launched. In 126th I. D. sector, the enemy with 1-2 
 companies attacked against the northern part of Urizk and was repulsed with high losses.  
 In corps sections, livelier interdiction fire with high explosive shells fell about the 126th 
 I.D.. Movements in sector much livelier.   
 
 III. SS.Pz.-Korps.: Lively field artillery activity in sector with impacts in the northern 
 sector  of the 9th Luftwaffe Field Division, as well as in 10th Luftwaffe Field Division 
 north of Petrowskaja. 9th Luftwaffe Field Division as well as the entire 10th Luftwaffe 
 field division observed strong work and motor sounds in sector.  Between Karelien, 
 Kronstadt, Oranienbaum five troop carriers were observed moving.
399
  
 
 Analysis of the information by corps from the German perspective demonstrates the 
Soviet main effort attack was initially difficult for the Germans to determine based on the rise of 
conventional activity in all corps sectors. As exchange of artillery fire would have been constant 
during siege operations, only the intensity and duration of fires would have given the Germans 
any indication of pending attack. While the other sectors had direct enemy ground contact in 
conjunction with Soviet artillery fire, III SS Panzer Corps did not. It is interesting to note in the 
III SS sector that the Luftwaffe field divisions were specifically targeted and mentioned in the 
report. As staff officers would have analyzed Soviet actions collectively using a process similar 
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to trend analysis, Soviet tactical actions reveal their intentions. Analysis of Soviet shaping 
operations through the use of artillery in conjunction with limited objective ground attacks was 
the Soviet method of probing the German defenses to determine composition, disposition and 
strength. Initial Soviet tactical efforts were being used to probe the German lines, but more 
importantly, these limited-objective Soviet attacks were used to secure key pieces of tactical 
terrain for the initial tactical penetration, setting the conditions for follow-on operational break 
through. The report continues with analysis by intelligence officers. It reads: 
 XXXVIII. A.K.: Confirms:  150th Company with 15th Staff Company. 
 Enemy losses: 3 prisoners; 1 MG (machine gun) captured, destroyed 1 anti-tank gun. 
 
 Analysis: 
 
 XXVIII. A.K. Middle Sector 30 punishment prisoners out of the 59th Army, at the end of 
 October. 600 punishment prisoners out of Irkutsk from the 59th Army and 80 from the 
 336th Machine Gun Battalion.  Beginning of December 800 punishment prisoners out of 
 Nowossibirsk and the Wolchow Front, from the 150th and 23rd Staff Company.  
 
 Special:  In XXXVIII. and XXVIII. Army Corps sectors, Enemy propaganda message 
 talked about the southern and northern front under threat of a 2nd Stalingrad.
400
   
 
 What is striking about the German analysis is two-fold; 1. Analysis of the use of Soviet 
prisoner units to probe German lines along with their locations; and 2. use of a reference to a 
second Stalingrad for the northern front. Deductions of German analysis shows first, the use of 
prisoner units by the Soviets served the purpose of allowing the Germans to use their resources 
to eliminate Soviet state enemies. The Soviets used these units to test German resistance in 
locations where they anticipated significant losses and usually in conjunction with main effort 
attacks. Secondly, it is interesting that enemy psychological operations were being reported at 
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the highest levels.
401
 These statements in an official report testify to the candidness the 
commander of Army Group encouraged amongst his staff officers. From these reports, a sense of 
the command climate can be gauged along with the ability to understand how information was 
reported and analyzed. 
 In contrast to the reports of January 13, 1944, the reports of the 14th demonstrate decisive 
Soviets actions taking place in the German corps sectors. The timing of the report is interesting 
in respect to when decisive actions occurred. The report was finalized at 19.45 on January 14th, 
half a day after the initiation of the Soviet main effort attack. The report states the following 
dispositions for Corps in the German 18th Army sector: 
 XXXVIII.A.K.: The 58th Soviet Brigade appeared again out of 8th Army reserve south 
 of  Nowgorod, Panzer. Battalion 501, somewhere out of the east.  Have also seen 239th 
 Soviet Division out of 59th Army in Leljawino.   
 Confirms: 15th Punishment Company.   
 
 XXVIII.A.K.: Confirms:  44th Soviet Division, 198th Soviet Division, 53rd Soviet 
 Brigade and 80th Soviet Division.  
 
 XXVI.A.K.: Confirms 1 Rifle Brigade., 364th Soviet Division, 18th Soviet Division  and 
 286th Soviet Division all reserves from 8th Army with 1 Battalion were used in 
 Oretschje. 
 
 III.SS.Pz.Korps: 131st Soviet Division again appeared out of 55th Army in the 
 Petrowskaja – Poroschki sector, 90th Soviet Division out of Leningrad Front Reserve in 
 the Poroschki – Perelesje sector, 48th Soviet Division out of 2nd Shock  Army reserve 
 with a Regiment in the Perelesje - Nowaja Burja section, 23rd Artillery  Division out 
 of 67th Army in the Tschernaja valley.  
 Confirms: 168th Soviet Division
402
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Map 7 Strategic Situation of Army Group North, January 14, 1944  
 
 Based on the reported information, the Soviet main effort attack appeared to be 
concentrated on the XXVIII Corps and XXVI Corps in comparison with the report of the 
previous day. Clearly, the Soviets properly "shaped" the Germans and placed the proper amount 
of effort in places on the ground they thought would lead to decisive results without 
compromising the main effort attack. While the history of the Leningrad siege states the breakout 
of the Leningrad pocket was set for January 14,1944, it is clear based on the  intelligence reports 
the Soviet attack began days before with the shaping actions executed by company and battalion 
sized units. The Soviets themselves recorded the Leningrad breakout as January 14, 1944, but 
perhaps a more appropriate way to think of these events is the Soviet attack achieved decisive 
results and the desired effect of breaking the German siege on January 14, 1944.
404
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 The report of January 14, 1944 also concluded with analysis of Soviet actions for the day. 
An interesting facet of the report is the German desire to obtain more prisoners in the XXVIII 
Corps area. Eighteen Army wanted to confirm the XXVIII Corps’ sector was the focus of effort 
for the main effort of the Soviet attack. Based on these reports, this would appear correct. The 
Soviets attack to breakout of the Leningrad was limited to the space available in the pocket to 
concentrate combat power. Soviet combat power had to be echeloned in such a manner it could 
be sent into action precisely in accordance with the plan, but the capability had to provide the 
Soviet commander with the flexibility to rapidly respond to a change in situation. In a siege 
scenario, it only makes sense for the Soviets to continue probing the German lines for weakness 
for two reasons: 1) they needed to begin offensive actions to shape the enemy; and 2) the Soviets 
needed to have the entire force begin moving to make room to commit to main effort decisive 
attack of January 14, 1944. Looking at the size of the forces being committed on January 13th 
and based on Soviet doctrine of the period; companies and battalions would be forming 
reconnaissance elements as the advanced guard to guide the efforts of the main effort attack. In 
essence, the elements were conducting what is referred today as “reconnaissance push,” meaning 
the main body of the Soviet force was pushing the smaller reconnaissance elements into contact 
with the enemy to determine German strength, but also so the Germans could commit strength 
against the reconnaissance effort to give away their positions and set the conditions for the main 
Soviet advance. A “reconnaissance push” model also best complimented the Soviet command 
and control style of centralized command and control.
405
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when exactly at the precise moment the roar of weapons broke the morning silence. Every minute the violent racket 
increased. From the fire the earth seemed to be shuttering. It continued this way for 65 minutes. I think if any 
German survived this hell, he would have never forgotten it. Our Artillery Army brought down more than one 
hundred thousand shells on the German positions a minute.” See page 316.    
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      Picture 3: Soviet Leningrad Campaign Medal              
406
 
4.2 THE SCIENCE AND ART OF SOVIET DECISIVE OPERATIONS FOR 
BREAKOUT AND FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS: 
 During the period immediately following the breakout from Leningrad, the Soviet 
commanders and staffs had to sustain the massive Soviet offensive in the given time and space. 
Like all offensives, the Soviet commanders recognized they could not continue all-out offensive 
operations without an operational pause. The art of deciding where to take an operational pause 
to allow forces to replenish stocks is largely predicated by the disposition of the enemy and the 
terrain.
407
 Both of these elements are affected by the condition of weather. When examining this 
concept against the Soviet operational goal of destroying 18th Army, clearly the Soviets saw the 
destruction of 18th Army as an enabling operation to allow them to re-enter Estonia and 
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recognize the subsequent goal of retaking the Baltic States. First, the Soviets had to decide in the 
rather limited time and space from Leningrad to the Narva River where to separate the German 
18th Army from the rest of Army Group North to destroy it. When the Soviets thought about 
how the Germans would defend based on their doctrine of defense in depth, or trading space for 
time while inflicting losses, the Soviets would be forced not only to breakout of the Leningrad 
pocket, but also attack to breakthrough the German defenses in depth to counter the effects of the 
German defenses prior to the Narva River. In essence, the Soviet could not afford the Germans to 
retrograde cohesive combat power.   
 Thinking about the Soviet problem from a scientific point of view, it is an interesting 
problem of articulating the use of force in time and space. The Soviet combat power had to start 
from complete rest in the Leningrad pocket then accelerate rapidly to break through the German 
defenses, and then attack multiple tactical objectives in the planned German engagement areas. 
The Soviets needed to conduct several tactical level actions in several places in depth at the same 
time using the forces they generated. While it is impossible to attack with forces in depth, the use 
of artillery allows multiple targets to be shaped in time and space while combat power moves in 
that time and space to attack. To recognize an attack into a flank, the Soviets had to understand 
the enemy in relation to the geography of the area. The geography dictated only a relatively 
narrow front could be achieved on land without the use of the sea or air assets. To accomplish an 
attack into the German flank, the Soviets had to tactically fix the Germans by using direct and 
indirect fires to achieve a combined arms effect. Once the German front was fixed through the 
use of suppressive fire, the Soviets then could create a tactical level penetration in the German 
lines and gain space to maneuver. In order for the Soviets to continue the attack to the west, the 
area of penetration had to be widened to accommodate the follow on force’s attack. Tactically 
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not only were the Soviets attacking to the west, they were also attacking to the north and south in 
limited objective attacks with the purpose of securing the “shoulders” of the areas where 
penetrations occurred and to prevent German counterattacks. The Soviets quickly realized fixing 
the Germans at the point of tactical penetration while continuing to maneuver in all directions 
gave them decisive depth in a break through. The Soviet action created an overwhelming 
sensation the German command and control couldn’t cope with. To recognize the strategic 
objective of liberating Leningrad, a precondition was to achieve a tactical penetration, but more 
importantly it had to be followed by a quick exploitation of the penetration with follow-on 
forces. It should be remembered a commander in the assault often has multiple axes of attack to 
enhance the chances of success. More appropriately, it should be thought of as a series of tactical 
penetrations linearly along a front, with multiple attacks in depth occurring near simultaneously. 
Taking this from abstract thought into concrete tactical missions to be accomplished by Soviet 
forces requires an examination of the force composition in relation to their assigned missions.  
 All young officers learn before they command their first troops the idea of proper task 
organization for a mission. The mission is a requirement that must be reconciled against the 
forces available to best accomplish the task. After analyzing the operating environment, the 
Soviets understood from decades of military action in the area the composition of the forces 
needed to accomplish the various missions. To accomplish the tactical task of penetration to 
break the German lines, the sub tasks of suppression to fix the German defenses, security of a 
breach site and follow on forces to exploit success had to be arranged.
408
 First, what was the 
required force composition to fix the Germans in their positions? 
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 To fix the Germans required the use of combined arms. The Soviets needed to employ 
direct fires in conjunction with indirect fires to fix the Germans, allowing follow-on forces to 
breach. The task of suppression required the use of artillery and mortars with armor and infantry 
to fix. The combination of these forces is deliberate based on the effects each weapon system or 
force could create. While artillery generally shoots a flatter trajectory, the effects of artillery can 
be massed easily to destroy an objective such as a trench line, if enough ammunition is 
available.
409
 Mortars on the other hand, shoot higher trajectory, having the ability to hit targets in 
defilade that normally escape the effects of artillery fire. In combination, artillery and mortar fire 
have the ability to destroy, but the amount of ammunition drives the time that indirect assets can 
be used to provide suppressive effects. As the attack continues and supply trains are further from 
the source of supply, the attack can slow because the enemy is no longer suppressed. In doing so, 
the amount of support given to attacking forces is lesser. When indirect effects are combined 
with direct effects a greater synergy of effort is created. While armored forces contribute 
firepower and protection when used in a support by fire role of a subsequent advance, they use a 
significant amount of ammunition to achieve effects, but not fuel. Armored forces not moving 
have only the security they can provide for themselves with their organic weapons. The terrain in 
the Leningrad area is heavily wooded, therefore dismounted infantry was required to secure the 
flanks of armored formations against German efforts to infiltrate the armored formation and use 
hand-held anti-tank weapons. Understanding the tenets of available capabilities allowed Soviet 
commanders to decide what force composition was best to fix with suppressive effects. In this 
case, space available in trucks and roads determines the support that can be given and sustained. 
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While operations drive logistical support, there are only so many trucks and so many roads to 
move them on. Actions within the space determined the composition of the force to be used; the 
terrain would determine where the force would be employed from. It can be shown how these 
facets come into action in time and space.  
 The problem of fixing German defenses with suppressive fire for the Soviets was 
predicated on two things, time and space. First, how much time was required to achieve effects 
against the Germans at a particular location and how much space was needed to mass the 
material required to achieve and sustain those effects. The local problem of providing 
suppression is also geometric; as the effects of fires must be used in a way which allows German 
defenses to be isolated, while other space has to be used to maneuver a force to the next phase of 
breaching the obstacle belt. This creates the physical penetration of the defense. Done correctly, 
suppressive effects can create the necessary conditions to not only isolate, but also blind the 
enemy with the use of smoke to allow for a physical penetration of the enemy defenses. 
 Once Germans positions were fixed by supporting fires, the Soviets then employed a 
task- organized force to conduct the breach of German lines. The key tasks required to conduct a 
breach are local suppression, security and assets which allow a force to create mobility. In terms 
of a breaching force, the assets needed by the Soviets were an armor/ infantry task force to 
provide securing for a tasked organized engineer unit that could breach the enemy plan, mark the 
breach lanes, proof lanes and expand the breach without interfering with follow-on assault 
forces. The easier task organization to produce was the armor/infantry team; the engineers were a 
more challenging asset to source based on requiring more specialized skill sets. The task the 
combat engineer in the offense is to create mobility. Depending on the terrain to be negotiated, 
the engineers may have to use bridging assets to cross rivers or reduce obstacles to facilitate the 
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follow-on attack. In the case of the Soviet advance in late January 1944, both were required. To 
maneuver in space costs time, negotiating obstacles with bridging requires even more time. The 
expenditure of time directly correlates to resource expenditure. Here, time needs to be thought of 
as ammunition. To gain the time needed to breach and exploit it requires the ammunition 
necessary to achieve suppressive effects. The longer a breaching mission takes; the more 
ammunition the support element must use to facilitate the breach. The key to the success of the 
breach was directly attributable to communications between the breaching force and the forces 
proving the suppression to fix the enemy. Not only does good communication facilitate better 
control of fires, but it saves ammunition vital to the success of the main effort. In this case, the 
main effort is the follow-on assault through the breach.   
 Once supporting fires became effective and the breach was prepared, only the main effort 
attack remained. Fires were shifted from local German positions to allow the Soviet infantry and 
armor the opportunity to close with and destroy the Germans in positions close to the breach site. 
At the same time, fires being used to support the breaching operations were shifted to deeper 
targets to support the main effort attack. To realize an attack in depth as a measure to defeat the 
German defense in depth was a more complicated logistical problem than it was operational. To 
sustain the attack logistically is the burden of every command seeking decision through offensive 
action. The art of the science is determining at what point on the ground the commander wants to 
achieve decisive actions allowing him to recognize the desired end state while also recognizing 
the limitations of the environment. With an understanding of the mechanics required to create the 
condition for an attack in depth, the Soviet attack can now be properly examined. The question 
eluding the historical record is where did the Soviets desire to achieve the destruction of the 
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German 18th Army relative to the limited space afforded by the terrain as well as the time they 
were afforded by the weather once the breakout of Leningrad was complete.
410
  
David Glantz’s record of events found in his work The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944,  
is perhaps the most accurate and insightful work written in English about the events occurring 
during the battle for Leningrad in 1944. As Soviet forces attacked toward the Luga River and 
subsequent German positions in depth, Glantz notes unhappiness on the part of the Soviet 
STAVKA regarding the speed of the attack. Glantz notes, 
 Although Govorov’s and Meretskov’s fronts resoundingly smashed both flanks of the 
 Eighteenth Army and threatened it with a general offensive from the Gulf of Finland to 
 Lake Il’men’, the STAVKA was still not pleased with their progress. It duly noted a host 
 of shortcomings in the 2d Shock, 42d and 59th Armies’ operations and demanded they be 
 corrected. Among the most serious of these deficiencies were the poor exploitation of 
 maneuver to bypass or envelop enemy strong points, lack of night combat, inadequate 
 reconnaissance of German defenses, and ineffective command and control, particularly at 
 army and corps levels.
411
  
 
What this statement makes clear about the Soviet units executing the operation must be 
examined against the context of what the units were doing prior to the offensive. The units that 
conducted the attack had not fought a continuous offensive up to this point. The units involved in 
this action on both sides had been positioned in static defensive positions for three years where 
the only form of offense action was occasional security or reconnaissance patrols. Clearly, there 
is a significant difference between tactical units executing security patrols and conducting 
coordinated deliberate tactical attacks. While STAVKA may have appreciated the difficulties of 
conducting offensive operations after three years, STAVKA also failed to recognize the 
challenges of executing these operations over the difficult terrain of the Leningrad area in poor 
weather. No matter how well planned and communicated, there were only so many external lines 
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of operation and communication for the Soviet Army to operate on to be decisive. Regarding the 
influence of weather during Soviet  breakout operations, a contemporary approach with the 
historical record is needed.  
Dr. Jaak Jaagus, a professor of climatology at the University of Tartu in Estonia, provides 
valuable generalizations about weather patterns from 1944. The Estonian winter of 1944 was 
fairly mild, particularly January, which is typically known for precipitation. The spring months 
of March, April and May were colder than normal. Maximum precipitation was recorded in May 
and June, while July was much dryer than normal. [See Figure 14]  
Average Temperature and Precipitation Date from Tiirikoja, Estonia (Lat 58° 52’ Long 26° 57’Along Lake Peipus) for 1944 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Average 
Temperature (C) 
-2.2 -4.7 -3 0.8 8.1 12.6 18.2 NR NR NR 6.2 0.9 
Average 
Precipitation (MM) 
27 10 13 24 52 90 62 44 NR 37 68 32 
NR= Not Recorded. Most likely due to the fact the Soviets were coming back into Estonia and the people responsible for the 
measurements fled.  
                                                               Figure 14                                                            
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 Analysis of this weather information in comparison to the situation at the front and the 
physical terrain reveals it would be possible to attack out of the Leningrad area quickly using the 
available road structure in the north with the thought of destroying the German 18
th
 Army prior to 
it escaping into the forests and swamps and crossing the Luga, Plyussa and Narva Rivers. Based 
on the terrain, weather and the historical situation, there is no doubt the Soviet main effort in the 
north was going against the German 18
th
 Army. Based on the Soviet official history of the Second 
World War, the Soviets correctly understood the German mission for Army Group North as 
“Units were tasked to stop the attack of the Leningrad and Volkov Fronts on defensive lines 
alongside the Luga River while maintaining control of the Luga-Pskov railway and highway 
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which were essential for the retreat of the 18
th
 Army units to the rear defensive line at 
“Panther.”413 Hidden in the Soviet history lies the fact the Soviet Army was concentrating forces 
on the German front, while attempting to cut the German line of communication to the rear. In 
doing so, a pocket would be created, thus allowing the Soviets to reduce the pocket over the 
course of time, while continuing the attack to the west. The Soviet official history attests to the 
poor terrain and weather conditions when it states:  
 Soviet units had to attack through woods and swamps, partially off-road. Units were isolated 
 from the sources of resupply; Lack of ammunition, fuel, provisions and means of 
 transportation existed. Armored and self propelled artillery units suffered heavy casualties and 
 losses and could not render significant support to rifle units. All of the above adversely 
 affected the speed of attack.
414
 
 
  Examining this statement against Figure 13, the scenario along with Soviet difficulties 
becomes clearer. The Soviets were employing massed regiments and divisions of artillery, the 
various types of vehicles alone on these unimproved surface roads would have been enough to not 
allow for infantry support. Not only would the movement on the roads be slow because of snow 
and inexperienced Soviet troops, but also because once the artillery left the road to establish firing 
positions, they would have to fight with local off-road conditions. Artillery and engineer units 
likely had to work together closely in order to allow artillery pieces to be set up. Engineers would 
have to likely clear pathways into the positions, then, clear the positions of vegetation. The 
amount of space needed for a regiment or division of artillery is enormous. Based on the speed of 
the Soviet attack and the range of their guns to support infantry and armor in the attack, it could 
be expected the artillery would have to displace often. With road space at a premium, troops 
would have move to the front to reinforce faltering attacks while artillery resupply convoys would 
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have been trying to move to their positions, only to find the unit they were supporting had already 
displaced. Even if the guns were able to support with adequate fires, controlling those fires in a 
manner which would make them timely was next to impossible. Even if the observer could get a 
timely message to the fire direction center or the gun line supporting them, the artillery observer 
could not necessarily correct fires for a few significant reasons: First, the Soviets employed their 
artillery in mass, firing thousands of rounds. When these rounds impacted, the observer could not 
tell which rounds were fired in support of him. Second, the other significant issue was the terrain 
and weather itself. Securing adjustments from the air was difficult for the Soviets, as few radio 
were in use between tactical air and ground units. As the ground in the area of operations before 
the Narva River and Estonia proper are relatively flat, Soviet artillery observers on the ground had 
a difficult time adjusting fires based on the terrain. As there are few natural features to refer fires 
to or from, it was difficult to get accuracy from the map. This fact is also verified by Combat in 
the Russian Forests and Swamps, “Massed fire on important targets must be planned with 
extraordinary care. Systematic area fire from map data has little promise of success and, in most 
instances, merely constitutes a waste of ammunition. In swamp areas, furthermore, a considerable 
part of the fragmentation effect is lost unless time fuzes are available.
415
The depth of snow on the 
ground in conjunction with the ice and soil under the snow made it difficult for artillery observers 
to see the rounds hitting the ground; vegetation such as pine trees and birch trees complicated this 
problem further. The Soviet answer to these problems was to employ all of their indirect fire 
weapon systems hub to hub and “remove” all vegetation. While the amount of rounds the Soviets 
expended was an impressive number, well in the millions; the effects of their fires did not 
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accomplish the mission efficiently. Ultimately, as Combat in the Russian Forests and Swamps 
points out “In forest fighting the psychological effect of artillery fire is greatly amplified while 
that of small arms fire is generally reduced. Prepared concentrations, if laid down to block the 
enemy’s main route of approach, can be highly effective.”416    
 Once Soviet forces left the road structure of the Leningrad region, the small lakes, forests and 
snow choked the Soviet advance. Armor in this terrain was generally road bound. T-34s and 
larger tanks had a difficult time operating in this environment, even with infantry support. As 
Soviet armor was designed to be employed in mass against an enemy weak point in depth, 
sufficient time and combat power are required along with the space to stage armor and logistical 
elements supporting the attack along an avenue of approach. Based on extensive Soviet 
experiences of conducting combat operations in winter against Finland in 1940, the Soviets 
published The Regulations for Combat Actions of Troops in Winter on March 4, 1941.
417
 In 
Section 5, entitled Offensive Combat, the following critical considerations regarding the 
employment of armor are discussed: 1) Use tanks only on short deployments during the attack 
when snow depth exceeds 50 centimeters. 2) A penetration into the enemy rear by cavalry, tank 
and motorized units can be exploited only when the snow depth falls below 50 centimeters and 
when a well-developed road network to the enemy is available.
418
 The reasonable question which 
needs to be asked is why 50 centimeters? 50 centimeters relates to the track width and height of 
the T-34 as well as other Soviet Army motorized assets. What must also be remembered is the 
more vehicle traffic through an area, the more disturbed the ground becomes. An answer to these 
problems was for the Soviets to use light tanks, such as the T-60, T-70, ect. What these tanks 
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lacked in armored protection and firepower, they made up in maneuverability and were easier to 
recover if they became mired in deeper snow. With snow sitting on the surface of the ground 
along with the weight of vehicles pounding the snow flat, eventually when the climate provides a 
slightly warmer day, the ground will turn to a morass as the surface water which would be frozen 
on the surface and slightly below the surface unfreezes. This scenario in conjunction with 
increased German resistance in compartmentalized terrain before the three rivers easily caused the 
Soviet attack to falter.   
 In order for the above considerations to come to fruition, operational-level planners needed to 
consider their offensive and defensive possibilities, not only in terms of natural and man-made 
avenues of approach and obstacles, but also in terms of the nodes and modes of communication 
which facilitate the speed and success of either the attack or counterattack. The information 
needed by planners to be effective is the initial throughput capacities available for operations, but 
more importantly, the planner’s ability to project enhanced capabilities for throughput to sustain 
current operations as well as build up for future operations. It is now time to examine how the 
Soviets took the lessons they observed and turned them into action for breaking the "Panther 
Position."        
4.3 SOVIET FORCES REACH THE LUGA LINE AND PREPARE TO CREATE 
BRIDGEHEADS INTO ESTONIA: 
 Even with STAVKA perturbed about the lack of speed associated with the Soviet attack 
after the breakout, the mere size of the Soviet attack overwhelmed German defenses. Perhaps a 
point that frustrated the Soviets even more was no matter how much physical size they 
introduced against the Germans, why were their forces unable to make the Germans totally 
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break.  This is an acknowledgement that the Germans executed Operation BLAU with discipline 
and control. The Germans knew the reality of the situation; they were going to be significantly 
outnumbered, but as long as they could continue to trade space for time, the Germans would 
continue to strengthen their position as they were reducing the length of their lines of operation 
and communication as they moved west toward Estonia. It should be remember from chapter 3 
that the Germans planned for the main engagement area to be 25 kilometers from the Narva 
River or the “Panther Line,” with the engineer engagement area being built 40 kilometers from 
the Narva River.
419
 Thus the Luga River in terms of an obstacle supporting a German 
engagement area is positioned, according to German defense in depth doctrine of the period, at 
the outer edge of the main battle area.
420
 The Soviets recognized the German plan and planned to 
counter with break 18th Army before it could reach the Luga River. Then, the Soviets could seek 
an operational pause. The Soviets believed if this occurred, the Germans would not have the 
combat power to conduct operations in their main battle area, nor would they be able to 
cohesively defend the “Panther Line” at the Narva River. This concept recognized the first 
Soviet campaign goal, to crush 18th Army and it paved the way for the Soviets to “liberate” the 
Baltic region starting with Estonia.  
 While the Germans continued a desperate life and death struggle against incredible odds 
on all fronts, on January 21, 1944 the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts continued their offensive 
operations.  
 That day, Kuechler flew to the Fuehrer’s headquarters to demand some freedom of 
 maneuver from Hitler. Early the next morning Kuechler informed Hitler that 
 Kranogvardeisk would fall unless Hitler permitted him to abandon Puskin and Slutsk. 
 Hitler categorically rejected Kuechler’s pleas, stating, “I am against all withdrawals. We 
 will have crises wherever we are. There is no guarantee we will not be broken through on 
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 the Panther line. If we go back voluntarily, he [the Russians] will not get there with only 
 half of his forces. He must bleed himself white on the way. The battle must be fought as 
 far as possible from the German border.
421
  
 
Here again, the German strategic hand of interference restricted the essence of Operation BLAU 
as a plan to execute the withdrawal in accordance with doctrinal considerations.  
 General Fediuninsky, the commander of 2d Shock Army, later recalled these operations 
of late January in his memoirs; 
 The troops of 2d Shock Army broke through the Luga River by January 31st. The enemy 
 showed fierce resistance. The most stubborn defense was established in the city 
 Kingissepa, where we had to fight over every single house. Finally on the first of 
 February the 109th Corps captured the city by using a turning maneuver and night 
 operations. Continuing the vigorous pursuit of the enemy, the army troops reached the 
 Narva River on February 3rd,  In separate sections our advanced detachments  crossed to 
 the west bank of river on the “enemy’s shoulders” and captured small bridgeheads. 
 Desperate battles were fought until mid-February and as a result we extended the 
 bridgehead along the front to 18 kilometers long and 15 kilometers deep. The task of 
 capturing the stations of Jõhvi, Atsalama, Jõuga, Kauksi and the railway from Ozeli till 
 Mustva did not happen until later. We failed to free the city of Narva by February 17th. 
 The military council of front expressed great displeasure on this occasion. After that, time 
 and again I would hear just reproaches from the army group commander.
422
 
  
General Fediuninsky continued to develop his understanding of the situation as his forces 
continued the attack on German positions along the Narva River in early February 1944.  He 
spent considerable time along the Narva River gaining excellent tactical situational 
understanding for the problem he was tasked with solving. As all commanders should do, he 
considered alternative solutions and tried to rationalize if the small gains he was making justified 
the losses in causalities. Here were his thoughts: 
 Being on the bridgehead (of the Narva River) along with my private observations I was 
 convinced that to force a crossing over the river and to take the city of Narva should be 
 done from another direction where the enemy did not expect it. On the present 
 bridgehead, it was difficult to concentrate enough troops secretly and thus the striking 
 power would not be enough to overwhelm the enemy. I was racking my brain over the 
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 picture the whole evening. Where to breach the enemy defenses? Which way was best to 
 capture the city and fortress of Narva? Is the developing of the attack worth giving up the 
 already seized bridgehead? It was clear to me that even if the main thrust wouldn’t be 
 inflicted from the bridgehead, it wouldn’t matter; the effort spent capturing it wouldn’t be 
 in vain. The enemy sent much strength against the bridgehead. That’s why an idea of 
 attacking from a different place came to mind.
423
 
 
 Soviet forces had control of bridgehead positions on the eastern bank of the Narva River, 
both north and south of the city of Narva by the beginning of February. As Glantz explains, 
Andreev’s 43d Rifle Corps of Fediuninsky’s army seized two bridgeheads across the Narva 
River on the army’s right flank north of the city of Narva on February 1st. Two days later 
Zaitsev’s 122d Rifle Corps seized two additional bridgeheads south of the city.424 Govorov's plan 
was to have Fediuninsky’s 2d Shock Army conduct a double envelopment of the city of 
Narva.
425
 The two areas the Soviets picked in the north were those of Riigiküla and Siivertsi (See 
Map 8). The tactical reason these locations were picked by the Soviets was they were the 
narrowest points of the Narva River in the north and they offered the best lines of 
communication to continue the assault once forces arrived on the west bank of the river (See 
Map 8).     
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NARVA RIVER
RIIGIKÜLA BRIDGEHEAD
SIIVERTSI BRIDGEHEAD
 
Map 8: Northern crossing points for Second Shock Army 
From the Soviet work Fight as I Shall Dig, February- September 1944, comes an interesting 
account of actions at the Riigula Bridgehead from February 3, 1944. It reads: 
 From the former commander of 308
th
 Regiment Colonel I. Naumov: “First and third 
 battalions enveloped the enemy near the highway along the river and proceeded with the 
 assault. Still, in the morning, the enemy was not taking any measures. The enemy was 
 isolated between the 131st Division and our forces. Third battalion had to send a 
 reconnaissance unit commanded by Lt. Tarasov. At 9 a.m., the enemy opened up with 
 artillery fire on positions in the bridgehead. The bridgehead was also attacked by German 
 ships in Narva bay. Mortars and smaller artillery were constantly being used. First two 
 nights at the bridgehead were very tense; our regiment had no clear contact with adjacent 
 units.  
 
 4
th
 Rifle Regiment Commander Colonel Kuznetsov also faced intense resistance along 
 the way. With heavy casualties, he managed to capture only the first enemy trench at the 
 village of Riigi. 9
th
 Company reached the western bank first. Commanded by D. 
 Kniazikov, 9th Company managed to force the fascists out of the trench. Under heavy 
 gunfire, 9th Company managed to eliminate 37 officers and soldiers and took an active 
 part in  resisting the enemy when it started the counterattack.
426
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Map 9: Situation in the Narva area in February 1944 
In the Siivertsi bridgehead, the attacks continued. Again, Fight as I Shall Dig, February- 
September 1944, offers a description of how intense the fighting was:  
 In the Riigi- Siivertsi zone, 131
st
 Rifle Division was assaulting the “Panther Line.”  
 482nd Regiment which had suffered heavy casualties while liberating nearby settlements 
 was kept in the second echelon. Besides the goal of ensuring the success of the first 
 echelon units, the Regiment had been ordered to protect the left flank of the division from 
 enemy attack from the south. In the first echelon, in Siivertsi-Vaasa zone, 593rd and 
 743rd  Rifle Regiments were assaulting. The 593
rd
 Regiment was the main effort. It was 
 assaulting the right flank, while insuring cooperation with the units of 98
th
 Rifle 
 Division.
427
  
 In the end, Soviet bridgeheads were frustrated by continuous German indirect fires and 
counterattacks. As Krivosheev and Kostin described on page 20: 
 Forces in the first echelon of the 43
rd
 Rifle Corps were involved in intense firefights for a 
 week to the north of Narva. Occupying a small bridgehead on the western bank of the 
 river, it was trying to widen the bridgehead along the front and in depth. The enemy 
 resisted desperately, conducting several counterattacks and using fresh reserves. For 
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 almost a week, our forces could not advance and were forced to defend themselves 
 instead.
428
  
  
  The obvious goal of the German counterattack effort was to eliminate Soviet control of 
the western bank, while preventing breaches in the Panther Line while preventing the Soviets 
from taking Narva. The Germans continued to buy time and frustrate the STAVKA who was 
well aware they had to breach the German positions before the ice of the Narva River was no 
longer able to support the weight of their forces crossing the river. The Soviets planned for the 
early winter as the best time to conduct river crossing operations based on extensive experience 
in other fronts, such as Kiev in the fall of 1943.
429
 Frozen ice strong enough to support the 
weight of tanks facilitated momentum of the attack and required no bridging equipment which 
took up an enormous amount of space on the roads along with time to set up once at the front.  
YOU ARE LOCATED IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION NEAR THE RIVER CROSSING SITE IN RIIGIKÜLA. 
(PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM VIC (35V NF 64018858) LOOKING TOWARD THE EAST.)
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Based on a detailed examination of the physical terrain of the Riigiküla crossing area during 
warmer weather, some interesting details were observed about the Narva River and the banks on 
both sides. The river flowed from the south to the north at about 5 knots toward the Baltic Sea. 
From position (35V NF 64018858, see star on Map 8), the bank was 315 degrees magnetic to 
the north and 140 degrees magnetic to the south. The river width was 251 meters from this 
position. The water was unclear, while the composition of the river bottom appeared to be silt. 
The composition of the soil at the water’s edge was sand, making the banks more susceptible to 
being destroyed with high traffic from armored vehicles. The Soviet side of the river (east bank) 
was unusually higher in elevation than the west bank. The river bank on the Estonia side rose up 
gently from the water, but the sandy composition of the river bank would have made a spring 
crossing after the thaw nearly impossible. Sandy soil composition along the river could not 
support the weight of armored forces crossing the river. The more tanks that crossed the river, 
the more the vehicles would erode the crossing point making it less usable. Clearly, the best time 
for the Soviets to cross would have been in the winter when the river was frozen. The Estonian 
side of the river also had far less vegetation than the Soviet side. (In 1944, both sides of the river 
were cleared by continuous fire.)
430
 The Germans had unlimited visibility looking to the east, but 
the Soviets dominated the western bank and could place fire wherever with impunity. 
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VIEW OF THE NARVA RIVER LOOKING TO THE EAST. (PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM VIC (35V NF 
64018858) THE DIRECTION TO THE YELLOW SIGN WAS 55 DEGREES MAGNETIC.
251 METERS
 
 Operations at the Siivertsi crossing point to the south of Riigiküla were no easier for the 
Soviets. In the following two examples, one sees not only the desperate nature of the tactical 
situation at the bridgeheads, but also the hand of friction played havoc. Looking at the action of 
February 6, 1944 through the lens of weather for the day helps explain some of the German and 
Soviet difficulties of operating in the area. First, the weather in the area.  
 
 
 
431 
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 DATA COLLECTION TIMES  
 07.12  13.12  21.12  AVG  
TEMP  -3.0°C  -2.2°C  -8.0°C  -4.4°C  
WIND SPEED  1 KPH  1 KPH 1 KPH  1 KPH 
DIRECTION  WNW  NW  W   
AVE HUMD  3.3°C  2.8°C  2.3°C  2.8°C  
REL HUMD 
(%)  
90%  71%  93%  85%  
STATION INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED AT: TURIKOJA (ON 
LAKE PEIPUS) LAT: 58° 52’          LONG:  26° 57’  
INFORMATION COLLECTED BY: ALLEK VALDUR 
***TIMES ARE PER LOCAL ESTONIAN TIME ZONE. IF USING IN 
GERMAN PLANNING SUBTRACT ONE HOUR FOR BERLIN’S TIME 
ZONE. 
IF USING FOR SOVIET PLANNING ADD ONE HOUR FOR 
MOSCOW’S TIME ZONE.  
 
432
 
 
What this data demonstrates is the limited amount of daylight the Soviets had to prepare for river 
crossing operations. In the days prior to night vision devices, there was about 7-8 hours of light 
to prepare and execute crossing operations. This was one reason why STAVKA insisted on 
crossing operations in the winter.  Based on the amount of time required to do bridging tasks, 7-8 
hours was hardly enough time to move the required combat power into position for the Soviets to 
articulate into the Estonian space.  
 To attest to the brutality of the fighting at Siivertsi bridgehead, several authors contribute 
accounts detailing the intense tactical level combat to repulse the Soviets in the vicinity of the 
Siivertsi Cemetery in the month of March, 1944. This tactical action illustrates Soviet 
determination to hold onto the bridgehead using a monument from the 1700 Northern War as 
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well as the multiple nationalities fighting together under German command to counterattack at 
the cemetery and the monument.   
 The road was now open for capturing the Siivertsi-Vepsküla area, so the final 
 adjustments were made. The plan was as follows: one battalion of “Nordland” would 
 commence the attack from a suburb of Narva, and attempt to capture the cemetery; where 
 one battalion of “Danmark,” from the Pähklimäe manor would provide support. In 
 addition, the 1
st
 Battalion of the 45
th
 Regiment (20
th
 Waffen SS Grenadier Division) 
 would capture Vepsküla and the military cemetery.
433
 The Siivertsi Cemetery was not 
 captured that day.” 434 Of the memorial: “Beyond the cemetery, however, the area around 
 the memorial from the Nordic War could not be taken. This memorial was a massive 
 granite block erected to honor the Russian General Sheremetjev. Now, the enemy used it 
 for their final stand. They dug a machine gun nest beneath the memorial and from there, 
 until darkness all attempts to push the Russians out failed. Before a heavy flame thrower 
 could be used to reduce the memorial, the machine gun nest lit itself on fire and the 
 ammunition exploded. The Siivertsi cemetery was conquered at 20.15 on March 2, 
 1944.
435
 
 
 
Picture 4: Memorial dedicating the Northern War of 1700. 
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 The size of the counterattack force was entirely limited by the terrain, as explained on 
page 193 of P-035, Retrograde of Army Group North During 1944, “A unified counterattack did 
not materialize. Support by tanks, artillery and heavy infantry weapons were practicable only to a 
limited extent as a result of the tremendous terrain difficulties. Hence, it was possible to break up 
and clear the enemy out of the penetration only in piecemeal fashion.”436 
 
 Picture 5: “Soviet batteries pounded the German positions still holding out during 
the morning of February 13th. Kompanie Landmesser, Kompanie Schirmer and SS-
 Pionier-Battalion 54 at the northern edge of the Siivertsi Cemetery were hit  
 especially hard. From positions on the higher east bank of the river, the Soviets 
engaged every visible target with their antitank guns.” 437 
 
As the amount of time available to conduct operations is definitively known to be 7-8 
hours during daylight, it would be instructive to see the totality of tasks the Soviets doctrinally 
anticipated to conduct based on their manual for river crossing from the period of operations. 
Based on a draft river crossing manual, we have the opportunity to learn two important points, 1) 
how the Soviets learned as an organization and distributed lessons observed across all of their 
                                                          
436
 Department of the Army, MS# P-035 Retrograde of Army Group North During 1944. (Carlisle, Army 
War College: Foreign Military Studies Department 1950), 193.  
182 
 
fronts to benefit other organizations conducting similar operations and 2) how the Soviets 
planned and organized their forces to conduct river crossing operations. First, an examination of 
the manual itself is required.  
 The manual explains crossing rivers occurs in three phases: 1) Organization and 
preparations for river crossings, 2) Focusing on the delivery of the first echelon and capturing the 
opposite bank with a security element while widening the bridgehead for follow-on forces and 3) 
Crossing the main effort to the opposite bank to carry on the attack.
438
 In section 39, the manual 
continues to explain step by step “how to” conduct the crossing in conjunction with the phases 
explained in section 38, starting first with the selection of a crossing point. Section 42 states 
specifically “Army crossing points are selected by Army commanders and division crossing 
points in zone are selected by the division commanders.”439 This helps explain Fediuninsky’s 
interest in personally selecting and examining the bridgeheads. Once a point was picked, a 
reconnaissance effort was nominated to identify the avenues of approach to the crossing point 
then onto the other side of the river. The reconnaissance effort also took into account the 
composition and disposition of enemy defenses on the far bank. Once the reconnaissance was 
complete, the decision was made to cross the river. Once the plan was executed, the first duty 
after crossing the river was to widen the bridgehead while maintaining control of the 
organization and communicating the situation to higher headquarters. Specifically, the manual 
states every effort must be made to conceal the concentration of the main blow against the 
bridgehead and the completion of the third phase of organization.
440
 This brings to mind the 
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excellent wartime use of camouflage and deception by Soviet forces throughout the war. Only 
Japanese forces could rival the Soviet’s use of deception and camouflage tactically.441 Finally, 
the exploitation attack of the bridgehead and conduct of the follow-on main effort attack were 
launched.
442
   
The follow-on main effort attack was what frustrated Soviet forces. The fact was the area 
Fediuninsky was trying to cross was too open to disguise or provide cover for his forces, nor 
could they maintain enough momentum to accomplish the task. STAVKA took notice.
443
    
By February 14th, STAVKA expressed its displeasure with the failed efforts to capture 
Narva and issued the following message to Govorov demanding it be captured at all costs no 
later than the February17th:  
 It is mandatory that our forces seize Narva no later than 17 February 1944. This is 
 required both for military as well as political reasons. It is the most important thing right 
 now. I demand that you undertake all necessary measures to liberate Narva no later than 
 the period indicated.  
      
       [signed] I. Stalin
444
     
  
An unstated military reason for hurrying the operation was the projected weather 
conditions in the Instructions on River Crossing.
445
  First, the average temperatures for late 
winter/early spring 1944 (See highlight portion of chart): 
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Average Temperature and Precipitation Date from Tiirikoja, Estonia (Lat 58° 52’ Long 26° 57’Along Lake 
Peipus) for 1944 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Average 
Temperature 
(C) 
-2.2 -4.7 -3 0.8 8.1 12.6 18.2 NR NR NR 6.2 0.9 
Average 
Precipitation 
(MM) 
27 10 13 24 52 90 62 44 NR 37 68 32 
NR= Not Recorded. Most likely due to the fact the Soviets were coming back into Estonia and the people 
responsible for the measurements fled.  
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 Comparing the differences in information between the average temperature and what the 
Soviets doctrinally needed to conduct a river crossing over the ice of the Narva River 
demonstrates the Soviets were starting in a lesser category and every day they went closer to 
April, the less likely the ice would be safe for heavier traffic bringing up bridging equipment 
would further slow the attack. Bridging assets would have been at a premium across all of the 
Soviet fronts. Every day that passed, the Soviets were growing closer to failure, but why?   
 General Fediuninsky stated in his memoirs the reason for this initial failure to take Narva 
with the following rational: “The primary cause of our failure was not enemy resistance, but 
rather the serious deficiency in organizing the attack and coordinating the troops by headquarters 
at all levels of command, particularly by the Army Commander and the Corps Commanders. The 
matter was complicated by being flattered with success in battles before reaching the Narva 
River.”448 While Fediuninsky struggled to create a bridgehead north of Narva, Soviet forces were 
also fighting to maintain and expand the bridgehead south of the city into the area of Auvere.  
In the area south of the city, the Soviets were making better progress than they were north 
of the city. On the map (See Map 9), it would appear the Soviets were in a far better position 
operating from their bridgehead in the south to breakthrough to the sea than anywhere else. This 
was only true on the map, the terrain in the Auvere area is amongst the worse to be found 
anywhere in the region. Due to the amount of swamps and trees in the area, the southern 
bridgehead was only tenable in the winter months and only to light forces. Heavy armor 
operating in the southern Soviet bridgehead, even in winter had difficulty operating. Looking at 
the problem of approaching the sea from the area of Auvere continues to demonstrate the 
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difficulty of the Soviet position. The terrain does not allow the Soviets to generate momentum 
quickly, nor does it allow the Soviets to maintain it. The closer the Soviets could get to the 
Narva-Tallinn Railroad track, the more vulnerable they became to the effective static fires 
coming from the Blue Hills in “Child’s Home Position (See Map 9).” A terrain study submitted 
by German 32nd Pioneers on March 14, 1944 speaks to the dominate nature of the Blue Hills 
terrain when it states, “The heights form a pivot position, while the forests forbid movement 
from the east, west or south. The heights offer unlimited visibility. Therefore the heights must be 
held.”449 From the south, the Germans are able to negate the Soviet mass by not allowing them to 
deploy across their front. The Soviets are forced to attack in column and are continuously 
channelized by the terrain and by the German obstacle plan and fires. 32nd Pioneer’s terrain 
study referred to the area as “an area for the slaughter of tanks.”450 As the Soviets continued to 
push toward the “Child’s Home Position” and Auvere, they created a salient the Germans called 
the East and West Sack (See Map 9). Again, on a map the Soviet salient looks dangerous to the 
German position, but the Soviets were accepting more risk by attacking than the Germans were 
in defending. German tank commander Otto Carius talked about his operations in the East and 
West Sack in his work, Tiger in the Mud. Carius describes action at the end of February in a 
chapter he described as the “calm before the storm.”451 Carius was in a great position to 
comment on the totality of actions on the Narva Front. As an independent commander with 
prized comedies such as Tiger I tanks, Carius had the opportunity to understand and reflect on 
the situation of the entire Narva Front. There is little doubt his extensive tactical experience was 
tailored by his exception grasp of the operational situation.  
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Based on a Soviet radio transmission, the Germans intercepted a Soviet operations order 
directing new action again the East and West Sacks. The message “forbade antitank and tank fire 
by the frontline units in the bridgehead. It made clear they did not want to give away their 
positions. Only in the case of a German attack on the bridgehead were they allowed to open 
fire.”452While the Soviets may not have wanted to give away their positions, they must have also 
wanted to save ammunition, as their supply lines were getting longer and the terrain was making 
delivery more difficult. As Carius states, the Germans learned two important things from the 
radio intercept,  
 On the one hand, they (the Soviets) certainly had respect for our tanks. On the other hand, 
 it was clear that Ivan had already positioned tanks in the bridgehead. That clearly 
 indicated an intention to attack. Tanks could only be envisioned for an attack. They were 
 completely unsuitable for defending in marshy woods, which allowed no repositioning. It 
 also didn’t require any tremendous strategic talent to realize that the Russians would risk 
 everything to roll up the bothersome German bridgehead at Narva from the south.
453
 
 
In comparison, an interesting assessment comes from the Army Detachment Narva 
Intelligence Officer regarding Soviet attacks and losses in the “west sack” area. The report of 
February 24, 1944 states, “Enemy led violent attacks with tank support against our positions. The 
attack began yesterday with the intention of breaking out of the Kirikuküla area from the south 
(Westsack). The enemy managed to advance only 100 meters before being stopped.  In the 
remaining sectors around the front, the opponent behaved quietly.”454 The report also has another 
interesting piece of analysis, it examines how the Soviets were replacing their losses and from 
what age bracket the men came from. Due to heavy losses in the infantry, the Soviets resorted to 
removing men from Artillery units to have enough combat power to make another attack. “Out 
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of the Artillery Regiment of the division (Guard Artillery Regiment 96) were extracted 120 men. 
Soviet Guard Regiment 129 (45th Soviet Guards Division) had 100 replacements arrive from 
Replacement Regiment 152 on February 20th, nominally in Slantsõ. Age of combatants is 60% 
are between 35-50 years old, 30% are 20-35 years old, and 10% are 19 years old.”455 This 
demonstrates how the war up to 1944 had effected the Soviet population, fewer younger men 
available, forcing the recruitment of older men for the front. Taken collectively, the main lesson 
to be derived from this report of the February 24, 1944 was the Soviets were still having 
difficulty coordinating attacks in multiple locations at the same time across their front. The 
Soviets attacked again and again, failing to achieve a decisive result. Again, they saw the utility 
of attacking from the southern or northern positions. Carius described a period of Soviet artillery 
preparation before an attack, “Even the Americans, whom I got to know later on in the west, 
couldn’t compete with them (the Soviets). The Russians shot with every available weapon, from 
light mortars all the way up to heavy artillery. They showed us they had been doing everything 
but sleeping in the previous few weeks.”456  At the end of March, 1944, the Germans made an 
attempt to eliminate the “East and West Sacks” Carius state, “Its execution was in the hands of 
Oberst Graf Strachwitz.”457 As war produces characters, Oberst Graf Strachwitz was a fine 
example. According to Carius, Strachwitz was a talented organizer and unafraid to remind others 
he was of old German nobility and this meant more than rank.
458
 The purpose of Operation 
STRACHWITZ was “designed to cut off the “West Sack” and eliminate it. The attack was 
conducted from west to east near the “sole” of the “boot.” Contact would then be reestablished 
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with the infantry in the “boot.”459 Operation STRACHWITZ was envisioned to be a joint tactical 
attack or as Carius described, “The entire operation was supported by Stukas (Ju-87s) or, better 
said, was supposed to be supported by Stukas. They proved to be ineffective in the densely 
forested terrain, however, and were even dangerous to our own troops! The pilots couldn’t 
identify their targets. The Ju-87s had arrived on time and brazenly dived onto their assigned 
targets.”460 The air strike was not responsive enough to be of use and the fires could not be well 
controlled. A scenario destined to be a disaster. These efforts in conjunction with the more 
effective infantry and anti-tank fires gave the Germans only temporary success against the “East 
and West Sacks.” The efforts of Operation STRACHWITZ would be repeated two more times, 
but could never provide the decisive result the Germans were seeking in a breakthrough 
counterattack. Attesting to the success of the effort made by Strachwitz, Felix Steiner stated, 
“Heavy tanks of Colonel Graf von Stachwitz’s unit had thrown back the opponent with a hard 
forest fight near Auvere by attacking a division and removing the direct threat to the Narva-
Reval (Tallinn) Highway.”461 It was getting closer to spring and the terrain was no better coming 
from the north to south, than it was from the south to north.   
   At the same time Narva was under attack, the Soviets also continued their attack toward 
the city of Luga. STAVKA devised a way to fix what they thought were the initial command and 
control issues of executing the attack. After the liberation of Luga on the February 12, 1944, 
“STAVKA immediately reorganized its forces for a subsequent advance toward Pskov and 
Ostrov. At 24.00 hours on February 13th it dissolved Meretskov’s Volkhov Front, transferring 
the 59th, 8th, and 54th Armies and their offensive sectors, the 65th and 310th Rifle Divisions in 
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the front’s reserve, and the 14th Air Army to the Leningrad Front effective  February 15th.”462 
While one would naturally think this would have made Govorov’s task easier, based on the 
principle of unity of command under the Leningrad Front only, the space being covered was too 
great for effective command and control. Two days later on February 17th, “Model began 
implementing his order to withdraw his forces back to the Panther Line by 1 March.”463 Once 
Govorov received more forces and a better understanding of the situation, he reworked his plan 
in reaction to Model’s actions. Govorov send another plan to STAVKA for approval that took 
into consideration the sum of all changes of the situation. The plan was submitted on February 
17, 1944 created the conditions for the Soviets to recognize their second operational campaign 
plan goal of liberating the Baltic States. It acts as the direct link between the tactical means 
available and the desired strategic end state. Glantz states,  
 Govorov dispatched his proposed operational concept to the STAVKA for its approval. 
 His concept recommended that two mutually supporting columns conduct the offensive 
 toward Pskov and Ostrov, the first consisting of the 42d and 67th Armies and the second 
 of the 8th and 54th Armies. At the same time, Tikhonov’s 108th Rifle Corps, on the 42d 
 Army’s right flank, was to conduct supporting attacks across the narrow neck of water 
 between Lakes Chud (Peipus) and Pskov (Lake Teploe). Govorov’s plan required 
 Fediununsky’s 2d Shock Army to capture Narva, penetrate German defenses between the 
 Narva Bay and Lake Chud (Peipus), and make its main attack southwest toward Parnu to 
 destroy the newly reformed Eighteenth Army in Estonia and capture Tallinn (Reval).
464
   
 
 On February 22, 1944, Govorov received a response from STAVKA approving the plan 
he had submitted just days earlier. He had been ordered to accelerate his planned offensive.
465
 
The order Govorov receives was as follows:  
 The STAVKA of the Supreme High Command approves your operational plan No. 
 126/sh and orders: 
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 1. After penetrating enemy defenses on the isthmus north of lake Chud (Peipus), the 
 front’s right wing, consisting of three armies (no fewer than nine rifle corps not counting 
 the Estonian rifle corps and one tank corps), will develop the attack toward Pärnu with 
 one army to cut off the withdrawal routes of the enemy’s Tallinn grouping and will attack 
 southward toward Viljandi, Valga and Tartu, and Viru with two armies.  
 
 2. The main forces of the front’s left wing, consisting of three armies (nine rifle corps), 
 will be directed to capture the Ostrov region by enveloping Pskov from the north and 
 forcing the Velikaia River. After which it will develop an offensive in the general 
 direction of Riga. In connection with the withdrawal of the enemies Staraja Russa 
 grouping and the establishment of communications with the 2d Baltic Front’s 1st Shock 
 Army, it is not necessary to allocate a strong group to protect the main forces’ left flank 
 in the south. 
 
       [Signed] I. Stalin, A. Antonov
466
     
4.4 CONCLUSION: 
 Ultimately, the success of anything is measured by the results it produces. In the case of 
the German plan for Operation BLAU, success of the plan was owed to realistic understanding of 
the capabilities of subordinate units along with providing flexibility to junior leaders to make 
decisions within an established doctrinal framework. The German operational-level success of 
Plan BLAU gave the strategic-level in Berlin something it thought it didn't need to plan for, that 
being an organized retrograde from Leningrad, while giving the tactical-level commander and 
soldier in the field what they needed to survive. There is little doubt the Germans understood the 
weight the Soviets would apply against Army Group North in their attempts to fragment the 
Army Group. Indeed, the Germans took the correct measures prior to the commencement of the 
Soviet attack, further reflecting an accurate planning effort from Plan BLAU. The execution of 
events in the Soviet  breakout attack make it clear the Germans were operating within the bounds 
of their established defensive doctrine and were acting in a way they were trained and educated 
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to do; the Soviets on the other hand were learning how to more effectively conduct a break 
through attack, while developing their doctrine and learning through hard experience. 
 In terms of doctrinal development for the Germans, the Soviet breakout attack from 
Leningrad validated years of refinement in their approach to defense in depth. Critically, the 
absent element was enough local strength in the form of  a tactical-level reserve to conduct a 
counter attack into the flank of oncoming Soviet formations. Time along with a massive space 
and oncoming opposing force did not allow reduced German combat power the slightest ability 
to locally mass at a position of advantage on the Soviet's flank. In terms of time, the Germans 
could only briefly fix the front and jab at the Soviet flank, but Germany could not afford a 
decisive defensive engagement as experience over two wars had definitively shown.       
 Doctrinally, on the other hand the Soviets had demonstrated they understood how to 
attack in depth, articulating massive amounts of men and material in time and space efficiently 
through a refined understanding of combined arms. Centralized command and control facilitated 
the order required to move the mass in the correct direction, then the mass predictably followed 
the paths of least resistance. The Soviet Army displayed a tremendous ability to be a learning 
organization as their bridging manual displays. Forces that seek solutions to problems from the 
top as well as the bottom are not only more likely to find the answers they seek, but they are also 
more likely to be accepted by the force that must implement them and make them work. The 
Soviet difficultly of crossing a river even while frozen in 1944 further validates the timeless 
nature of war, commanding the attention of the scholar and professional soldier today. Only 
though reflections born of observation can meaningful changes be made to the conduct of war.    
 When applying scientific understanding of the terrain and weather to the execution of 
Plan BLAU, it is also clear the Germans masterfully examined the external lines of operation and 
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communication the Soviets could use in the theater of operations to achieve their desired end 
state. The Germans managed tactically to do the impossible with young formations of different 
experience levels and from several different countries. Plan BLAU was simple enough to 
accommodate many different and complicated factors while flexible enough to deal with the 
unforeseen that ruins most plans. While Plan BLAU successfully accomplished it's chief task of 
retrograding Army Group North to the  "Panther Position," what will be explored in the next 
chapter is two-fold. Firstly, how well did Plan BLAU facilitate subsequent German planning 
efforts to fight to the Blue Hills positions and set the stage for the German evacuation of the 
Baltic region after the Finns decided to leave the war? Secondly, how well did the terrain chosen 
by BLAU for the "Panther Position" cripple follow-on Soviet tactical actions to exploit the 
success of their breakout attack from Leningrad?  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conventional Means of Exploitation: German Defense in Depth 
versus Soviet Attack in Depth  
 
 While breakthrough attack is an important first step in offensive operations, it will not by 
itself bring victory. Breakthrough attack must be followed by exploitation. Operational and 
tactical breakthrough must be followed by operational and tactical-level exploitation to facilitate 
a strategic end state being recognized. Such was the case for the Soviets operating against Army 
Group North in the late spring of 1944. While the Soviets successfully broke the German hold on 
the city of Leningrad and achieved their first campaign goal, they now had to content with the 
strength of the German position along the Narva River designated the "Panther Position" as 
articulated in Plan BLAU.
467
  
 Understanding no plan survives as it was thought of, what should be considered is what 
changes are made to the original plan that allows it to remain relevant. Also, how does the plan 
as it was conceived allow for transition to other subsequent planning efforts as strategic goals 
change and how do the combatants respond to those changes.  In this chapter an examination of 
how the "Panther Position" was composed in comparison to available terrain and the newly 
Army Group Narva will be conducted. Recognizing exploitation attacks designed to achieve the 
second goal of retaking the Baltic states were not working fast enough, the Soviets first looked to 
the sea with a landing operation at Merküla along the Estonian coast as a way to gain the German 
flank of the "Panther Position" and the new emerging "Tannenberg Position."
468
 What should 
interest the scholar or professional soldier is how did the Germans manage to withdraw under 
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such heavy pressure in such an organized manner. How does the "Panther Position" of Plan 
BLAU facilitated the success of Operations SEEALDER and FLAMINGO with the use of the 
"Tannenberg Position?"
469
 How is the "Tannenberg Position" being used to Soviet forces at 
Sinimäed allowing for the successful retrograde of German forces to Latvia? How does a second 
defense in depth at the "Marienburg Line" allow this successful movement to Latvia to occur?
470
 
These questions and thoughts comprise the purposes for this chapter. Starting first with an 
examination of the "Panther Position."    
5.1 THE “PANTHER POSITION:" 
 First, it is necessary to define exactly what the Panther Line was in order to understand 
what the Soviets desired to breach. According to Operation plan of Operation BLAU, it was the 
last phase line or control measure labeled “D” on the plan graphic.471 In P-035, the Germans 
defined the “Panther Line” or Position as; 
 In the Eighteenth Army’s zone, the proposed position extended in front of the Velikaya 
 River from Puchkinskiye-Gory, east and north of Pskov toward the southern tip of Lake 
 Pskov, from there along the western shore of Lake Pskov and Lake Peipus up to the 
 Naroova (Narva) River and along the western bank of that river up to the Baltic Sea. The 
 total length of this position, called the Panther Line, amounted to 425 kilometers, of 
 which 215 kilometers were “land fronts” and 210 kilometers “lake fronts.”472  
 
The explanation of the position is then given in terms of anticipated German troop to task needs 
to defend the “Panther Line” based on the terrain and enemy situation. P-035 continues,  
 The latter (the lake front units) could be guarded by a few security units. In comparison 
 with these figures, the old position comprised 400 kilometers of “land fronts” and 50 
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 kilometers of “lake fronts.” Disregarding the “lake fronts,” the shortening of the front 
 held by Eighteenth Army would therefore have amounted to nearly 200 kilometers. As a 
 result of the occupation of the proposed Panther Line, very substantial elements of the 
 forces employed along the present line would therefore have been freed to serve as 
 reinforcements or reserves in the anticipated defensive battle.
473
    
 
Examination of this statement demonstrates the Germans made a concerted effort to pair the 
needs of the task against the terrain to create an economy of force mission for 18th Army. This 
statement also acknowledges the German desire to create an operational reserve to be employed 
perceivably as a counterattack force. This was again another attempt on the part of German 
operational and tactical level leaders to fight Hitler’s dictum to not give the Soviets ground by 
using doctrinal considerations of defensive employment as a reason to not only retrograde forces 
to the “Panther Line,” but to counterattack with a prepared force. 
 A Soviet description of the composition of the “Panther Line” is also found in the work 
Fight as I Shall Dig, February- September 1944. It states;  
 The defensive line of the enemy along the Narva River was based mainly on this large 
 water barrier and consisted of the number of well arranged positions. 100 meters away 
 from the first trench there was a second trench reinforced by more positions. On the 
 eastern side of the river, the fascists had two strong points. One was in the vicinity of 
 Ivangorod, and sub-strongholds in Popovka, Lilienbach, and Dolgaya Niva. The other 
 was located 20 kilometers southwest from Ivangorod and included the villages of 
 Krivaso, Dolgaya Niva and Pustoi Konets. Big trenches along these strongholds, 
 reinforced by  bunkers and firing positions 20-25 meters apart. Barb wire ran in front of 
 the first trench with minefields. Both bridge strong points could be supported by 
 artillery fire from the  stronghold located on the western bank of the Narva River. 
 Ivangorod bridge strong  points had secondary trench lines arranged in a defense in 
 depth,  located 100-200 meters away from the first trench. Tank avenues of 
 approach were covered by the enemy. All  roads leading to the river were mined. 
 Underground  casemates of bunkers and Swedish  Bastions were equipped for 
 artillery, mortars and  shelters for personnel.
474
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Picture 6: A View of the Narva River taken from the North in Spring 1944. 
On March 18, 1944, III SS Panzer Korps wrote a study on the best way to defend the city 
of Narva along with the tactical level ramifications of leaving the positions they were holding in 
the previous quote. This document is best viewed in its entirety, as this study has never been 
viewed in context of this problem. It states;  
 Headquarters         Korps HQ, 18.3.1944 
 III. (germ.) SS Panzer Korps 
 Ia Tgb.Nr. 186/44 g.Kdos. 
 Subj.: Study on the Defense of Narva 
 Ref:  Mission of the Commander of Army Group North to the Commander of III. (germ.) 
 SS Panzer Korps 
 
 With a vision of the defense of the west bank of the Narva River, it is necessary to hold 
 the east bank with forward positions.  
 
 The line of defense includes islands south of the city, to include Cemetery and Popowka 
 lines. If this was to be done, two battalions could be saved. 
 
 However, here are the drawbacks: 
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 1.) New fighting positions and old fighting positions with obstacle plans are given to the 
 enemy (by moving from current positions). 
 
 2.) Defense of the towns will create more causalities. Digging in on the western side, the 
 ground contains rock. 
 
 3.) Heavy weapons and artillery will be able to provide supporting fires in this course of 
 action. 
 
 4.) Due to a strong current, units on the east bank will have difficulty resupplying. The 
 narrowness of the bridgehead makes this difficult as well. 
 
 5.) The fields of fire on the west side for assigned weapons, in difference to what they are 
 doing now on the HLK (Main Line of Resistance), are much smaller. Heavy weapons 
 must be used because the river creates dead space. 
 
 The fights for Narva have already today yielded the leadership proof that the present 
 line (HLK), even though it seems to be a loss of combat power, is the only possible form 
 of the plan.
476
 
 
 Any major changes to the plan will result in the loss of the City of Narva. 
 As of today, the defense of the City of Narva has cost 2,884 losses. 
 There is no replacement plan, but there is a need for one.
477
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Picture 7: German use of a 20mm Anti-Aircraft Gun as a direct fire weapon. 
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 This study demonstrates the Germans were committed to continue fighting on the east 
bank of the Narva River for as long as possible, even though they speak of supply concerns. 
Correctly, they cite “weaponering” concerns or the ability to properly employ weapons from 
their positions in relation to the terrain they are charged with defending as the main concern. The 
authors also acknowledge the idea of using the city as a place to defend from, while they also 
identify the cost in friendly causalities. While the Soviets could be made to pay for every block, 
they had more men to pay with than the Germans did. Thoughts such as these are the sign of a 
well trained, group of professional soldiers who understand their business. In no area of war are 
the effects of weapons considered more closely than the tactical level. The tie of weapons to the 
terrain is the most important aspect of tactical combat. Not understanding the ground and how to 
use it can lose a battle before it begins.     
  
  By the Germans choosing the isthmus of Narva, they were attempting to do the same 
thing the ancient Spartans did against Persia at Thermopylae.
479
 Like the Persians, the Soviets 
had a significant amount of mass they could bring to bear against the German lines, but like 
Thermopylae, the terrain of the isthmus made the Soviet number count for nothing, as they could 
not bring their superior numbers to bear against the Germans in the given space of the terrain. 
There was no space to bring offensive combat power to bear and what space was available was 
dominated by the Germans on very narrow, limited directions of advance that were defended in 
depth. Soviet mass therefore could not maneuver in depth or time and space. To make needed 
changes to the plan required a new task organization for available German forces.      
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5.2 ARMY GROUP NORTH CREATES ARMY DETACHMENT NARVA: 
 In the midst of the Soviet attack and reorganization from two fronts to only one, German 
Army Group North in conjunction with 18th Army identified the need to create a separate Army 
Detachment which was eventually called Army Detachment Narva. Amazingly, the Germans had 
to make this decision at the same time they were conducting a retrograde to the “Panther Line.” 
However, there is disparity in the historical record regarding the timing of the breakoff of the 
element that became Army Detachment Narva. According to Earl Ziemke’s work Stalingrad to 
Berlin: the German Defeat in the East, “On 24 February General der Infanterie Johannes 
Friessner, who had proved himself in the fighting on the Sixteenth Army-Eighteenth Army 
boundary, took over Sponheimer’s command which was then redesignated Armeeabteilung 
Narva.”480 David Glantz also made use of the previous quote in his work on Leningrad between 
pages 390-91. Examining the ex-post German thoughts of General der Artillerie Herbert Loch 
contained in P-035, The Retrograde Defensive of Army Group North during 1944, yet another 
explanation and date is found regarding the break off of Army Detachment Narva. On page 100 
Loch states, “At 24.00 hours on 3 February Group Sponheimer, which could no longer be 
controlled by the army headquarters because of the great distance between them, was separated 
from the Eighteenth Army and assigned directly to the army group.”481While the purpose here is 
not to retrace the various names of Army Detachment Narva, it is import to understand clearly 
when and why the Germans created an organization they had not planned for in their conception 
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for Operation BLAU.
482
 With an understanding of the creation of the organization comes a need 
to understand the command and control relationship for subsequent tactical employment.  
 
         
483
 
Picture 8: A German Tactical-Level Command Post on the Narva Front 1944. 
While an operational level command, Army Detachment Narva was initially subordinate 
to 18th Army as Group Sponheimer, the organization was eventually given a direct relationship 
to Army Group North by March 1944 as Army Detachment Narva.
484
 While there is disparity 
amongst historians and the records over when Army Detachment Narva was formed, an 
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 While discussing the command relationship, another important aspect to examine is the commander’s 
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examination of the Army Group North table of organization and associated manning documents 
makes clear the command relationship and the effective dates. The definitive answers are found 
in NARA T-311, Roll 70, First Frame 7,091,147 or the Orders of Battle (Kriegs-Gliederungen) 
for Army Group North. The table of organization for January 16, 1944 has no references to a 
task organized force, however it is clear based on the decisive Soviet breakout attack from 
Leningrad on January 14th there was a significant amount of fragmented units operating at 
reduced strength.
485
  
Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  16.1.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091159
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
Divisions:
L er XXVIII
XXXVIII
6 Attached to 
other 
Divisions
II./Gr.Rgt. 391
I./      “       399
7 Police 
securities -
and order 
troops
NORTH
III. Germ.
4
Frw Br.  
L6 18
Nordland 10. 9.
11.126. 215.170.
LIV. 138
24. 225
18 2
15 Inf Div
1 Jg Div
5 Lw F Div
1 K Gr
1 Frw Leg
1 SS Nordld
170J D
61.
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Armeeabteilung.” See: Department of the Army, MS# P-035 Retrograde of Army Group North During 1944. 
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LEGEND: Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  16.1.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091159
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
Divisions:
6 Attached to 
other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities -
and order 
troops
XXVI. 113
NORTH
212.227. 121.
XXVIII. 24
Span
Legion 12.
21.
13.
XXXVIII.
30
r.A.583.28Jg.
1.
2
Lett .  
Reports directly 
to 18th Army:
2
HgH
Argb
303
18 2
12 Inf Div
1 Jg Div
1 K Gr
1 Frw Leg
1 SS Nordld
2 Br
K-Gr
Pol
 
On February 1, 1944, the table of organization for Army Group North still illustrates 18th 
and 16th Armies directly subordinated to Army Group North, with a task organized Group 
Sponheimer subordinated to 18th Army.
486
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Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  1.2.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091179
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from 
other 
Divisions:
6 Attached 
to other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities 
- and 
order 
troops
NORTH
III. Germ.
4
Frw Br.  
L
6113
Nordland
Reste
11.
Reste
126.
Kgr
212
138
KGr
24.
Kgr
215
18 2
Kgr
225.
Gr. Spoonheimer
(LIV.)
1 6
Kgr
61.
Kgr
178.
Kgr
227.
Pz Gr
Fhh.
 
LEGEND: Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  1.2.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091179
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
Divisions:
6 Attached to 
other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities -
and order 
troops
XXVI.
NORTH
58.121.
XXVIII.
Gr
Korow12.
21.
13.
XXXVIII. 30
r.A.583.Kgr
28Jg.
2
Lett .  
Reports directly 
to 18th Army:
2
HgH
Argb
303
K-Gr
Pol
Gr
Pehl
12.
Span
Leg.
18 2
 
The composition of Group Sponheimer as an entity to facilitate command and control of 
forces was centered around the Corps staff of the LIV Corps, thus this organization was 
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redesignated Group Sponheimer after the commander of III SS Panzer Corps.
487
 On February 19, 
1944, two interesting things stand out on the Army Group North table of organization. First, the 
fragmented combat power of Group Sponheimer was clearly consolidated and strengthened to be 
made more cohesive. Second, the first appearance of Nahtgruppe Friessner.
488
 This was the 
organization alluded to by Ziemke and Glantz that occupied a position between 18th and 16th 
Armies responsible for the seam between the two Armies.
489
  
Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  19.2.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091187
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from 
other 
Divisions:
6 Attached 
to other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities 
- and 
order 
troops
NORTH
III. Germ.
4
Frw Br.  
L
113
Nordland
11.
Sich
207.
G 
Krucher
138
18 2
Kgr
225.
Gr. Spoonheimer
(LIV.)
Kgr
61.
Kgr
178.
Kgr
227.
Pz Gr
Fhh.
Est
Frw Br.
58.
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LEGEND: Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  19.2.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091187
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
Divisions:
6 Attached to 
other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities -
and order 
troops
XXVI.
NORTH
24
XXVIII.
12.126. 13.
r.A.
583.
Reports directly 
to 18th Army:
2
HgH
Argb
303
K-Gr
Pol
Span
Leg.
18 2
18
215. 21.
212.
Basse.
 
The table of organization for March 7, 1944 shows Army Detachment Narva, 18th and 
16th Armies all directly subordinate to Army Group North.
490
  
Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  7.3.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091192
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from 
other 
Divisions:
6 Attached 
to other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities 
- and 
order 
troops
NORTH
III. Germ.
4
Frw Br.  
XXVL
113
Nordland 11.
Sich
207.
12
16
18 2
227.
Armeegr. Narva
67. 122.270.Fhh.
Gr. Berlin
Reports directly 
Army Group Narva:
138
20 Est
Frw Br. 58. 225.214. Sich
285.
L
24
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LEGEND: Troop Arrangement of Army Group North      As of  7.3.44
(Minus 16th Army) Frame:7091192
2 A.O.K.
3 Corps
4 Divisions
5 Attached 
from other 
Divisions:
6 Attached to 
other 
Divisions
7 Police 
securities -
and order 
troops
XXXVIII.
NORTH
30
XXVIII.
21.
126.
13.
r.A.
583.
Reports directly 
to 18th Army:
2
HgH
Argb
303
Pol
Span
Leg.
18 2
18
215.21. 212.
Remm
linger.
24
121.
30
Kgr
8.Jg
VI. 
2. Lett
Brig.
15. Lett
Frw Div
 
What should be taken away from this discussion is the importance of command 
relationships and task organization based on the enemy situation and terrain. The tables of 
organization demonstrate not only the relationship of who was responsible, but more importantly 
what they were responsible for. What these tables of organization prove is based on the enemy 
situation and the German location of available combat power on the ground, senior German field 
commanders made the decision to task organize a unit to fulfill a specific purpose. What is 
debatable is was Army Detachment Narva task organized to fulfill the purpose of defending 
Narva or was Army Detachment Narva in reality what the Germans had available to fulfill the 
task of defending Narva. The truth is the latter. Commanders always make do with the resources 
they have available to accomplish their mission. True task organization is not taking fragmented 
capabilities and making units from them. Typically, task organization is thought of as the use of 
cohesive and complete capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission. These units usually have 
the opportunity to train with each other before they operate, but this was hardly the case 
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anywhere on the Eastern Front. In the case of the German forces operating around the Narva 
area; the terrain and situation dictated a need to have something smaller than an Army, but large 
than a Corps handle the task of controlling the situation and terrain in and around Narva. 
Recomposing capabilities under combat conditions is especially difficult, but the desperate 
nature of the problem certainly drove the necessity. The reason for this task organization has 
been little explored by historians, but the answer lies in the mission and the terrain.   
NARA T-312, Roll 1630, Frame 1 is the command chronology of Army Detachment 
Narva. As is the case with most unit histories, reasons for command decision are rarely given.
491
 
However, the history of events leading to the creation of Army Detachment Narva allows the 
reason for formation to be pulled from the tactical situation on the battlefield.  
 As German forces continued their retrograde toward the “Panther Line,” commanders and 
staff planners were confronted by the reality of the enemy situation as well as the physical nature 
of the terrain in the vicinity of Narva. With the Baltic Sea to the north and Lake Peipus to the 
south, the city of Narva was considered the gate into Estonia. Narva geographically was seated at 
the entrance to the isthmus.  It was not genius that allowed the Germans to define how the 
Soviets were going to try to break the Narva River positions in the “Panther Line,” but rather 
natural and manmade geographic constrains coupled with historical precedent. Many of the 
answers for how to invade Estonia in the Estonian War for Independence as well as the plan for 
Estonian Defense prior to 1940.
492
 Estonian expertise could be consulted by the Germans for 
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 As the Germans had incorporated members of the former Estonian Government into their service, those 
who survived the 1940 Soviet purges could have been used to explain the Estonian plan to the Germans.  
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how to best defend Estonian territory as well as engendering a more active interest on the part of 
Estonians to fight for their country.
493
  
 Examination of Soviet possibilities for the invasion of Estonia by breaking the “Panther 
Line” yields three possibilities for invasion. The first possibility was the Soviets could attack 
from the sea, if they had the available sea lift to embark a landing force. In doing so, the Soviets 
could dominate the use of the strategic and operational flank by concentrating a force for a 
tactical penetration somewhere along the northern coast. An amphibious operation was certainly 
the most dangerous course of action from the German perspective; but it was also the most 
unlikely, particularly one on a large scale. Based on a lack of experience,  the Soviets were most 
likely to conduct an amphibious raid . While the Soviets may have had the lift required to 
embark a landing force, they lacked the expertise needed for the complicated ship to shore 
amphibious envelopment of a strategic flank. The Soviet inability to conduct an amphibious 
operation will be later demonstrated in this chapter by the much smaller tactical landing attempt 
at Merküla.  
 The second possibility for the invasion of Estonia was centered around directly attacking 
Narva and the isthmus behind it. Narva acts as the cork at the top of a bottle. With the Baltic Sea 
to the North and a significant swamp and forest area to the south, winter was the only feasible 
period to attack across the Narva River to the north or south of the city. This possibility was 
seriously entertained by both the Soviets and Germans. The defense of the isthmus was the 
reason the Germans felt they needed to create a separate Army Detachment. This direct 
connection to the desired strategic needs of keeping open strategic lines of communication and 
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operation to Finland in the north, while also helping to secure iron ore from Sweden.
494
 It can be 
argued that Army Detachment Narva was fulfilling a joint task with tactical level force 
integration, as they were directly responsible for the accomplishment of two major German 
strategic objectives.  
 The third possibility for the invasion of Estonia consists of coming around the southern 
tip of Lake Peipus from Latvian territory. This was the most likely course of action based on the 
Soviet force composition. While it would take longer for Soviet forces to get to the Estonian 
coastal cities with an attack from this direction, it placed Soviet forces in a central position to 
conduct a more direct approach attack toward Riga, while cutting off German forces operating in 
Estonia.
495
  
 While all three possibilities fell into Army Group North’s purview, they directly affected 
the commanders and staffs of 18th Army as they planned the defense of the Narva area. All three 
possibilities are addressed in the remaining sections of this chapter.   
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The timing of the Merküla landing was synchronized with the main Soviet plan resubmitted to 
STAVKA.  
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5.3 THE SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS ATTEMPT AT MERKÜLA: 
(MAP 10) GERMAN MAP FROM FEBRUARY13, 1944 SHOWING THE MERKÜLA 
LANDING IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOVIET BRIDGEHEAD OPERATIONS.  
                                                                                                  
496
 
The middle of February 1944 provided the Soviets with the opportunity to try their hand 
at amphibious operation in the area of Merküla (See Map 10). Works written in English offer 
little about the Soviet amphibious failure. It is necessary to examine this failure to see what can 
be learned from it. An interesting commentary on the failures of this operation can be found in 
the war memoirs of Soviet Rear Admiral U.V. Ladinski.
497
 In The Watch of War, Ladinski 
describes all aspects of the operation; from how the operation was conceived, to thoughts about 
why it failed. Ladinski starts by describing the operational environment the Soviets faced in the 
early months of 1944, “The Front line troops failed to overpower the enemy defenses on the 
Narva isthmus and the attack was halted.  Thus the most urgent task remaining (for the Soviet 
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navy) was to assist the seashore flank of army.”498 Recognizing this, Ladinski recalled the 
reaction of the Soviet naval high command.  
 At the beginning of February, I was called by the Fleet Commander. The members of 
 Military Council Rear-Admiral N. K. Smirnov and the Chief of Staff Rear-Admiral A. N. 
 Petrov  were also present. The Fleet Commander said to me: 
  
 The island base (Kronstadt) has ordered the landing of troops in the Narva Bay area; the 
 unit chosen was the sub-machine gunners’ battalion from the 260th detached Marine 
 Brigade. The landing  will be supported by the gunboats division from Skerries 
 detachment, which was to deliver the battalion on Lavanseri tomorrow. Tomorrow, 
 move out to the island and take control of the landing preparation. The Chief of Staff will 
 inform you in more details later.
499
 
 
 Before the details were provided to Ladinski by the Chief of Staff, the Soviets had issued 
some important operational planning guidance that would prove to have catastrophic effects on 
the operation. Ladinski recalls, “The battalion was not being provided as a means of 
reinforcement, this meant the battalion going ashore would join the attacking troops (already on 
the offensive from the bridgeheads) on the same day. Their actions before this point had to be 
ensured by the fleet with naval gun fire support.”500 However, in order to preserve the element of 
surprise, the decision was made not to use naval gun fire support for the landing. Other plans for 
the landing operation included, “Torpedo provision for the landing detachment and fire support 
ships, including mine-sweeping of fairways leading towards Narva Bay and the areas of 
maneuver. The landing was planned for the village of Merküla. The landing was to be 
commanded by Rear Admiral G. V. Zukov.”501 The subordinate commanders for the landing 
were Major S. P. Maslov, the Battalion Commander for the landing force from the 260th Marine 
Brigade, while the naval shipping and support force was under the command of Captain 1
st
 Rank 
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S. V. Kudrjavtsev.
502
  Fight as I Shall Dig explains the order to execute the landing was sent; “on 
February 13, at 13.05.  Fleet headquarters sent an order by phone: “mission must be 
accomplished tonight February 13th  to February 14th according to your plan”. At 15.30, the 
landing force was embarked aboard ships. Loading was completed in half an hour.”503 The 
Soviet landing force then moved out for the landing site at Merküla with mine sweepers in the 
lead. 
 At 04.00 on the morning of February 14 1944, the sub-machine gunners loaded landing 
craft and headed for the shore in the vicinity of Merküla. Merküla was a “fishing village with 30 
houses and two churches” and it served as the command post for Gruppe Berlin.504Initially, as 
troops went ashore there was no resistance. German defenses then came to life.
505
 “The main 
body of the assault force was led by the landing force commander, Major S. Maslov, with 250-
300 Marines. These men fought their way to Repnika, Langa, and Auvere. Their mission was to 
attack German positions from Merküla and consolidate with units of 2
nd
 Shock Army attacking 
from the south. From the landing force, three soldiers managed to reach friendly forces: 
Lieutenant. A. Lubimov, Junior. Sergeant. I. Meteush and Sergeant. G. Semenkin.” 506  
                                                          
502
 Ibid.  
503
 E. Krivosheev and N. Kostin, Е. Кривошеев Н. Костин, Битва за Нарву, Февраль - Сентябрь 1944 
года (Fight as I Shall Dig, February-September 1944) (Tallinn, ESSR: Eesti Raamat, 1984), 47.  
504
 Wilhelm Tieke, Tragedy of the Faithful, A History of the III. (germanisches) SS-Panzer Korps, 
(Manitoba, Canada : J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing 2001), 62. 
505
 U. V. Ladinski, Ю. В. Ладинский, Военная Вахта (The Watch of War) (Moscow, USSR: Military 
Publishing House, 1983) 185. 
506
 E. Krivosheev and N. Kostin, Е. Кривошеев Н. Костин, Битва за Нарву, Февраль - Сентябрь 1944 
года (Fight as I Shall Dig, February-September 1944) (Tallinn, ESSR: Eesti Raamat, 1984), 53. 
214 
 
Picture 9: MERKÜLA SOVIET LANDING SITE (VIC 35V NF 54988718 ) LOOKING 
NORTH TOWARD THE BEACH.
 
Attesting to the individual bravery of the Soviet Marines conducting the landing, Ladinski 
recalled,  
 For example, “BMO-505” under the command of First Lieutenant V. B. Lozinski 
 distinguished itself. They reached the coast first, landed the troops and supported them 
 with fire from their automatic gun and machine-guns.  They then removed Marines from 
 damaged launches against shells and bullets. When the launch commander was killed, 
 Second Lieutenant M. E. Rokin then took charge. Overcoming pain of a wound, he 
 leaded the launch to the coast, landed a second group of sub-machine-gunners and 
 moved away. Many of seamen from the crew of “BMO-509” and “MBKA-562” under 
 enemy fire showed courage and skill.
507
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MERKÜLA SOVIET LANDING 
SITE MEMORIAL 
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 Awaiting the Soviet Marines were German defenses, “An Estonian police battalion 
defended the coast line from Mummassaare to Merküla. A naval coastal artillery battery with 
10cm captured guns was also in the dunes.”508 The sector of Merküla was controlled by Marine-
Battaillon Hohnschild, a group of German Auxiliary Sailors.
509
 Once the Germans began to gain 
control of the situation, “twelve Stukas showed up at the same time.”510  Eventually by 09.00, an 
armored platoon with infantry under the command of SS Sturmbannführer Engelhardt 
counterattack from the southwest. Felix Steiner also recalled this landing and the counterattack,  
 Brave Panzer Grenadiers smashed every attack of the Soviet's landing at Merküla; 
 they became quick prey for the Estonians.  The enemy knew he had to fight to the death.  
 Therefore, the unit landing was designated as a "death battalion.”  Every one of its 
 soldiers carried a picture Stalin with his signature. In vain, Stalin had given them this 
 talisman.  Everyone fought fanatically to the last breath.
511
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 By 10.00, the landing had been crushed with 300 Soviet Marines dead and 200 more 
captured.
512
 
Picture 10: MERKÜLA SOVIET LANDING SITE MEMORIAL: THE STONE TO THE 
RIGHT  READS, “HERE IN MERKÜLA IN FEBRUARY 1944 THE SOVIET SAILORS 
HEORICALLY FOUGHT TO CLEAR SOVIET ESTONIA FROM THE FASCISTS! 
EVERLASTING GLORY TO THE HEROES!”
 
Some of the lessons Ladinski observed of the amphibious attempt at Merküla were 
centered around the lack of support for the operation, both tactically in the local area of the 
operation, as well as collectively as an operational level attempt to break the German hold on the 
Narva area. In Tragedy of the Faithful, Tieke understood the Mereküla operation was being 
conducted in conjunction with operations in the northern and southern bridgeheads (See Map 
10).
513
The Soviets were unable to capitalize on confusion in the German rear and exploit the 
fluid situation to their advantage. Amphibious operations in broad daylight are difficult enough 
for a well rehearsed force; the level of difficulty for a night time assault was clearly beyond the 
capability of the force conducting the operation. On page 185, Ladinski summarizes his thoughts 
about the operation; 
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 The landing action should have been coordinated with land forces attack. That morning 
 the attack was undertook without any success. At this point, help couldn’t have come to 
 the Marines. Later after returning to Leningrad, I talked to those who landed and had 
 managed to reach our troops through the front line. They told me after landing on the 
 coast, they met superior forces and powerful fire. To move forward was impossible. 
 Then, the battalion commander ordered the Marines to break through the Auvere station 
 in small groups, where it was  planned for them to meet attacking troops.
514
 
 
 Examination of the terrain where the landing occurred demonstrates the Germans did not 
need to expend much energy to make the Soviet landing a disaster. On average, the water’s edge 
was about 100 meters from German positions. The German positions rested neatly on top of a 
cliff 40-50 meters above the water line of the beach. German guns were aimed straight down the 
beach, without supporting fires from naval guns to make the transition from ship to shore. 
Retrospectively,  it is amazing anyone survived to reach the beach. In the end, Tieke recalled, 
“the Soviets who had landed repeatedly charged the steep slope to eliminate the battery. 
Hundreds of them were killed on the steep, heavily vegetated slope with its multiple barbed-wire 
entanglements.
515
    
5.4 THE SOVIET ATTACK THROUGH THE ISTHMUS AND ACTIONS AT 
SINIMÄED AND BEYOND: 
 By July 1944, the Germans understood they could not hold the city of Narva indefinitely. 
The constant pressure coming from the northern and southern bridgeheads was too great. While 
the Soviets wanted to recognize their intermediate goal of moving quickly down the Estonian 
coast to secure Tallinn and other ports on the west coast of Estonia, they were also attacking to 
capture Riga. In doing so, they were recognizing their second campaign goal of retaking the 
Baltic states. The Germans realized the “Panther Line” was totally compromised along the 
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southern bridgehead and it was only a matter of time before they could no longer resist in Narva. 
The German story of retrograde from Narva to the “Tannenberg Position” and subsequent 
defense in recent times was built more on myth then on facts. Most German sources written after 
the war treat the subject from the point of view of the Waffen SS and it's volunteers holding back 
the “Red Terror.” Understandably the accounts were written during the Cold War, but they are 
generally more emotional than factual. Many German accounts fail to explain how the Germans 
recognized their positions in Estonia were no longer tenable and how they continued to 
retrograde combat power in an organized fashion out of Estonia to Latvia. Without a political 
reason to have strategic lines of communication to Finland along with the military inability to 
continue to stop Soviet forces, an understanding must be established of how the Germans 
planned to retrograde their forces from Narva to the Tannenberg Positions, then out of Estonia.
516
  
Through a combination of primary and secondary sources and with analysis, a new synthesis of 
better understanding can be achieved. This synthesis adds more depth to existing knowledge of 
operations, but it also allows professional soldiers and scholars to examine the plan for 
retrograde from Estonia against the execution of actual operations. First, the retrograde from the 
“Panther Position” to the “Tannenberg Position.”  
 Two unknown German operations for the retrograde from the “Panther Position” are 
Operations SEEALDER and FLAMINGO. In the holdings of the U.S. National Archives, T-312, 
Roll 1633, Frame Number 000245, the German warning order for the retrograde from Narva to 
the “Tannenberg Position” is found.517 The warning order was issued by the operations officer of 
Army Detachment Narva on July 13, 1944 at 01.40. to III SS Panzer Corps. The warning order 
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states three important things, 1) the purpose of the order is to clear the Narva bridgehead to the 
“Tannenberg Position,” 2) orders the code name for the operation to be SEEADLER and 3) it 
states the 11th Infantry Division would be used to prepare the engagement area beginning at 
12.00, July 12 to July 15, 1944 towards the Tannenberg Positions in Sinimäed or the Blue Hills. 
Retrograde operations were to commence the night of July 16th and 17th with extensive 
destruction of key infrastructure in conjunction with good accountability of German manpower 
and material. After the retrograde to the “Tannenberg Position” was complete, forces were to 
then decisively defend.
518
 The Germans also demonstrated a thought toward operational security 
by including in the warning order that all long distance phone calls above the division level 
regarding the business of SEEALDER were forbidden.
519
 Operation SEEALDER was envisioned 
to be a combined arms retrograde. Artillery was to support the retrograde operation from the 
vicinity of Jöhvi (10-12 Kms from Sinimäed). The units identified to support the retrograde were 
708th and 928th Artillery Battalions with the 458th, 503rd and 508th Batteries in addition.
520
 The 
actual order for the conduct of SEEALDER was issued on July 14, 1944.
521
  
 
        
522
 
Picture 11: A Young SS Artilleryman from Holland. 
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 In addition to the points stipulated in the warning order, the order for the retrograde 
movement or Army Detachment order Ia Nr. 896/44 g.Kdo, clearly stated the purpose of 
Operation SEEADLER was to continue defending the main line of resistance (HKL) of the 
Peipus position to the positions south of Wairara Church using the Tannenberg Position (See 
Map 15).
523
 Interestingly, this order states a strategic purpose for the defense of the Tannenberg 
position as protecting the slate oil zone along the Estonian coast and forbid an enemy 
breakthrough into Estonia.
524
 In the order, the Germans recognized the danger of the seam or 
area between the III SS Panzer Corps and the XXXXIII Army Corps to the south.
525
 The 
operations order also adjusted the time of execution found in the warning order from the night of 
July 16th to the night of the 17th into the 18th.
526
 A point of close coordination explained in the 
order was the destruction of key infrastructure at the same time in the city of Narva to aid 
retrograding forces.
527
 Lastly, the operations order also defined the “Tannenberg Position” as 
tank favorable terrain and the retrograde was explained as necessary to strengthen the Narva 
Front.
528
 While the orders found in the National Archives cover the plan, the actual execution of 
the plan used by the III SS Panzer Corps is found in the secondary sources.  
 The key tactical task for III SS Panzer Corps was the collapse of the Narva bridgehead 
and the retrograde of forces from the east side of the Narva River to the “Tannenberg Positions” 
in the west only 25 kilometers away (See Map 11 for starting positions of units).  
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                          Map 11               
529
 
 
 Tieke explains: 
 The withdrawal plan established four intermediate positions before reaching the new 
 main line of resistance. The four positions would be occupied in leapfrog fashion and 
 then evacuated. The first intermediate position (A) was at Vanaküla and in the Riverbank 
 Woods at the worker’s houses across from the notorious “Snake Woods.” Those blocking 
 positions were about six kilometers west of Narva. Blocking position (B) was at 
 Puhkova, Suur-Soldino (echeloned forward somewhat to the east) and at Samokras. The 
 (C) positions were at Walge, east of the Repikno and directly east of Auvere. 
 Intermediate  position (D) was at Udria, Auvere railroad station and 2 kilometers west of 
 Lipsu. The plan was very precise.
530
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PROPOSED BLOCKING POSITION (A)  AT VANAKULA FOR 24 JULY 1944
(A) VANAKULA
 
PROPOSED BLOCKING POSITIONS (B) PUHKOVA, (C) 
VALGE AND (D) UDRIA FOR 24JULY 1944
(B) PUHKOVA
(C) VALGE
(D) UDRIA
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BLOCKING POSITION (A) FACING EAST TOWARD DIRECTION 
OF SOVIET ADVANCE
 
 
 
BLOCKING POSITION (B) FACING NORTH EAST TOWARD DIRECTION 
OF SOVIET ADVANCE
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BLOCKING POSITION (C) FACING SOUTH TOWARD DIRECTION 
OF SOVIET ADVANCE
 
BLOCKING POSITION (D) FACING SOUTH TOWARD DIRECTION 
OF SOVIET ADVANCE
 
The German retrograde plan was finally executed at 23.30 on July 24, 1944. This plan was 
referred to as Operation FLAMINGO.
531
 The order to execute the retrograde was sent out to 
subordinate commands at 20.30 on July 23, 1944.  Regiments and battalions began their 
movements in the III SS Panzer Corps battle space (See Map 11 for starting positions of units) 
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225 
 
with the goal of reaching the 61 and 55 eastings in time and space to control their movement 
back to the “Tannenberg Position (See Map 12).”532  
Map 12 From: Wilhelm Tieke, Tragedy of the Faithful, A History of the III. (germanisches) 
SS-Panzer Korps, (Manitoba, Canada : J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing 2001), 89.  
Using a blocking positions along the main east-west road allowed III SS Panzer Corps to move 
quickly along the Main Supply Route (MSR) and disperse in space quickly allowing the next 
unit to past the static unit and begin providing security to continue the retrograde movement. In 
essence, the III SS Panzer Corps was using the same technique the Army Group North and 
Operation BLAU did leaving Leningrad. P-035 makes mention of the III SS Panzer Corps losing 
a “retreating SS Regiment” in the course of moving to the “Tannenberg Position."533 The SS 
Regiment in question was the SS Freiwilligen Panzer Grenadier Regiment 48 “General 
Seyffard.”534 The lost regiment was assembled in the Narva /Kreenholm railroad station and 
commence movement toward Soldino (Blocking position B according to the withdrawal plan) 
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with the reconnaissance elements arriving by 03.30 and the remainder of the regiment no later 
than 05.00 on July 26,1944.
535
 The movement of the regiment occurred along the Narva - Tallinn 
Railroad from the east to west. Continuing to move, by 08.00 on July 26 1944 the regiment 
reached the area south of Tuulukse. Breaking in from the vicinity of Auvere in the south, Soviet 
forces managed to move 300 men and 13 tanks in to stop the westward movement of the 
regiment, while other Soviet forces oriented on the unit and eventually destroyed it. Soviet focus 
on “General Seyffard” allowed remaining German units to fight to the “Tannenberg Position,” 
where some of the most serious fighting took place during the war beginning on the July 26, 
1944. 
N
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                        Map 13 Current 1:50,000 Scale Map of the Sinimäed  
The key terrain of the “Tannenberg Position” was a series of three east-west running hills 
situated between the Finnish Sea in the north and the swamp area of Auvere to the south (See 
Map 13). The area is called Sinimäed in Estonian, Blaubarger in German and the Blue Hills in 
English. The composition of the hills was the Kinderheimhöhe or Children’s home in the east, 
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then Grenadier and Hill 69.9 in the west. The main east-east west MSR or the Rollbahn ran 
directly through the three hills. Since the occupation of the “Panther Line” and the beginning of 
Soviet operations in the area in late January-early February 1944, the Germans had been 
evaluating the Sinimäed area for another defense that could add depth. Recognizing the 
tremendous strength of the area, the Germans saw the Blue Hills as the lynch pin in any future 
defensive network and likewise, the Soviet regarded it as something that had to be taken from the 
Germans in order to continue attacking to the west. After the German withdrawal from the Narva 
bridgehead from July 23-25 1944, the Soviets wanted to carry the attack forward with the same 
momentum and over run the Germans before they could reach the Blue Hills. The Soviet attack 
began in earnest on July 26, 1944.  
On the morning of July 26
th
 the Soviets began with a heavy artillery bombardment of 
units in the Blue Hills area. “Until now, artillery had not been concentrated but came from the 
southeast” 536  Shortly after sundown on July 26, 1944 (about 19.46 hours537) “the Soviets 
mounted a daring attack with five tanks and mounted infantry which drove straight through a 
unit of German sailors with no means at their disposal to stop them. The Soviet unit continued up 
the Kinderheimhohe where the tanks stopped and took up positions and the infantry looked for 
cover in trenches and shell holes. News of the incident reached the commander of 24
th
 Regiment 
who immediately dispatched his Panzer Jäger Platoon to link up with the 11. /SS Company. The 
platoon arrived around midnight. The commander of the Panzer Jäger Platoon relays the events 
as he remembered them; 
 Just behind our lines in 11./SS Company we could see the five tanks. We were only able 
 to see three of the tanks from our position. I decided to engage all five tanks at the same 
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 time, so the second in command took two other men with Panzerschrecks around to a 
 position where he could see the other two and he would initiate the attack by a signal. 
 The signal he used was a bird call he had learned while in the Hitler Youth. This signal 
 was much less dangerous than a light signal. On this signal we engaged all five tanks and 
 they began to burn
 538
  
 
Map 14 From: Richard Landwehr, Narva 1944: The Waffen SS and the Battle for Europe, 
(Silver Springs: Bibliophile Legion Books, Inc  1981), 78.  
Artillery fires continued to intensify at 06.00 on July 27, 1944 to barrage strength. 
“Calibers of all sizes rained down on the position of the three hills covering them in a thick black 
smoke. The few remaining assault guns and tanks of the division antitank and armor battalions 
were sent forward to SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 24 “Danmark” which would be at the focal 
point of the enemy’s main effort.” 539 Concentrating their artillery fire on the units blocking the 
rollbahn, the Soviets launched an uncoordinated attack from three side of the Blue Hills 
designed to secure their objectives. The Soviet’s lacked good avenues of approach to conduct an 
attack. Because the Germans were not given a great deal of time to occupy their positions or 
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improve them with obstacles; they had to take strict advantage of anything they could from 
nature. The only things capable of stopping the Soviet advance were natural obstacles. Finally, 
the III. (germanisches) SS-Panzer-Korps massed their artillery regiment in the area of the 
Swedish Wall in order to better concentrate fires. Using II./SS 49 and 10./SS and 11./SS 24 
positions, the Germans planned direct fires for the defense in conjunction with an obstacle plan 
and an indirect fire plan to build an effective Engagement Area (EA) quickly.   
ROLLBAHN
VIEW OF THE FRONTAGE FROM THE AREA OF 11./SS AND 10./SS 24 REGIMENT “DANMARK,” 
LOOKING TOWARD THE EAST. (PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM VIC (35V NF 50708220) 
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VIEW OF THE FRONTAGE FROM THE AREA OF 11./SS AND 10./SS 24 REGIMENT “DANMARK,” 
LOOKING TOWARD THE SOUTH. (PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM VIC (35V NF 50708220) 
RAILROAD TRACKS
1500 METERS
 
  
VIEW OF THE FRONTAGE FROM THE AREA OF 11./SS AND 10./SS 24 REGIMENT “DANMARK,” 
LOOKING TOWARD THE WEST AND KINDERHEIMHOHE. (PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM VIC (35V 
NF 50708220) 
KINDERHEIMHOHE
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            Map 15: Original 1:50,000 Scale Map of the Blue Hills area       
 
 The Soviets pressed the attack again, this timed from the area south of the Blue Hills. N. P. 
Klyavin’s work Narva Red Banner,  A Sketch of the Military Path of the Narva 256th Rifle Red 
Banner Division examined the attack of the Blue Hills, offering an excellent account of the 256th 
Rifle Division’s attack of the Danes of 10.and 11./SS Companies. A Soviet penal company was 
assigned the mission of reconnaissance in-force and did not either report back in a timely manner 
or at all with the situation in front of them (See Map 16). The Soviet’s problems were further 
tactically complicated as the infantry and armor unit’s efforts were not coordinated with timely 
supporting arms for their movement or maneuver. Once Soviet units were engaged, reports to 
higher headquarters were lacking, thus not allowing senior commanders an opportunity to exploit 
success.   
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THE DIRECTION OF 256TH RIFLE DIVISION ATTACK. THIS PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM 
THE BASE OF THE KINDERHEIMHOHE (VIC 35V NF 49908190) LOOKING TO THE 
SOUTHEAST. IT IS ABOUT 2000M TO THE FAR TREE LINE.
256TH RIFLE DIVISION STARTING POINTRAILROAD TRACKS
GERMAN DEFENSIVE LINE
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Map 16: Soviet Map of the Blue Hills Attack 
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At 09.00 hours a strong Soviet infantry and tank assault force attacked the front lines of the 10
th
 
and 11
th
 Companies/ “Danmark,” which were tasked to guard the Tirtsu road. SS 
Hauptsturmführer Trautwein, in command of 11
th
 Company, had been badly wounded in the 
stomach. 30 Stalin tanks and T-34s moved to within 70 yards of the 11
th
 Company’s trenches. A 
survivor of the engagement, SS Unterscharführer Illum, described what happen next: 
 When we saw what was now occurring, we became speechless. The noise of Soviet tanks 
 caused everyone to look up. Coming directly at us from south of the highway were 30 
 “Joseph Stalin” and T-34 tanks! We had only one thought: how could we stand up to this 
 great mass of armor? North of the highway, a 7.5cm PAK gun opened fire, but it was too 
 far away to be effective. The tanks came closer and closer. From about 70 yards away 
 their cannons opened fire on our positions. We sprang up and run for our lives. After 
 these frightening minutes passed, we came to our senses and began aiming and shooting 
 our “panzerfaust.” When the first tank went up in flames our old battle spirit re-exerted 
 itself and our confidence returned. All over the tanks were bursting into flames and 
 smoke was billowing thickly. After 14 tanks had been destroyed the others turned around 
 and took off for the rear.
 541
 
 
This is an example of war in any time. Human beings have limits and react to fear. Good units 
will be able to get a hold of themselves and control their fears, while poorly trained units will 
crumble and run. Any account of war in which men were not terrified for their lives is not true to 
the nature of man or war. The Soviets would eventually overwhelm the German positions on 
Kinderheimhohe, but not without heavy losses in men and material.  
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THIS MEMORIAL WAS LEFT ON KINDERHEIMHOHE HILL BY THE FLEMISH VETERAN’S 
RELIEF ORGANIZATION, ST. MAARTENSFONDS. THE MEMORIAL READS, “HERE REST 
UNKNOWN YET UNFORGOTTEN SOLDIERS FROM FLANDERS.” THE INSCRIPTION IS 
WRITTEN IN ESTONIAN, GERMAN AND FLEMISH.
542 
 German actions at Grenadier Hill on July 27, 1944 center on the actions of a young 
Flemish SS volunteer named Remi Schrijnen. Remi Schrijnen was assigned to the 6. SS-
Freiwilligen-Sturmbrigade “Langemarck” as a 75mm PAK 40 gunner located on Grenadier Hill. 
For his brave actions starting in the mid-morning of July 26, 1944 through the morning of July 
27, 1944 he was awarded the Knight’s Cross. The Last Knight of Flanders by Allen Brandt 
provides a sense of his actions through reading the award’s citation: 
 On July 26, 1944 at 09.00 hours the Russians attacked with three T-34s along the “Narva-
 Reval” highway. Schrijnen knocked out two T-34s at a distance of 400 meters. During 
 the afternoon at 1500 hours the Russians attacked again with infantry forces, and were 
 supported by artillery and heavy grenade launchers (mortars). Schrynen again knocked 
 out two T-34s and a single “Stalin” tank. A further T-34 was damaged. Its crew 
 disembarked. The damaged tank was probably dragged away during the night. On July 
 27, 1944 at 04.00 hours, Geschutz Schrijnen moved to a position 400 meters north of the 
 hill Kinderheim, left of the “Narva-Reval” highway. Schreynen recognized a position 
 where eleven Soviet tanks were preparing to attack. Under the protection of two T-34s, 
 Six T-34s and one KVII the soviets approached the highway from the north. At a 
 distance of 700 meters, Schrijnen knocked out a T-34. Two T-34s in position to attack 
 shot at the anti-tank gun. Schrijnen cleared a jam in the gun and five minutes later he 
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 knocked out a KVII. Immediately thereafter the Geschutz was knocked out by a direct 
 hit. Schreynen was named in the Wehrmacht reports that followed the battle.
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LOOKING TOWARD THE BASE OF THE KINDERHEIMHOHE FROM A POSSIBLE 
POSITION OF ONE OF REMI SCHRIJNEN’S  GUNS (VIC 35V NF 49308223) LOOKING TO 
THE EAST. IT IS ABOUT 400M TO THE BASE OF THE KINDERHEIMHOHE.
 
 
 Standing at the base of Hill 69.9 looking at the large black cross and smaller memorials 
serving as memorials to the battle and German units that fought there, you can still feel the 
desperation of July 1944 in the air. At about 12.00 on the July 27, 1944, Fritz von Scholz, the 
highly respected commander of 11. SS-Freiwilligen-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Nordland” 
was present at a meeting in the new command post position of the SS Panzer-Grenadier-
Regiment “Danmark” located on the southwestern slope of Hill 69.9.544 The decision made in 
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the meeting was for the “1./SS-Pionier-Bataillon 11 to send another combat patrol forward into 
the main line of resistance. The acting commander requested permission to lead the patrol. Fritz 
von Scholz denied his request.
545
  In the early afternoon of July 27, 1944, the Soviets shot an 
artillery round that altered the course of the battle and never knew it. 
 
 
Von Scholz left the command post. He wanted to get to SS-Hauptsturmführer Larum, whose 
13./SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 24 “Danmark” was in a firing position nearby. He then 
wanted to get an overview of the combat situation with SS-Sturmbannführer Kappus. 
 
 At that moment, the Russian artillery again laid down heavy fire. The regiment adjutant, 
 SS-Hauptsturmführer Ternedde, decided to send a messenger with von Scholz as a guide. 
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 At almost the same moment, he and SS-Haupsturmführer Larum rushed out into the 
 open. Fritz von Scholz was hit in the head by shrapnel. They quickly got the wounded 
 man to the command post of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 24 “Danmark” and placed 
 him on a cot. He was unconscious.
546
 
 
 
        
547
 
Picture 12: Fritz von Scholz awarding his men in the Spring 1944. 
 The Soviet leadership saw July 29, 1944 as the day for decisive offensive action against 
Sinimäed. German armored forces under SS Obersturmbannführer Kausch however, saw an 
opportunity to counterattack. Kausch estimated the enemy to have reached his culminating point 
after repeated attempts to capture Sinimäed and assessed he was no longer able to attack. “Just 
when the breakthrough succeeded and Grenadier Hill appeared lost, SS Obersturmbannführer 
Kausch
 
committed his tanks and assault guns into the fray. Only they could bring the chaos to an 
end.” 548 Following behind the tanks and armored vehicles were the Estonian men of the I./ 45 
SS- Freiwilligen-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment under the command of SS-Hauptstrumführer Paul 
Maitla. His battalion was badly depleted of men and material from months of fighting, but he led 
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his unit into the assault with about 150 men. The attack was timely and “the Red Army Soldiers 
were thrown off balance and fled. Although the Red Army attempted to retake Grenadier Hill the 
same day and the days that followed, the Estonians remained in control of the terrain. When the 
battalion was replaced in the positions on August 2, 1944 it had 48 men remaining. Maitla was 
decorated with the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for retaking Grenadier Hill.549  
STAGING AREA FOR SS OBERSTURMBANNFUHRER KAUSCH’S ARMOR
(VIC 35V NF 47308190) TO THE SOUTH WEST OF HILL 69.9. YOU ARE LOOKING TO THE 
NORTH. 
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THE AREA SS OBERSTURMBANNFUHRER KAUSCH’S ARMOR CROSSED TO 
COUNTERATTACK. PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM HILL 69.9 (VIC 35V NF 48738198).
LOOKING TO THE SOUTH. 
230 METERS
DIRECTION OF KAUSCH’S ATTACK
 
  
 While the Germans crushed the attempted decisive Soviet attack of July 29, 1944 in a 
counterattack, the Germans maintained their position in the Blue Hills through August into 
September. In the end, it was a Soviet indirect attack against Tartu in the south that made the 
Germans lose their will to continue defending the Blue Hills, not because the position was 
captured. It is prudent to examine why the Germans needed to finally give up the Blue Hills after 
half a year of defending it. The answer to this question can be found in Operation HOUSE-
CLEARING.
550
   
 In the campaign plan to evacuate Estonia, the retrograde and fighting at the “Tannenberg 
Position” must be looked at through the lens of MS # 151, Fighting on the Narva Front, the 
Evacuation of Estonia and the Withdrawal to the Dvina to understand how this tactical battle was 
part of the greater plan. 
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 Examination of MS# 151 contains discussion of the German plan for withdrawal. 
Accordingly, the following steps were taken:  
 1. The operation was assigned the code name “Entruenpelung” or house-cleaning. All 
 equipment not absolutely needed was to be moved back to Germany. 
 
 2. A small group of officers, sworn to absolute secrecy, conducted a rehearsal of the 
 planned operation under the code name “Tannenbaum I”. Direction of the withdrawal and 
 lines of resistance were established on the maps and were reconnoitered on the ground 
 inconspicuously. 
 
 3. Armeeabteilung (Army Group) Narva designated highways for motorized and  horse-
 drawn vehicles. Bridges were reinforced.  
 
 4. Depots were established for all classes of supply. 
 
 A withdrawal directly west toward Reval (Tallinn) and the Island of Ösel  (Saaremaa) 
would have been the least difficult for Armeeabteilung Narva. The over- all situation, however, 
necessitated a southwesterly and ultimately a southern direction  toward Riga.
551
 
 
         Like most plans, this concept for an operation was not executed as intended because of the Soviets  
attacked into Southern Estonia. Recognizing their inability to break the will of the defenders of 
the “Tannenberg Position” at Sinimäed by using a direct approach in attacking it head-on, the 
Soviets decided to use the indirect approach by attacking southern Estonia. To understand the 
effect of the Soviet operation against German planning efforts in Operation HOUSE 
CLEARING, an examination of Arved Kalvo’s work entitled The Banishment of Fascists From 
Southern Estonia is needed.
552
 Operations against Tartu occurred between August 10- September 
6, 1944. The description of the Soviet planning effort to capture Tartu is described by Kalvo on 
page 41. Kalvo explains;  
 The Chief of Front (3rd Baltic Front) Staff Lieutenant General V. R. Vashkevich, the   
                    head of the operations department Major General S. S. Bronevski and the head of   
                    operations department, Colonel I.G. Nikitinski along with other staff officers    
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                    worked out the final review of Tartu operation. There were three stages
 
of operations   
                    in accordance with the character of battle activity. First stage covered the period of   
                    10 to 15 of August when our troops broke through the “Marienburg Line” and   
                    swiftly started to develop success. During the second stage from August 16
th
 to 27
th
,  
                    the Fascists launched large counter-attacks, attempting to stop our advance.  During   
                    this period large battles were carried out and Soviet troops reached the banks of the  
                    rivers Suur and Väike-Emajõgi in the zones between the Lakes Peipsi 
                    and Võrtsjärv. In the third stage, from August 27
th
 August – September 6th, our  
                    troops had to go on the defensive to repulse fierce enemy counter-attacks against Tartu.  
                    Units which had reached the southern line of Lake Võrtsjärv – River Vjaike-Emaiigi – River  
                    Gauja, began to prepare for the Riga offensive operation.
553
  
  
             There are many interesting facets to Kalvo's statement; first, the mention of the 
“Marienburg Line” in relation to the time and space of the Soviet advance into southern Estonia 
and second, how discussion of the “Marienburg Line” ties to the overall German plan of 
Operation HOUSE CLEARING and tactical actions of the Narva Front. Clearly, the 
“Marienburg Line” was part of the overall German plan to trade space for time in order to 
facilitate the German retrograde to the Latvian coast. It is necessary to understand the 
composition and disposition of the “Marienburg Line.” 
             According to Kalvo, The Germans began building the “Marienburg Line” in May 1944. 
The “Marienburg Line” was purely a tactical position, as the line reached a depth of 1.5 - 2 
kilometers; in important sectors of the defenses from 3 to 4 kilometers. To the south-eastern 
portion of Pechora, northern and southeastern portion of Aluksne, the depth of the defenses along 
the main macadam roads was about 4 kilometers.”554 Regarding the composition of the position 
itself, Kalvo adds;  
 The defensive positions consisted of systems of machine gun and rifle positions, located 
 in two lines: directly along the front line and 2-3 kilometers behind. They were connected 
 with each other by communication trenches with complete sections and passages. The 
 Germans widely used natural obstacles as well, emplacing their weapons while 
 establishing strong points and centers of resistance both on the front lines and in a 
 defense in depth particularly along the most important roads. On each kilometer of the 
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 "Marienburg Line" there was 1,800 linear meters of trenches, 800 linear meters of 
 communication trenches, 20-30 machine gun bunkers, about 20 mortar and artillery 
 positions, 10-15 dugouts and 600-800 linear meters of wire entanglements. Density of 
 mine fields was up to 350 mines per square kilometer.
 555
     
 
            This statement shows how the Germans were continuing to refine their methods technically and 
 tactically for tactical defensive positions in depth. The Soviets assessed the operational and 
tactical importance of the “Marienburg Line” as follows: 
 The position linked the troops of Army Detachment "Narva" (occupying the defense to 
 the west of Lakes Pskousk and Peipsi) with the troops of 18th and 16th Armies. It  enables 
 the Fascists to freely maneuver troops and reserves to the west of the line. It gave  the 
 enemy options due to the large water obstacles (Lake Peipsi and Pskousk) to spare 
 strength along sectors of the front. Therefore, the command of Army Detachment 
 "Narva" considered the "Marienburg Line" together with Lakes Peipsi and 
 Pskousk one of the most important elements in the system of defenses for Ostland.
 556
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“Tannenberg Position”
“Marienburg Position”
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Map 17 The "Tannenberg Position" and "Marienburg Position" Together Facilitate the 
Way to Latvia 
 With Soviet pressure in the north at the "Tannenberg Position," the natural obstacles 
presented by Lakes Peipsi and Pskousk at the "Marienburg Line" were an operational and 
tactical- level nature obstacle that facilitated the German withdrawal into Latvia. The 
"Marienburg Line" could be naturally reinforced as units withdrew from the Narva area in their 
movement south. This explains the Soviet difficulty of breaking through Estonia (See Map 17).  
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5.5 CONCLUSION: 
 The battles of the Leningrad Front and Army Detachment Narva in 1944 were the clash 
of ideological systems at many different levels. It was a continuation of the political struggle of 
Fascism and Communism carried out in depth through the conditions of time and space.
558
 
Whether attacking or defending in depth, the combatants each applied the principles and 
conditions of war successfully, but in the end the Soviets carried the day, ultimately winning the 
war. A universal truth of war is the ability to apply mass.
559
 The Soviets had the ability to mass 
and the Germans could not. The Soviets massed effects and manpower at decisive locations and 
created penetrations for exploitation. Breaching and crossing obstacles such as rivers were 
sciences rooted in the art of tactics. Another way to think of the problem is the Soviets had the 
ability to concentrate their masses, while the German concentration could not defend 
everywhere.
560
 Manpower and material superiority provided the Soviets with a position of 
advantage. The Soviets had the ability to continue replacing their losses, albeit with difficulty, 
while the Germans did not. While the will (moral) is to mental or physical three as to one; in the 
end mass can eventually break the defense’s will to resist.561  Battles are not won only on the 
battlefield they are fought on, but also on the battlefields to the left and right along with factories 
at home. The operational level of war must synergize the strategic ends with tactical efforts and 
assets through the art and science of war. This is a true realization of how ends and means meet 
through ways. The lessons observed from battle must be distributed to other units to learn from. 
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Refinement of doctrine exists for the simple reason of synchronization and unity of effort while 
spreading new ideas in the force. While the Germans continued to fall back on shortened lines of 
communication, the Soviet ability to generate mass and momentum marginalized the German 
lines of communication. The Germans were able to defend their positions because they 
maintained the will and means to resist along interior lines of communication, but they were 
unable to compete with Soviet mass. Once the Soviets identified Tartu as vulnerability in the 
German defense, they attacked; forcing the Germans to leave the “Tannenberg positions” or lose 
the force defending there. The Germans lost the “Tannenberg Position,” not for a lack of will; 
rather they lacked a significant offensive ability to decisively tactically counterattack. When 
Finland left the war, the strategic reason to defend was lost. Without the ability to operationally 
attack, it would only be a matter of time for a tactical level defense. Time in late 1944 was 
something Germany did not have in abundance.        
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Irregular Warfare and Conventional War 
 
 The Second World War is typically thought of in terms of major battles being fought by 
convention forces on a grand scale. Thoughts are usually of the combatants, or the strategies 
(ends) and tactics (means) they used to achieve their desired ends. The use of war facilitates the 
end state of the combatants through their campaign plan, but conventional methods rarely 
defined war plans alone. In the Second World War on the Eastern Front, both the Germans and 
Soviets were adept at the use of unconventional forces to achieve their end states; demonstrating 
there is truly nothing “new” in waging war. While the names and terms have changed over the 
years, combatants then, as today find ways to harness the immense strength of the moral factors 
found in war from the will of people.
562
 Today, professional soldiers and scholars believe there is 
nothing “new” to learn based on the experience of the last 10 years of fighting asymmetric forces 
using a counterinsurgency or COIN strategy as it has been called; a closer look reveals both 
professional soldiers and scholars have lost their fundamental understanding through invented 
terms that cause confusion while contributing nothing toward a better understanding of the art 
and science of war.
563
 Regardless of the form war takes, it must be waged in time and space.  
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Often talked about in today's conversations is the question of law in war as it relates to 
the use of force by combatants.
564
 The Second World War challenges many perceptions 
regarding the law, but are these examined in the proper context. In the continuum of war, 
irregular war is considered an illegal form of war, but not illegitimate as a method.
565
 All parties 
in the Second World War engaged in irregular warfare. In the past 10 years of war, nations have 
“learned” several lessons they would have been better off only observing. Subjective 
understanding gained from experience yields little without objective thought and reflection. It 
seems mankind continues to “re-learn” the same lessons over and over, leaving the dirty task of 
reminding humanity to the historian, while generation after generation suffer in wars.  
Those who doubt this is the case for asymmetric war in general, need only examine War 
in the Shadows by Robert B. Asprey.
566
 Written at the conclusion of the American experience in 
Vietnam in 1975, Asprey showed the failure of American firepower against the human will. As 
Clausewitz once wrote in On War, “war is the clash of wills.”567 Vietnam showed the world a 
superpower against an opponent of few resources along with the will to fight could achieve 
victory. This same lesson Americans knew from their own War of Independence against 
England. Summarizing the professional soldier’s and scholar’s numbness to reflecting on the 
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observations paid for with blood, Asprey warned, “America can afford one Vietnam, but not 
another.”568 Reflections and observation of this warning have been long absent. The professional 
obligation of soldiers and scholars is to read and write for others to “learn” the lessons observed. 
To this end, actions on the Eastern Front in the Baltic region provide yet another clear example 
of the uses of asymmetric war to be learned from.
569
 
A close examination of actions and techniques used by combatants on the Eastern Front 
demonstrates not only an excellent case study for how to “operationalize” the use of asymmetric 
forces in support of offensive and defensive operations, but it also exposes a tremendous gap in 
the historiography of the Second World War.  One such gap is the use of combined arms 
techniques in conjunction with partisan and anti-partisan operations. While the German and 
Soviet strategies along with their tactical methods of employment have been considered in depth 
over the past decades, little to no understanding has been developed regarding the Estonian 
position in relation to Estonian goals relative to 1944. Indeed, a position which is never thought 
of is the plight of the Estonian population who were the rightful tenants of the land being fought 
over. This provides the setting to examine the Estonian use of war to achieve their end state 
independent of the Germans and the Soviets. While the Germans and Soviets fought to impose 
their will on each other through any available means, the Estonians too had an agenda they 
sought to evoke by restoring their boarders to the pre-1940s arrangement.  
The overall aim of this chapter is to examine the use of irregular warfare through the lens 
of partisan and anti-partisan efforts. This chapter will first lay bare terms which have been 
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abused by both professional soldiers and scholars over the past decade to achieve a common 
understanding for the purpose of studying this case. Once this understanding has been achieved, 
attention can then be directed towards understanding the tenants of Soviet ideology found in the 
persecution of an asymmetric war through Marxist-Leninist theory and writings. Showing the 
connections between the moral aspects which drove the techniques of asymmetric war being 
used to the use of conventional forces helps both professional soldiers and scholars understand 
the Soviet relationship between the (means) and (ends) found in their “operationalized” (ways).  
A key component of Soviet success was forces were task organized for their missions and the 
roll they played in conjunction with conventions forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After examining the Soviet ideology and methods, focus will be shifted to German forces 
and their task organization for conducting anti-partisan operations. Attention must be paid to the 
evolution of German tactical doctrine along with the continued development of “combined arms” 
anti-partisan techniques to achieve the desired ends. To explain German failures, it is necessary 
to examine why the operational-level of war did not incorporate tactical-level field commands, 
who were largely concerned with securing external and internal lines of operation and 
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communication for retreating German units; while the German civil administration was 
responsible for the governance of Estonian territory. Lastly, the work of the Omakaitse or 
Estonian Home Guard will be explored to develop an understanding of their purpose and 
connection to German rear area security forces. First, by understanding the Omakaitse’s mission, 
attention can be focused on their task organization to see how it complimented German units and 
their strengths. Through a series of Omakaitse reports submitted throughout 1944 with trend 
analysis, professional soldiers and scholars can see how Soviet intentions are exposed through 
their use of partisan forces acting in conjunction with conventional forces, thus validating the 
methodology of irregular warfare. Statistical analysis demonstrates how the number of partisan 
attacks correlates with the locations of the Soviet main effort conventional attacks in the time 
and space of Estonia over the duration of the two campaigns assigned to breaking the German 
hold on Leningrad along with the investment of Estonia.  
6.1 DEFINING AND DECONFLICTING TERMS OF REFERENCE: 
 As stated in the introduction, the last 10 years of operations in the Middle East have done 
more to confuse professional soldiers and scholars about the nature of asymmetric war than 
anything else. The words and the acronyms used to describe and define counterinsurgency 
operations evolve almost hourly. While it can be contended that the nature of these operations is 
fluid and dynamic, the tenants of current operations are not new to the history of war. Words and 
terms have specific meanings. Regardless of what word precedes war, such as guerilla war or 
asymmetric war, a violent struggle of wills as defined by Clausewitz still applies. With so much 
damage being done from a decade of war, it is first necessary to explain the differences and 
relationships between guerilla and irregular warfare.  First, guerilla warfare is a tactic or method 
used by combatants in the conduct of fighting. Commonly, this is thought of as “hit and run” 
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tactics, or in other words, not being decisively engaged. On the other hand, irregular warfare 
combines the methods of several different tactics or methods of engaging the enemy, to include 
the use of guerilla tactics and conventional operations into a strategy. Successfully harnessing 
irregular warfare into a national strategy for war should be the goal, not having a strategy in 
irregular warfare.
570
 Having deconflicted these terms, it is time to examine the use of terrorism as 
a tactic.
571
 Terrorism is defined as a tactic made up of several techniques such as assassination, 
bombing, arson and kidnapping.
572
 In this way, terrorism is thought of as a concrete method. 
Terrorism can also be thought of in the abstract or as “pure,” meaning as a logic. Regardless, all 
of these terms have in common one theme, violence as a means to achieve desired ends, whether 
the ends are thought of collectively as legitimate or illegitimate.
573
  
 During the Second World War on the Eastern Front, both the Germans and the Soviets 
employed forces with irregular warfare in mind. While the Soviets employed partisans and the 
Germans countered their efforts with anti-partisan forces, both used terrorism as a method of 
employing their tactical formations. Of the two combatants, the Soviets came closer to 
harnessing the efforts of irregular warfare (combining partisan activities with the efforts of 
conventional forces) into a national strategy simply, because it was a resident part of communist 
ideology. Next, an examination of Marxist-Leninist theory in relation to the application of 
violence found in partisan warfare.      
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6.2 SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND ITS APPLICATIONS FOR PARTISAN WARFARE: 
To understand the role of the partisan in a Soviet concept for war, one must understand 
how the Soviets defined war. All Soviet activities in relation to the revolutionary era find their 
origin in the mind and writings of Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party and 
Soviet State, based on the works of Marx and Engels. Collectively, these thoughts comprise 
Marxist-Leninist thought. It is important to remember the context of the Russian Revolution and 
the eventual overthrow of the Tsar; the main catalysts for the events were the perceived 
imperialist wars of the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War.
574
 Lenin’s understanding 
of history saw war as a continuation of revolution and class struggle; both were at the heart of the 
dialectical method.
575
 According to Lenin and in accordance with the understanding of war 
provided by Clausewitz, Lenin said, “War is the continuation of politics of classes and states by 
violent means. War is a major test of the economic, organizational and moral forces of nations, a 
summing up of politics.”576 Lenin continued by writing, “wars are a historically transient 
phenomenon. They are linked only with the period of existence of an exploiter society. They are 
based on private ownership and the division of society into classes.”577 
Specifically, Lenin saw the use of war as a method for societies to make the 
transformation from capitalism to scientific communism. Lenin “regarded in dialectical unity all 
the elements of the military power of a state as the totality of its economic, scientific, morale and 
                                                          
574
 A direct correlation exists between failures on the battlefield in the Russo-Japanese War and the coming 
Red Revolution of 1917. On January 9, 1905, a large crowd of more than 200,000 men, women and children was 
stopped at the Narva Gate in the City of St. Petersburg at bayonet point by the Czar’s soldiers. The impending clash 
resulted in thousands killed and wounded. Of the event Lenin wrote, “The revolutionary education of the proletariat 
made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched 
existence.” See Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History, Volume I), (Garden City NY: 
Doubleday & Company Inc., 1975), 293-4. 
575
 See: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 50 Volumes, (Moscow, USSR: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1963). For discussion relative to dialectical method. 
576
 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 39, (Moscow, USSR: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1963), 321. 
253 
 
military potentials.”578 Further examining what Lenin meant by use of the dialectical method in 
relation to war, it is important to understand the “dialectical method opposes a hollow, abstracted 
approach to the concept of war and age, comprehensively examining the historical features, the 
historical types of wars in each era or age separately.”579 In other words, war was not to be 
thought about as an intangible concept, but more appropriately, in concrete terms, such as 
terrorism not only as logic, but as a method to perpetrate violent acts to achieve the desired end. 
To make war a more tangible concept, organization was needed. The first task was the 
organization of society for the conduct of war, as war is social phenomenon, “organizational 
development of a regular army can be effected both in “pure” form and in combination with 
elements of a militia system (universal military training, worker’s militia, ect) or can even adopt 
the form of a territorial-cadre system, as was the case in this country (Russia). But in all 
instances a deciding role is played by cadre units.”580 The idea of a trained cadre for the 
population who was capable of participation in irregular war was the basis of the Soviet partisan 
effort in the Second World War.  
At the center of the successful Soviet use of irregular warfare were organization and 
method of employment. Irregular warfare was a type of “combined arms” for Lenin, as he 
correctly advocated combining its effects with those of conventional arms, whether in the offense 
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or defense.
581
 Lenin advocated for the use of guerrilla warfare as a tactic in combination with 
conventional methods as early as 1906 in an article entitled, “Guerilla Warfare.” Here Lenin 
wrote, “Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism in that it does not link movement 
with any one specific form of combat. It recognizes the most diverse forms of combat…”582 
Marxist-Leninist thought would be tested to the extreme by the German blitzkrieg crashing 
across Soviet frontiers on June 22, 1941 with the beginning of Operation BARBAROSSA. 
With the beginning of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union taking Joseph 
Stalin totally unaware, it took until July 3, 1941, 12 days after the opening rounds of the war for 
Stalin to make a statement to the Soviet people about what had transpired and for him to pass 
guidance to the masses.
583
 In his public radio address to the Soviet nation, with a voice 
demonstrating considerable stain, he reiterated a message he gave to his party officers four days 
earlier. Stalin called for, “evacuation and a scorched earth policy in threatened areas and partisan 
warfare in enemy occupied territory. He asked the Kolkhoz (collective farm) peasants to drive 
their livestock eastward ahead of the Germans and the workers to follow their fellows in 
Moscow and Leningrad by organizing Opolcheniye (home guards) in every town threatened with 
invasion.”584 In two short subsequent speeches in November 1941, Stalin continued to show the 
connection between partisan warfare and conventional operations, the first speech with a strong 
connection to a war of annihilation. On the occasion of celebrating the 24th anniversary of the 
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October Revolution on November 6, 1941, Stalin gave more basic instructions for the conduct of 
partisan warfare when he said; 
 The Germans wish for a war of annihilation with the people of the USSR. So be it then, if 
 the Germans want a war of annihilation, they shall get it.  From now on it becomes our 
 duty, the duty of the peoples of the USSR, the duty of the soldier, of commanders and 
 political collaborators, of our Army and of our Fleet to destroy to the last man all 
 Germans who have sneaked into the territory of our fatherland in the character of 
 occupying forces. No quarter to the German Occupation Forces!
585
      
 
 Reinforcing his message from the previous day, Stalin published a second message at the 
Red Army parade in Moscow on November 7, 1941. Here again, he reinforced the fact it was the 
patriotic duty of every Soviet citizen to resist. Stalin states; 
 Comrades, Members of the Red Army and Sailors of the Red Fleet, Commanders and 
 Political Collaborators, partisans, men and women! Remembering all this, be a 
 courageous and steadfast soldier. Love of the Soviet fatherland and hatred of the foe are 
 your strongest weapons. Scorn of death- your duty. A coward dies a hundred times- but a 
 hero dies but once. His memory is immortal among the people. However your duty does 
 not merely consist in fighting with dignity and honor against the foe yourself, but also in 
 carrying along with you all workers into the struggle against the Hitlerite fanatics. You 
 are not merely a soldier, but also a propagandist, an agitator of the Party and of the 
 People. Forge all powers of the people together for the war of annihilation against the 
 German intruder! Bring new comrade-workers, peasants and intelligentsia, people 
 courageous, honest and devoted to the Soviet government, into the partisan detachments 
 and diversionary groups!
586
 
 
 A word used consistently in both speeches was duty; this was not by accident. Stalin was 
making a direct approach to the morale of the Soviet people. He was galvanizing the strength of 
the Soviet will against the German invader. Like their comrades in arms in the armed forces the 
Soviet Partisan took an oath to defend the Soviet Union. The oath is crucial to examine because 
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it demonstrates the will and resolve of the individual Soviet partisan to approach his duties. The 
oath stated;  
 I, as a citizen of the USSR, a true son of the heroic Russian people, do hereby swear that I 
 shall spare neither my strength nor my life in order to liberate my people from the 
 German-Fascist invaders.  
 
 I shall not lay down my arms until the homeland has been rid of the German-Fascist 
 persecutors. I swear that I shall carry out the orders of my commanders and superiors 
 strictly and conscientiously, that I shall strictly observe the disciplines of war and guard 
 war secrets.  
 
 I swear to avenge to the fullest the burning of our towns and villages, the blood and the 
 death of our women and children, fathers and mothers, the cruelty and vilification heaped 
 upon my people, with self-denial to fight everywhere in order to destroy the German 
 occupants boldly, with determination, and without fear. 
 
 I swear to assist the Red Army actively with all my powers and all means at my disposal, 
 everywhere to root out the German monsters so that I may aid in the speedy and utter 
 destruction of bloody Fascism.  
 
 With my signature I endorse the words of this sacred oath which I have sworn before my 
 comrades, the partisans, and shall not take one step to deviate from this oath.  
 
 Should I, however, violate this oath, due to my weakness, cowardice or evil intent, and 
 betray the interests of the people, then I shall die an accursed death at the hands of my 
 comrades in arms.
587
   
 
Having examined the role the individual partisan was to fulfill, an exploration of the 
doctrine for their employment and how the partisan was going to affect the situation through a 
task organization is warranted.   
6.3 SOVIET PARTISAN TASK ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS IN THE 
BALTIC: 
 The Soviet leadership had to offer the population more than just rhetoric if they were to 
have any luck defending the Soviet Union against seasoned German troops. The Soviet 
leadership understood that many of those who were going to fill the ranks as partisan fighters 
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were either too young or old for military service in the armed forces, so the logical question to 
ask is what kind of service did the Soviet leadership expect to get from partisan forces? In 
essence, what mission were partisan forces to fulfill? From actions in White Russia emerged a 
leaflet subsequently translated by the Germans to help them better understand the mission the 
partisans were executing. Entitled Directive Number 4, it was issued by the People’s 
Commissars for White Russia and Central Committee X of the Communist Party. The stated 
mission for Partisan forces encompassed four main areas as follows; 
 1. The partisan battalions consist of the population of the cities and the country and fight 
 against the German Fascists in order to support the Red Army; they follow Red Army 
 operations, secure the supply routes, liaison to the cities, industry, collective farms and 
 bridges.  
 
 2. The battalions organize battles in connection with river crossing units and parachute 
 troops. 
 
 3. The battalions build fortifications for defense against the enemy. 
 
 4. Partisans must know the terrain well. In case of enemy attack they must destroy their 
 supplies, fuel and signal equipment in order to prevent it from falling into enemy 
hands.
588
   
 
 Examining the missions makes one question what sort of individual the Soviet leadership 
was going to find to execute such dangerous missions. The answer was someone who was 
expendable and would not likely return. The Soviets had a great plan for the Soviet Union when 
the war ended; those serving in the partisan ranks were individuals the state saw little purpose for 
when the war ended. From the statements of many who were used to continue fighting Baltic 
freedom fighters when the war was over, we know the Soviets were employing criminals and 
individuals of low character to accomplish the tasks they were assigned.
589
 Flowery rhetoric 
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aside, the Soviets were going to employ partisan units against missions were they blended into 
the environment better and could be better used as part of the deception plan to lure the Germans 
into a trap where they could be dealt a sharp blow with little chance of compromise or loss. This 
was the essence of using indoctrinated citizens to conduct guerilla warfare as a tactic against a 
better trained force, just as Lenin wanted in 1906. To give the partisans any military chance of 
success required the investment of some manpower to train and supervise the actions of the 
partisans against the campaign and tactical plans, but also precious material assets such as 
weapons and ammunition. A cadre had to be used by the Soviet leadership to ensure the partisan 
forces were conducting operations in accordance with the plan at the times they were required 
and communist mentorship was also needed for the partisans through a Commissar to ensure 
Comrade Stalin’s orders were being followed to the death. Another possibility for trained 
available manpower was Soviet units and individuals cut off by advancing German units. Like 
all military organizations, the Soviet leadership published doctrinal publications about how to 
conduct partisan operations which were distributed to partisan units. The issuance of a doctrine 
future demonstrates that the partisan was part of the Soviet “combined arms” fight and irregular 
warfare was going to be used to contribute to a Soviet victory. In this doctrine Kalinin declared, 
“partisan warfare reaches an ever increasing importance in the strategy of this war; it has been 
developed to a higher degree than ever before in this war against the excellent tactics of the 
enemy.”590  
A look at the evolution of Soviet partisan doctrine helps form a useful basis for 
understanding how partisan capabilities could be used in conjunction with conventional 
capabilities against the Germans as stated previously in the four partisan missions. Making this 
information about Soviet partisan doctrine of more value is the fact that it comes from captured 
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German intelligence files, having been translated and commented on by German commanders 
and staff officers seeking to better understand ways to address the threat. The examination of 
Soviet partisan doctrine begins with a document captured by the Germans dated July 20, 1941. 
The documented beginnings of Soviet partisan doctrine to the four missions finds a 
formal beginning with an order signed on July 20, 1941 by the Commander of the North-West 
Front, General Sobeschvikow.
591
 This document covered what could be considered common 
“how to” soldier tasks with a typical flavor of communist propaganda. The document was 
subsequently captured by the Germans and incorporated into intelligence reporting for Army 
Group South.
592
 The opening paragraph is a focusing statement from Stalin, it reads; 
Partisan units on horseback and on foot along with diversionary groups must be 
 organized to fight the units of the enemy army, to kindle partisan warfare everywhere, to 
 demolish bridges and roads, cut telephone and telegraph wires, and to set fire to the 
 woods, camps and transportation. In the occupied areas, life must be made intolerable for 
 the enemy and his henchmen. They must be pursued and annihilated at every turn, and all 
 their measures must be undermined.
593
 
 
In the next paragraph, the document wastes no time instructing partisan units how to be 
task organized to conduct partisan operations. Two major groupings of organizations are listed, 
combat units and diversionary groups.
594
 The People’s Commissariat of the Interior exercised 
control over the employment of partisan forces.
595
 A combat unit at this time was defined as a 
“battalion” of 75-150 men sub-organized into two-three companies of two to three platoons 
each.
596
 The document further states, “As a rule, they (a combat unit) will act only at night and 
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from ambush (positions), their mission will be to attack columns and assembly area, motorized 
infantry, camps, transporters of fuel and ammunition, headquarters, air bases and railroad 
transports.”597 On the other hand, diversionary units were to be comprised of 30-50 men who 
operated in 3-5 or as many as ten man groups.
598
 Interestingly, the document alludes to the fact 
that “the diversionary groups must be plotted in such a manner that partisans of one group do not 
know those of other groups.”599 In modern terms, these units were operating in the same manner 
as a terrorist cells. They were small in number, yet they operated with a common mission 
without knowledge of what other units were doing. This ensures the safety of other units in case 
a unit had members captured. The mission of the diversionary groups was to “Cut telephone and 
telegraph lines, setting fire to fuel dumps and transports, delivering close range rifle fire 
dismantling railroad tracks and removing rails, annihilating individuals driving alone or in small 
groups of passenger vehicles and capturing documents.”600 These statements collectively help 
explain the unsuccessful nature of Soviet operations at the beginning of the war. The combat 
readiness of these early partisan units demonstrated they were woefully unprepared to accept 
combat with well-trained German conventional combat formations. The partisans at the early 
stages of the war lacked the experience necessary to attack such formations. The remaining 
pages of the document provide cursory guidance to partisan organizations about how to carry out 
their assigned tasks in terms of tactical actions. There was not enough detail contained in the 
document to train a man who had been a farmer the day before the war started, nor for the young 
soldier whose task it was to train him. The Soviets recognized the weakness of their partisan 
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efforts in 1941 and revamped their doctrine for 1942. A comparison of the 1941 and 1942 
documents is in order to understand how change was affected. 
The Soviet 1942 partisan doctrine by organization of content fully recognized the failures 
of the opening year of the war in the East. Titled, Basic Principles of Partisan Policies, it was 
based in Stalin’s Order Number 130 of May 1, 1942.601 The document comprising this doctrine 
was far more comprehensive in its approach to the conduct of operations at the tactical-level. The 
document contained 16 chapters of several subchapters, covering full spectrum combat 
operations regardless of weather conditions or enemy action.
602
 While much of the same 
methodology is applied to describe formations and numbers necessary to prosecute partisan 
operations, far more emphasis was placed on small unit leadership and actions. This document 
did not contain nearly the same amount of hallow propaganda as the 1941 document, giving the 
partisan sound tactical thoughts which could be easily trained by a cadre. Perhaps the greatest 
difference between the doctrine of 1942 and 1941 was the scoping of the task expectation in 
accordance with the abilities of the force conducting the mission. In “Destruction of Enemy 
Objectives” the document clearly states partisans should attack deep into the enemy rear and 
along lines of communication where the Germans were conducting resupply operations.
603
 The 
order of target precedence for Soviet partisans to attack in 1942 was listed as such, “Enemy 
communications, railroads, paved highways, dirt roads and anything that allows the enemy to 
move his transports, personnel and war material.”604 The other key difference between the 
document from 1942 and 1941 was in 1942, there was far more emphasis placed on the use of 
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reconnaissance in the anticipation of Red Army movements. The document gave finite questions 
for the partisans to answer as they examined German facilities in rear areas. As stated, 
“Reconnoiter the location of the Fascist garrison in various parts of the town or village, find out 
the total number of the garrison, what forces are protecting the separate objectives, what the 
Fascists are armed with, the manner of changing guards, sentinels and patrols.”605  
 
        
606
 
Picture 13: Soviet Partisan Destruction of a German Train on the Narva Front 1944. 
Conducting extensive reconnaissance of the objective area also allowed Soviet Partisans 
the ability to better pick the time of attack along with the method that would be used to break 
contact from the enemy once surprise, the greatest asset of the partisan was lost. The 1942 
document better recognized the limitations of the partisan and employed them in ways better 
suited to their skill sets. The 1942 Soviet partisan doctrine would continue to be refined with 
minor changes, but it would largely retain its character in 1944 when the Soviets were advancing 
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into Estonia. In the end, it was how effective the partisan was, not fighting alone; but as a 
contributing factor to the overall success of the mission and toward the irregular warfare strategy 
the Soviets were applying to accomplish their goals through their campaign. One way to gauge 
the measure of a force’s performance is basing opinions on the thoughts of the opponent.  
German General Schenkendorf’s thoughts about Soviet Partisan operations were recorded in a 
pivotal Soviet work entitled The People, the Army, the Commander. This work stated; 
 General Schenkendorf characterizes the growing danger to German troops arising from 
 Soviet partisan activities as follows: 
 
 1. Key railroads for material supply purposes are under threat. The number of partisan 
 raids and diversions increase daily. 
 
 2. Economic use of vast areas in hindered in the highest degree. 
 
 3. Continued utilization of key enterprises is hazardous. 
 
 4. In areas under their control, the partisans have such large units that our forces could 
 hardly repel a simultaneous attack by them on our rear communications and services. 
 
 5. A continuing increase in the enemy’s numerical strength should be expected. 
 
 6. The population has ceased to believe in the strength of the German army, as it sees that 
 we cannot cope with the partisans. The local inhabitants willingly help the partisans, and 
 are entering their ranks.
607
       
 
Having explored the Soviet concept for employment for partisan forces against Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and developing doctrine, it is now prudent to examine the German concepts to counter 
the Soviet partisans and examine their methods.   
 6.4 GERMAN ANTI-PARTISAN DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS: 
 As has been demonstrated in other chapters, while the Soviets were wholly unprepared 
for the German onslaught with the invasion of the Soviet Union in all facets of offensive and 
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defensive preparations, the Germans were no more prepared to hold the ground they had taken 
either. Often, professional soldiers and scholars only acknowledge the successes and failures of 
German front line troops, as has been examined, the more dynamic failures were of German 
policy at the strategic-level with Hitler at the helm. Hitler’s interference into tactical matters is 
well known, but often times the things he chose to neglect are not. Hitler’s radical racial policies 
were also the match that ignited the fire of failure at the tactical-level in the occupation of the 
USSR. Hitler’s policies being implemented by his willing executioners managed to turn the 
welcoming civilian populations into a tool for their Soviet enemies to exploit. While Hitler’s 
strategic policies and guidance to his commanders could be considered the cause of the greater 
Soviet partisan participation, the effect of Soviet partisan participation was felt by all German 
operational and tactical level commanders across the Eastern Front. Hitler’s policies are directly 
to blame for the partisan problem encountered by German troops. 
 Just as the Soviets were unprepared to execute partisan warfare as part of a greater 
strategy of irregular warfare, the Germans were no more prepared to counter partisan activities in 
the beginning. The Germans were unprepared at the tactical level to secure their vast lines of 
communication. They hinged their hopes on the use of older men or reservists who were 
unprepared for the task of rear area security.
608
  Like most armies and plans, the Germans had 
concentrated on the offensive plan and not their logistical support planning. Evidence of this 
exists in Rear Area Security in Russia. Published shortly after the war in 1951, the United States 
Army examined key lessons observed from German operations on the Eastern Front. Two 
pertinent lessons resonate, firstly, questions of the initial organizational structure to conduct rear 
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area security and secondly, the use of active and passive measures to provide security.
609
 Closer 
examination of German structure for the conduct of anti-partisan operations and its evolution is 
required in order to determine how it was to be used in conjunction with their conventional 
operations plan. 
 The question of who is responsible for rear area security naturally falls on the unit 
commander responsible for the area which is being operated in. However, security for lines of 
communication, such as roads and rails for German forces was a most convoluted arrangement. 
Once German tactical forces left the area and continued east in the attack, the lines of 
communication became the problem of the Chief of Supply, while the area itself was the problem 
of the military occupation authorities.
610
 Often, there was little communication between the 
commanders and the staffs of the Army Group and the occupation forces. Covering the 
occupation of territory in the rear area was a network of Kommandanturen or administrative area 
headquarters. It was the responsibility of the Chief of Supply to determine the size and the 
composition of forces to be employed to secure the rear area.
611
 The task was normally assigned 
to security battalions through security divisions.
612
 In actuality, these units were typically 
comprised of poor quality soldiers and leaders, not men up to the challenge of fighting 
decentralized tactical operations. In October 1941 Brauchitsch issued his Directive for Anti-
Partisan Warfare to assist local rear area commanders understanding their mission along with 
the problems they were tasked with solving.
613
 The document explained the task organization, 
mission and methods of the partisan, but Brauchitsch only told commanders at the front what 
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they already knew about the enemy and he provided them with nothing in the way of ideas to 
combat the partisan. Like the Soviets, as the Germans began to better understand the problems 
presented by partisan operations, they modified their doctrine and procedures to accommodate 
changes in enemy tactics, techniques and procedures.  
 In August, 1942, based on Führer Directive 48, Directive for the Increased Fight Against 
the Partisan Menace in the East was published.
614
 Like their Soviet counterparts, the German 
doctrine had marked improvements. The document in short order recognized the threat Soviet 
partisan operations posed to German lines of communication. To cope with the threat the 
document stated; 
 The (partisan) bands must be annihilated and with this the front behind the army pacified 
 by the beginning of winter, in order to prevent decisive disadvantages for the conduct of 
 operations of the Wehrmacht during the winter. This requires: 
 
 1. Quick, sharp and active anti-partisan warfare by assembling all suitable forces of the 
 Wehrmacht, SS and Police. 
 
 2. Concentration of all propagandistic, economic and political measures for the need of 
 anti-partisan warfare.
615
  
 
This statement demonstrates the Germans understood they could not rely solely on military 
actions to address the partisan problem. Instead, the Germans thought the answer to the partisan 
problem could only be found in a synergy of disciplines. Coming quickly from the abstract into 
the concrete, the document laid out six general guidelines for operations, followed by the 
delineation of duties for organizations operating within the area of operations. First, an 
examination of the six guidelines is required. 
The six guidelines were as follows; 
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 1. Anti-partisan warfare is like command at the front, a command responsibility. It is to 
 be organized by the appointed command staff in accordance with OKH-GenSt d H-Gen 
 Qu/Op Abt (I) nr. 10887/42 g.Kdos, dated August 9, 1942. 
  
 2. The annihilation of the bands requires active warfare and harshest measures against all 
 who participate in the organization of bands or who support them. 
 
 3. The necessary confidence in the German command must be gained by strict, but just 
 treatment of the population.  
 
 4. Prerequisite for destruction of the bands is to secure the minimum of existence for the 
 population. If this is not accomplished and if the available goods are not distributed 
 justly, the bands will receive increased membership.  
 
 5. Cooperation by the population in anti-partisan fighting is absolutely essential. Rewards 
 for deserving people must be generous. They must really be an incentive. However, even 
 harder, therefore must be the reprisal measures for all who abet and aid the bands. 
 
 6. Undue familiarity towards inhabitants, especially those employed by German agencies 
 must be prevented. Although the mass of people are anti-partisan, one must always count 
 on informers who have the mission to inform the bands.
616
    
 
Analyzing these six guidelines, some interesting trends emerge which demonstrate how the 
Germans thought about the problems associated with Anti-Partisan warfare. First, the Germans 
made clear command of the rear area was like command at the front. While the threat was more 
pronounced, it gave rear area commanders the ability to be taken more seriously when they 
requested assets and forces to address challenges. Second and more importantly are the 
discussions of how to deal with the population. The Germans correctly understood the central 
role the population played in rear area security. Here the question should be asked, if the 
Germans understood the population was central to their success, then why were gross violations 
of law allowed? The root of this answer is found in the complex command relationship which 
was still developing.       
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 In the Directive for the Increased Fight Against the Partisan Menace in the East the 
document makes a clear distinction of which organization would have responsibility for 
controlling rear areas. It states,  
 1. Reichsführer SS (RFSS) and Chief of the German Police: the RFSS is the central  
 agency for the collection and evaluation of all experiences in the field of anti-partisan 
 warfare. In addition, RFSS is responsible for anti-partisan fighting in the 
 Reichskommissariate. 
 
 2. Army: The Chief of the General Staff of the Army is solely responsible for anti-
 partisan in the operational area. To fulfill this mission, all police forces located in the 
 operational area are subordinate to the pertinent commanders. Besides this, there are 
 available army forces whose mission is anti-partisan warfare. The commander will 
 delegate the command of individual operations according to the prevailing situation, 
 commitment of forces and available rank of personnel to army officers or higher SS and 
 Police leaders.
617
 
 
This statement continues to explain why the Germans failed to secure their lines of 
communication to the front from the rear area. It could most easily be explained as a lack of 
unity of effort. While the RFSS was responsible for the strategic rear area, the Army was 
responsible for the operational rear area. Common of large bureaucracies, there was very little 
coordination within levels, let alone cross-coordination between organizations. In essence, there 
was not a single headquarters at the tactical, operational or strategic-levels that looked at partisan 
operations through the same lens and coordinated collective efforts. There was no connection 
between civil matters and military matters, even though they stemmed from the same population 
in the rear areas. The German failure occurred at the operational level.  
Failure to plan at the operational level was the connection between the German military 
executing the tactical rear area security mission and the civil powers responsible for the 
administration of the occupied territories, more importantly the centers of throughput and lines of 
communication to move men and material to the front at the strategic level.  Without a solid 
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connection between the civil administration and the military authorities, the lack of a cohesive 
tactical doctrine for how to execute rear area operations simply hastened German failure.  
6.5 GERMAN TASK ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF ESTONIA: 
 While historians have typically concentrated on the exploits of the 207th, 281st and 285th 
German Infantry (Security) Divisions as the main organs responsible for rear area security in the 
Army Group North area of operations, a more accurate picture of German rear area security 
planning and operations is still lacking. Perhaps a more accurate way to think of those three 
Security Divisions is as the “catch all” division, as these units were employed against tasks 
ranging from being a reserve used to close a gap, to securing line of communication and 
conducting anti-partisan warfare.  Playing a significant role in the rear area fight for Army Group 
North was a unit known as the Kommandant des rückwärtigen Armeegebietes or Korück 583 
(See Below for Task Organization).
618
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Found on NARA T-312, Roll 904, Frame 9083979, the task organization for Korück 583 
highlight an interesting point not often thought of when examining the history of the Second 
World War, that being, the role local nationals play in the defense of their own territory (See 
Below). Much has been written which examines the significant shortage of manpower the 
German Wehrmacht experienced from the beginning of hostilities in 1941 through the 
conclusion of the war, but little examines what methods were employed to cope with shortages. 
What has gone largely unknown are the measures the Germans took to mitigate their shortfalls 
with the use of local Estonian forces. 
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See: NARA T-312, Roll 904, First Frame 9083979
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 NARA T-312, Roll 904, First Frame 9083979. This frame shows the disposition of 18th Army in 
November-December 1943 before the Soviet breakout from Leningrad.  
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 Before Soviet forces broke the hold the Germans had on Leningrad on January 14th 
1944, the Germans had Korück 583 in place to act as a liaison force between the Omakaitse or 
Estonian Home Guard and the German military occupation authority as well as Army Group 
North. Korück 583 did nothing but secure rear areas and conduct anti-partisan operations along 
with supporting the Omakaitse when needed. The Germans, rightfully understanding their 
shortage of available manpower and recognizing the need to secure rear areas, incorporated the 
use of the Omakaitse as part of a collective tactic to provide rear area security. The Germans 
recognized the strengths the Omakaitse had in knowledge of the physical terrain as well as the 
population and sought to capitalize on them. In modern parlance, we could think of the Germans 
“contracting” the services of the Omakaitse while providing a quick reaction force to reinforce 
the Omakaitse when necessary.
619
 Playing upon Estonian fears of a second Soviet occupation, 
the Germans easily secured help from the Estonians. P-035 Retrograde of Army Group North 
During 1944 assists in understanding the relationship of German forces to the use of Estonian 
forces. It states, 
 The general desire of the Estonians to participate actively in the defense of their country 
 was understandable. Since there was no data for a systematic mobilization, the latter was 
 conducted as a pure improvisation. It was carried out by Estonian agencies with the 
 support of the German civil administration. Three infantry regiments were initially 
 activated. Difficulties in the procurement of weapons and equipment delayed their 
 employment. A Citizen’s Guard (Omakaitse), as a rule varying in strength from a squad 
 to a platoon, had already been formed by the civil administration to provide security. 
 These protective measures, as well as the attitude of the population in general, greatly 
 relieved the burden of the Armeeabteilung command. There never was much fighting 
 against partisans.
620
     
 
                                                          
 
619
 A quick reaction force (QRF) is a unit assigned to support troops who are in contact with the enemy that 
do not have the required combat power to break the enemy's hold. 
620
 Department of the Army, MS# P-035 Retrograde of Army Group North During 1944. (Carlisle, Army 
War College: Foreign Military Studies Department 1950), 183-4. This portion of P-035 was written by 
Generalleutnant Paul Reichelt, who in March, 1944 was assigned to Armeeabteilung Narva as the Chief of Staff.  
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By examining the actions of Korück 583 against the reports of the Omakaitse throughout 
1944, a clearer historical picture emerges of how Soviet partisans were used as an irregular force 
in conjunction with advancing Red Army troops from the breakout of Leningrad to the 
investment of Estonia. Through documents stored at the Estonian National Archives in Tallinn, 
Estonia, historians have the reports of the Omakaitse for the entire year of 1944. These reports 
are found in Estonian National Archives, ERA 358-2-23.
621
 While these documents do not spell 
out explicitly the mission of the Omakaitse, they clearly define the role it played was to defend 
the boarders and the Estonian population. The Omakaitse was in a difficult position, while it 
wanted to defend Estonian territory it was still occupied by a foreign power. Clearly, the 
Omakaitse had to work for the Germans because they were there, not because they wanted to. 
While they may have disliked the Germans, they knew what would be coming with a second 
Soviet occupation and they would fight only to avoid that. The task organization for the 
Omakaitse can be found in the Estonian National Archives in ERA 358-2-24 (See Below).  
                                                          
621
 The Omakaitse reports for the year 1944 are contained in Omakaitse Peavalitsus I Peaosakand Operative 
Kokkuvote. See: ERA 358-2-23. I am indebted to the friendship, scholarship and common professional interest of 
Captain Peeter Pekri of the Estonian Armed Forces. Without his understanding of the language and knowledge of 
the reports, I would not be able to interpret them. The maps and data on the number of partisan events which follow 
in this chapter were first captured in his work for the Estonian Defence College entitled, 1944a. Sündmused Eestis 
Omakaitse Ettekannetes: Edastatud operatiivettekannete Põhjal koostatud ohupilt.  
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Task Organization of an Omakaitse Regiment.  See: ERA 358-2-24  
The examination of Soviet partisan activities begins by categorizing the types of activities 
conducted.  ERA 358-2-23 generally speaks of Soviet partisan activities in terms of four areas, 
direct fire engagements between the Omakaitse and partisans, banditry and air drops, air 
activities and “other” reportable issues such as bombings or assignations. Within these four 
categories, from January 1, 1944 until September 11, 1944 there were 1,160 events reported by 
the Omakaitse to German authorities (See below for monthly event breakout).
622
  
Month 
in 1944 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept 
Number 
of 
Events 
118 244 160 81 133 106 192 85 24 
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 ERA 358-2-23. 
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When partisan events are examined purely as numbers, it quickly becomes clear that during the 
month of January when the Soviets were breaking out of the Leningrad encirclement, 118 
partisan activities were used to assist shaping conventional actions throughout the German rear 
area in Estonia. The month of February however saw the decisive main effort of partisan activity 
with 244 partisan events in support of breaching effort in the Narva area against the “Panther 
position” as examined in chapters 4 and 5. Between the months of March and May, a noticeable 
phase of sustainment operations is noticed, in March, with 160 Soviet partisan events, being cut 
almost in half in April as an operational pause was conducted to conduct tactical resupply 
operations and to conduct assessment of current operations along with planning for future 
operations. Partisan activities then spike again in May to 133 events, followed by sustained 
operations in June with 106 events. In July, a noticeable second spike is observed with 192 
offensive events throughout Estonia, with a gradual tapering off to 85 events in August along 
with 24 events in the early part of September 1944.
623
 
 Looking at the types of partisan events recorded and during which periods which they 
occurred allows the professional soldier and scholar to understand what methods the Soviet 
partisan was using in support of Red Army conventional operations through the process of trend 
analysis. Generally speaking, banditry is a consistent theme throughout the year as a partisan 
activity. A consistent feature to all partisan activities was the collection of information and 
reconnaissance for follow-on Soviet conventional forces. Direct fire engagements between the 
Omakaitse and Soviet partisans are generally rare according to the number of incidents. This 
attests to the value of partisans to shape German rear areas through reconnaissance activities, 
vice becoming decisively engaged in active battle. The heaviest direct fire engagement periods 
                                                          
623
 It must be noted that 24 is only a partial count for the month of September, 1944. September is generally 
considered when the conventional war in Estonia was over between the Germans and the Soviets and the beginning 
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occur prominently during two periods. In February when Soviet conventional forces are 
attempting to break the “Panther position” in the Narva area and then in the Summer of 1944 
when the Soviets make a final attempt on “Tannenberg Position” at Sinimäed and adjust their 
main effort to the south against German positions at the “Marienburg Line” in the Tartu area in 
southern Estonia.  
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As a shaping operation, prior to the January 14th 1944 breakout of the Leningrad pocket, 
there were 21 actions reported by the Omakaitse in the rear area.
624
 Speaking to actions prior to 
the Leningrad breakout, 18th Army reported to Army Group North from January 2-8, 1944 
partisan activities beginning to increase.
625
 On January 3, 1944 the results of Operation OTTO, 
an anti-partisan operation conducted by 18th Army to “clear important lateral communications 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the second Soviet occupation began with Estonian national resistance against the Soviet occupation. 
624
 Based on ERA 358-2-23 through January 10, 1944. 
625
 NARA RG # 319 Stack Area 270 Row 19, Shelf 04-4 Box 3. 
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between Sebesh-Polozk and Sebesh-Drissa” were filed to Army Group North.626 On January 6, 
1944 18th Army “finds it imperative to destroy the partisans in the Luga-Narva area who 
threaten the rail road and the Narva-Gatschina road. The Army requests a Security Regiment 
from the Army Group.”627 On January 7, “south of the Gatschina-Narva line (south of III SS 
Panzer Korps) there is a new partisan main effort. The danger exists that the enemy some day 
may block the Gatschina-Narva Road and the rail road in connection with an attack from the 
Leningrad and Oranienbaum area in concert with this partisan center.”628 No statement could 
make clear the intentions of the Soviets or the German understanding of anticipated Soviet 
actions. Clearly, the Soviets intended to use partisan action in conjunction with conventional 
forces and the Germans knew it was coming.  
  
                                                          
626
 Operation OTTO was conducted between December 20, 1943 and January 1, 1944 by Kämpfgruppe 
Jeckeln. The wildly successful operation “annihilated partisan bands operating in the area.” The results of the 
operation were recorded as 121 partisan camps, 56 dugouts, 25 field trenches, 94 living and combat bunkers and 10 
block houses destroyed. Losses were 1920 partisans and those that aided them. German losses were recorded as 21 
killed, 87 wounded and 1 German missing in action. See Ibid. 
627
 Ibid. 
628
 This is clear proof that the Soviets saw the use of Partisan forces as a method of irregular warfare when 
combined with conventional forces. Partisans should be seen as shaping the operational setting to enable local 
tactical area successes. See Ibid. 
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Map 18: Soviet Partisan Activity, January 14, 1944 
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Map 19: Rail Network in the Baltic Area 
 
Examining Maps 18 and 19 in conjunction with 18th Army reports from January 13-16 
makes clear how the Soviets intended to use partisan forces in support of main effort 
conventional operation. Reports of January 13th state anti-partisan operations in the Luga area 
would continue. The Soviet main effort attack breaking the hold on Leningrad is registered as 
January 14, 1944; however the Germans conveyed their concerns about partisan activities in the 
Novgorod area.
629
 In the wake of the Soviet main effort attack, at midnight on January 16, 1944, 
Korück 583 reported 300 partisans attacked the Nachinskaya rail road station (31.5 Km NE of 
                                                          
629
 Ibid. 
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Luga) with heavy losses to personnel and rail infrastructure.
630
 Korück 583 reports from 13.47 
January 19, 1944, state the operations officer of 18th Army reports to the operations officer of 
Army Group North that “the arrival of 8th Jäger Division was much delayed due to rail 
demolitions” throughout the area. At 14.15 the same day, SS Obergruppenführer Jeckeln “states 
that he is able to furnish 5 Latvian and 2 Lettgallen battalions (about 4,000 men) after a short 
period of training for anti-partisan warfare. This requires Army Group North to furnish arms to 
the new units.”631 Attesting to the strength of partisan attacks, at midnight on the 19th the 
following report was sent, “numerous rail road demolitions on the line 6 Km North of Solzy. 
Repair operations interrupted by raids of partisans. Strong partisan activity in the area of Army 
Group North. Anti- partisan actions in that area broken off due to superiority of partisan forces. 
Numerous rail road demolitions on all rail lines.”632 The effect of such partisan operations on 
German lines of communication and the German rear demonstrating the Red Army was 
successfully conducting conventional operations in front, while clearly having a dramatic effect 
on the overall effectiveness of Operation BLAU as discussed in chapter 3.  
Using the information from the Omakaitse reports, Map 20 (See red circle) demonstrates 
the concentration of partisan and air bombardment against the “Panther Position” in mid-
February 1944. Based on the reported number of incidents by the Omakaitse for the month of 
February, 1944 and with knowledge that mid-February was the Soviet main effort against the 
“Panther Position,” it is not difficult to see the complimentary effects of Soviet operations.   
 
 
 
                                                          
630
 Ibid.  
631
 Ibid. 
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Map 20 
 
Once the Soviets recognized the change in weather was coming in March and April, they shifted 
their tactics to continue to weakening German rear areas in the “Tannenberg Position” area, but 
they also directed a significant bombing effort against the rail infrastructure of Tapa to the west 
and against Tartu to the south. (See Map 21). This bombing effort would continue with a more 
intense duration from March 27- April 4, 1944 (See Map 22).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
632
 Ibid. 
Partisan and Soviet Air Force activity from January 31- Febuary 27, 1944. Information extracted from 
ERA 358-2-23 
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Partisan and Soviet Air Force activity from Febuary 28 – March 26, 1944. Information extracted from 
ERA 358-2-23. 
 
Map 21 
 
Soviet Air Force bombing from March 27 – April 4, 1944. Information extracted from ERA 358-2-23. 
 
 
Map 22 
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This intense Soviet bombing campaign of the rail infrastructure precedes German plans to 
retrograde equipment and personnel as part of Operation HOUSE CLEARING as described in 
chapter 5.  Not only did Soviet bombardment and partisan activities cripple retrograde operations 
from the “Tannenberg Position” in the Narva area, but it also set the conditions for a shifting of 
the Soviet main effort to the Tartu area and the “Marienburg Line” (See Map 18).   
 
Partisan activities in support of attacks from the Tartu area. July 3– September17, 1944. Information 
extracted from ERA 358-2-23. 
 
Map 23 
 
Looking at the all of the events against the locations on the various maps demonstrates a 
few interesting general trends. The first was Soviet  para-drops would be sent deep into the 
German rear in Estonia. Next, ground partisan activities always preceded a major offensive by 
the Red Army. Red Army actions were coordination with aerial bombings against key 
infrastructure such as rail depots, not typically far from the front lines. Lastly, large movements 
of the civilian population from the front line to areas on the west coast of Estonia follow Red 
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Army offensive operations. Collectively, these actions demonstrate the effectiveness of a 
strategy of irregular warfare.      
6.6 CONCLUSION:  
 The historical record of events in the Leningrad area and Estonia demonstrate two very 
important observations about the Soviet use of partisan operations as well as German anti-
partisan efforts for scholars and the professional soldiers to consider. The first observation is the 
Soviets clearly demonstrated the strength of partisan operations in conjunction with conventional 
forces to achieve complimentary effects. Quite clearly, this also demonstrates the value of 
irregular warfare as part of an overall strategy for victory. Evidence of this assertion is present in 
the work of Professor Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte.
633
  
 In an interview conducted on July 29, 1986 with Professor von der Heydte, Michael 
Liebig, an Executive Director of the European branch of the Executive Intelligence Review 
interviewed Professor von der Heydte who spoke conclusively and retrospectively about his 
thoughts and experiences regarding the Soviet partisan as an irregular fighter. Von der Heydte 
was asked by Liebig, “Do you believe that the Russian conduct of partisan war decided the 
war?”634 Von der Heydte replied,  
 Yes absolutely. I saw it myself. Under regular combat conditions on the East Front, we 
 (the Germans) could handle the Russian soldier. But when a totally new adversary 
 cropped up in the dense forests and swamp areas, one we did not know about, then the 
 eagerness for war vanished rapidly. We did not know how strong this adversary was, nor 
 how extensive his coverage was, nor did we know what he was doing .We only knew, 
 this adversary is against us. The Wehrmacht was also disorganized in its morale by the 
 partisan war in the east.
635
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 Friedrich August von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, In Defense Policy and as a Military 
Phenomenon (New York, NY: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986), 248.  
634
 Ibid, xxii. 
635
 Ibid. 
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 The other lesson is not something the Germans, nor did we today observe retrospectively; 
that being, the role of the population and its interaction with combatants. Without the support 
and will of the population, the partisan cannot physically survive, in terms of food for subsidence 
nor physical security. Nazi policies, convoluted command relationships and poor tactical 
doctrine / execution made it impossible for the Germans to capitalize on any gains at the 
strategic, operational or tactical levels. Like all occupiers, the Germans became their own worst 
enemies, not because every German soldier was trying to enforce Nazi policies, but rather 
because there were some who were. While good treatment amongst the occupied spreads slowly, 
word of abuse spreads like wild fire. The fire it ignites is the will of a people to be without 
occupation. Ultimately, the German challenges of dealing with the partisan problem began with a 
lack of planning for the occupation of Russia. The truth of the matter is winning the peace is 
never as expensive as its maintenance. More soldiers are required to hold what was been won 
than winning in the first place. Having a plan to fight and beat an enemy on the field is the easy 
part, planning to secure the victory is what requires skill and understanding. Fighting an army of 
the people is winnable, fighting the people has proven to be the same challenge in 1944 as it is 
today. The question to all who conquer is how to secure the peace which is won.     
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 War is made a complex phenomenon because of human participation and the desire for 
each combatant to impose his will on the other.
636
 The ultimate aim of war is to quickly restore 
peace and status quo after the strategic end state of the war has been achieved. The manner in 
which the will of the opponents is imposed is subject to the art and science of war. The art and 
science of war, or the tangible and intangible aspects of the human experience comprise the 
method through which the conduct of war is implemented. It is the conduct of war which defines 
the clash of wills, providing the raw cases the scholar and professional soldier studies to learn 
from. For the scholar and professional soldier to develop their judgment based on past conflicts 
for anticipated conflicts of the future, a model is required to examine and explain the end states 
of combatant strategies against the tactics and equipment employed.
637
 Effort must be expended 
to show how the actions of the combatants were coordinated through planning efforts. The 
product of planning is a plan. Plans govern ideas about the use of force, but orders are the 
communication medium through which plans are expressed. The model used throughout the 
course of this work demonstrates the utility of examining strategic ends against tactical means 
through the use of a historical case study. The articulation of strategies into coordinated tactical 
conventional and asymmetric actions occurs at the operational level through the use of a 
campaign plan.
638
 In difference to an order, a plan coordinates actions of a combatant in time and 
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 See: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps, Warfighting MCDP-1 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Marine Corps, June 20, 1997). 
 
637
 The purpose of military officers studying history is to improve their judgment for future decision 
making. 
 
638
 See: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps, Planning MCDP-5 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Marine Corps, July 21, 1997). 
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space, while the order is used as a means to communicate the plan.
639
 The campaign plan is the 
essence of operational art, as it joins the strategic ends to the tactical means through operational 
ways. The purpose fulfilled by this work was demonstrating the connection existing between the 
levels of war through operational planning in relation to the elements of the art and science of 
war. The case study presented of actions in late 1943/44 in the Northern Baltic served as a means 
to better explain this connection to both professional soldiers and scholars.  
 If this work illustrates nothing else, it shows nothing about war is truly new. War is based 
on a few immutable facts, those being, war is an act of violence that must be fought in the same 
time and space where one combatant is in the offense, the other, the defense.
640
 While the 
defense is thought of as the stronger form of combat, it is the offense that is decisive.
641
 The 
defense is a means of stopping an enemy advance and trading time for space as a method to 
accomplish the ends. The Germans by the Second World War were masters at trading space for 
time as they had spend most of the latter years of the First World War and the interwar years 
perfecting techniques across the strategic to tactical-levels.
642
  
 The question of time and space speaks directly to the issues of terrain and weather. Any 
plan failing to consider these two key factors is doomed. Rarely do professional soldiers or 
scholars truly consider the effects of terrain and weather in their plans or studies. These two 
factors influence operations and man's abilities more than anything else. Terrain and weather 
influence all man does,  including war. As terrain and weather always influence the nature and 
conduct of war, there are other immutable aspects that are timeless features of the conduct of 
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 See: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps, Warfighting MCDP-1 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Marine Corps, June 20, 1997). 
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 See: Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine. The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During 
The First World War (Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School, July, 1981). 
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war. Operations in time and space always dictate formations start from bases of operations in 
order to attack or defend.
643
  
 Throughout the course of the work it was made clear the Germans were operating from 
the main Estonian sea ports as points of entry and places from were throughput of logistical 
support could be controlled as their base of operations. In the Soviet case, it was the city of 
Leningrad itself that acted as the Soviet base of operations. To move supplies to the front 
required the use of lines of communication. Lines of communication can be rivers, rails or roads 
that move material to the front. Fronts can have a defensive or offensive character. In the case of 
the Soviets executing offensive operations from the Leningrad pocket, the attack was launched 
from a static front of limited space and was conducted over external lines of operation. In the 
Soviet's case, it was a true feat to start an offensive operation from the halt and generate 
momentum from "stacked" static combat power. Combat power was then limited by terrain that 
formed avenues of approach, mainly along roads. Mobility off road was severely limited during 
the winter months and non-existent after the winter thaw and summer months. This consideration 
drove operations to be conducted during the winter.
644
 Soviet necessity to execute the operation 
during the winter months is confirmed when examining Soviet plans to cross ice, vice using 
bridging assets. The validity of the Soviet plan is confirmed by Estonian weather data and Soviet 
river crossing doctrine.
645
 Securing external lines of communication is a heavy tax on combat 
power as it is continuous and ever moving to support the army. In the case of the Germans 
operating along interior lines of operation, the task was to secure the rear area from partisan 
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 While Clausewitz and Jomini debated the finer points of theory in the early 19th Century, Jomini made a 
clear attempt at explaining the mechanics of the operational art as it was conducted by Napoleon. See: Baron De 
Jomini, The Art of War (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott & Co, 1862). 
 
644
 See: Eesti Meteoroloogiajaamade Vork, Weather Record, Feburary 1944, (Dorpat (Tartu), Estonia: 
Station Year Record 1944). 
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forces while continuing to shorten their lines of communication / operation and conduct the 
retrograde of forces from Leningrad, first to the "Panther Position," then into Latvia to the south. 
The fighting that occurs at the Blue Hills proves to be a significant operational level enabling 
operation for Germany; the Germans traded space for time to do two critical things. First, the 
Germans were able to shorten their lines of communication and operations to the Estonian coast 
while providing local reinforcements for the withdrawal to Latvia from the Blue Hills. Secondly, 
the Germans were able to take their time while recovering from the massive Soviet breakout 
attack from Leningrad, thus taking the initiative and momentum away from the Soviets. The 
critical element the Germans needed was a plan allowing them to execute without friction. In 
Plan BLAU the Germans had such a tool along with educated commanders capable of executing 
this difficult mission.       
 Commanders at all levels have a responsibility to communicate their desired end states 
for operations through guidance, intent and the plan they promulgate to subordinate 
commanders. The culmination of initial planning guidance and commander’s intent becomes 
actionable through an operational campaign plan. The plan is not only a document comprised of 
operations, but also of intelligence, logistics and communications related thoughts. Without a 
synergy of staff disciplines, the soldier in the field could attack or hold a position for only a short 
period of time. The soldier must not only be told generally what is expected in the absence of 
orders, he must also be given an idea of the enemy composition on the objective will be and how 
he will be resupplied once there along with what to report to higher headquarters.  Indeed, the 
commander enables the actions of his subordinate commanders through his guidance and intent 
along with his campaign plan and subordinate orders. A plan is then turned into orders for 
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 See: Ibid along with Red Army Publication, Генеральный Штаб Красной Армии, (Проект) 
Наставление по Форсированию Рек, (Draft, Instructions on River Crossing) (Moscow, USSR: Military Publishing 
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tactical formations to execute and report their progress back to higher headquarters. The body of 
the work presented in this thesis examined Operation BLAU, a plan that articulated clear 
strategic guidance against the realities of clashing organizations; those of Adolf Hitler and the 
OKW against the OKH and the field commands.
646
 Most importantly, the actions were examined 
in the proper historical context, where cause and effect could be considered in the totality of the 
decisions made.  
 The Operation BLAU plan clearly took into consideration the anticipated interference of 
Berlin and Adolf Hitler at the strategic level and weighed it against the terrible price being paid 
at the tactical-level by those fighting for Germany. Commanders and planners at Army Group 
North and 18th Army clearly understood the gravity of the situation in their sectors of 
operation.
647
 Those in the field understood politicians in Berlin were not concerned with 
understanding the reality of the tactical situation on the Eastern Front. Commanders and staff 
planners also well understood Hitler was not interested in the traditional German doctrinal 
method of trading space for time based on Nazi ideology. Commanders and planners in Army 
Group North demonstrated mental flexibility and courage by creating a plan that Berlin thought 
it didn’t need, while addressing the problems of the local commanders at the tactical-level 
charged with holding back an enemy without proper resources.  
7.1 STRATEGIC ENDS: 
 The strategic ends for a conflict are philosophically the moral impetus for war in the first 
place. The moral clause for war is defined by the political reasons for war. The political reasons 
for war inform strategic leader's decisions regarding the nature and the conduct of an impending 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
House of People’s Defense Commissariat, 1943).  
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 See: Army Group North’s “Fall BLAU,” or Operation BLUE contained in NARA T-311, Roll 76, First 
Frame 7099655.   
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conflict. War is not just an exercise of military power, but the use of military power can be used 
to enable other methods of accomplishing strategic objectives. Examining conflict in the Baltic 
states in late 1943, early 1944 required first and foremost an understanding of economics and 
political desires for each combatant. As demonstrated throughout the course of this work, the 
major disconnect for Germany existed in a lack of unity of effort, not only amongst the various 
branches of the armed forces, but between the military and the civil branches as well. The 
disconnect between German civil and military authorities was never more evident than when it 
came to the administering the occupied territories and which organization was responsible for 
what action. This lack of unity of effort collectively resulted in the fragmentation of efforts 
between various German organizations, while contributing nothing to common operational 
picture to address the issues with limited assets. The Soviets on the other hand had clear unity of 
purpose between military and civil authorities. In essence, the two were the same. The Soviets 
were able to achieve strategic success because they possessed a clear vision of the world after the 
war terminated. As evidenced in this work, the Soviets every move was tied to war termination 
and the coming grand strategy post conflict. The Soviet strategic goal was the elimination of 
Fascist Germany.
648
 In order to recognize this goal, certain conditions had to be met which 
would allow the Soviets to properly phase the efforts of their fronts in time and space, not only 
against the weakness of the German fronts, but in the areas the Soviets desperately needed back 
under their control to support their war effort. Thus, the Soviet main effort attack was made 
against the Ukraine in late 1943 and throughout 1944.
649
 With strategic resources pooled to 
support main effort operations in the Ukraine, Soviet planners had to be deliberate in how 
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House, 1953), 145-6. 
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supporting efforts would accomplish subordinate tasks associated with the Soviet idea of war 
termination. To reach the strategic goal of eliminating Fascist Germany in time and space, first 
the Germans would have to be removed from Soviet soil. This could only be accomplished by 
the destruction of German combat power.
650
 While clearly the Ukraine could feed the Soviet 
people, the Baltic states provide the buffer from the west Stalin so desperately wanted to have 
back.
651
     
 Both the Germans and the Soviets recognized the economic value of the Baltic and the 
geographic position of advantage the area held based on hundreds of years of history. The 
difference in views between the Germans and the Soviets lies in their strategic end states based 
on the situation of the late war. While Berlin was convinced at the highest levels the war could 
still be won, Moscow knew the war would be won and wanted to be in a position of advantage 
when the war terminated against the western allies. While the campaign in the Baltic states 
allowed Germany the ability to remain connected to their allies in Finland, it was the iron ore of 
Sweden and the ability to regulate commerce and more importantly, access to the Baltic Sea 
consumed Germany’s logic to fight in the Baltic. While the German armed forces were guided 
by joint principles of unified action at the strategic level, service politics dominated planning 
efforts and the use of resources.
652
 In practical application the German armed forces were 
fighting as disaggregated forces under the command of the Army. In practice, the examination of 
Army Group North’s concept of withdrawal from the front at Leningrad to the "Panther Position" 
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along the Narva River demonstrates the fact the army was carrying the weight of the plan, while 
the navy and the air force where supporting efforts.  
The main difficulty with the German execution of the Operation BLAU at the strategic 
level was the identification of tasks commensurate with the capabilities of the force being 
employed. As chapter three clearly showed, German planners at the strategic level invested a 
significant amount of time and effort into articulating the ground concept of operations and 
scheme of maneuver without enough effort to explain how the air force and navy would be used 
to support the army’s efforts. The lack of synergy in planning overtaxed the abilities of the 
tactical level by asking soldiers to do far more then they had the capabilities or abilities to do. 
Throughout history, when this is the case, historians often write heroic stories to compliment 
soldiers impossible acts. The fact is, leaders at the strategic and operational levels fail the soldier 
in the field and put him against places and positions they never should. The result is the soldier 
usually gets a grave, medal or both.  
 
 
    
653
 
Picture 14: Grave of a Danish man who fell in Service with the Waffen SS. 
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7.2 DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT: 
 Examining the problem of the Soviet breakout from Leningrad in 1944 demonstrates the 
essence of the traditional issues of operations and tactics in time and space. At the heart of the 
problem is mobilizing combat power and articulating it in time and space with a common 
objective. While space for this problem was defined by considerations of terrain and weather; 
time was common to both combatants. Examination of this problem from early 1944 highlights 
all combat power starting from a static position must find space in order to gain the momentum 
to begin the tactical fight. This is best accomplished through unity of effort at the tactical level 
between assets. The Soviets demonstrated a high degree of this understanding in the latter years 
of the Second World War. Soviet tactical employment was built on decades of doctrinal 
development.  
 By 1944, two things were evident by the execution of Soviet operations on the Eastern 
Front; the Soviets had learned to adapt to the fighting style of the Germans and were capable of 
conducting breakthrough operations using centralized command and control. The Germans on 
the other hand, could not execute operations without interference from Berlin at the strategic 
level. In essence, the Soviets continued developing methods of breakthrough attack and 
exploitation at the operational level that had intellectual roots in the works of Svechin, 
Tukhachevsky, Triandafillov and others from the interwar years.
654
 From these intellectual roots 
sprung the origins of deep battle.
655
 Many Soviet officers and scholars understood how to make 
breakthrough attack a reality, but without the industrial base to produce the equipment needed to 
support the doctrine, there could be no serious future development in the late 1920s and early 
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1930s. The Soviets demonstrated they not only were a learning organization, but they clearly 
communicated what they observed to other fronts of the army in a more rapid fashion than the 
Germans. Evidence of how change at the tactical level was conducted was shown through 
information gleaned from the river crossing manual of late 1943.
656
 In the publication of their 
doctrine, the Soviets demonstrated they recognized when change was necessary and promulgated 
changes across their entire force on all fronts to quickly affect the situation. Instead of waiting to 
send out a definitive version, the Soviets would send out a draft manual to get ideas out to the 
army. The army then worked with the new ideas in combat and provided feedback on the idea 
based on how it worked. The Soviet system of doctrinal development, while driven from the top, 
was refined from the lower ranks and sent back up the chain of command and distributed 
laterally throughout the army and drove change. This ensured "buy in" throughout the entire 
army regarding the new doctrine.  
 What is more incredible about Soviet doctrinal development was the depth of ideas 
rooted in theory. While Soviet doctrine was dominated by the ideology of Marx, this link 
galvanized the Soviet population under one cause and focused the entire weight of the Soviet 
Union to fight together. Indeed, the thoughts of Lenin and Marx about war and politics were 
connected, thus making Soviet thoughts about the two subjects the same. Marxist thought could 
be explained to the lowest levels of society by the political commissar and enforced through 
security organizations of the state. There was no difference between what the soldier thought and 
what the peasant thought because the "Vanguard of the Proletariat" or the Communist Party was 
thinking for both.  Based on this, the Soviets arguably experienced the most successful use of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
655
 Modern concepts of maneuver warfare are clearly linked to the doctrinal experimental of the Soviet 
Army during the Second World War.     
295 
 
irregular forces in conjunction with conventional forces during the Second World War. The 
concepts of unity of command and single purpose allowed Soviet commanders the ability to 
focus their recourses and give them a single task to accomplish under one commander. This was 
not only commensurate with their doctrine, but it made the most sense for the circumstances. 
What is most simple in war works best, but the simple is always the most difficult.   
 The Germans had been training and thinking about the war they were fighting in the 
Northern Baltic since the First World War.
657
 Traditionally, the Germans were not strangers to 
economy of force missions and task organizing units for  specific purposes. As described in this 
work, the concept of the "elastic defense" provided the ability to fight in depth and trade space 
for time, while attriting the enemy forcing him to reach a culminating point for local 
counterattack. The concept of the elastic defense forced leaders at the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels of war to truly understand the operational environment and assets in terms of 
manpower and resources available to accomplish a mission. A shared common understanding 
amongst the levels of war created consensus of vision for the best method to attack the problem. 
In practice, tactical-level challenges of terrain and weather could be offset against the available 
assets while efficiencies could be found to address the problem.  
 While the elastic defense was the way German leaders were trained and educated to think 
about the problem of trading space for time in the defense, Adolf Hitler's inflexible thoughts 
about holding terrain countered their education. In difference to the Soviet Army that was 
developing their doctrine as a result of the war, the Germans had an excellent model from before 
the Second World War they were forbidden from using. Many attempts by commanders and staff 
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officers to get Hitler to understand their doctrine and how it was developed failed to satisfy 
Hitler's vision rooted in National Socialist ideology.
658
 Hitler's constant interference in tactical 
matters forced operational level planner to compensate for strategic level interference in their 
planning efforts, as demonstrated in Plan BLAU.
659
  This compensation effort did not allow 
German planners the ability to leverage strategic assets with the same unity the Soviets did. 
While there was harmony amongst the German operational and tactical levels,  along with a 
strong connection to the strategic end state, there was no harmony amongst German decision 
makers. Wars cannot be won only at only one level of war. Without unity of purpose that 
translates common vision from the strategic level into actions at the tactical level though 
planning efforts at the operational level, a battle can be won, but a war lost.          
7.3 TACTICAL MEANS: 
 The articulation of combat power in time and space is addressed through the means of a 
plan along with a combat order developed to commit forces. The plan must clearly define the 
objective of the operation and how combat power can be used in time and space to accomplish 
the objective against potential opposition. In the philosophical dimension, the tactical level of 
war represents the physical manifestation of combat power and the nation's will to fight. Several 
critical lessons have been observed throughout the course of this work regarding the use of 
combat power in conjunction with planning for Operation BLAU. Most importantly, planners 
can never write a plan and not continually re-assess the combat power assigned to execute the 
plan as it was written. Not only must the units capabilities be understood, but the combat strength 
and experience level of the unit must also be considered before the unit is assigned a task. In the 
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case of German forces participating in Operation BLAU, many units at the division level were in 
actual number a regiment that was reinforced with partial units or individuals that were not 
cohesive. These units or individuals could be used to augment existing combat power, but they 
rarely could be used to hold an area of the front. As Operation BLAU demonstrated, being 
written in the fall of 1943, many of the units assigned to the plan had been significantly reduced 
in combat power or reassigned to other areas of the front prior to the execution of the plan. This 
left inexperienced units accustomed to holding static defensive lines with the responsibility of 
conducting a difficult retrograde operation.  
 In the course of this work two types of tactical-level combat power had to be assessed; 
conventional along with asymmetric force for effectiveness. Another way this was explained was 
to think of regulars acting in conjunction with irregular forces to accomplish the mission. Both 
the Germans and the Soviets had an excellent understanding of the use of combined arms as a 
means of attack and defense and both were equally adept at incorporating irregular forces into 
their respective schemes of maneuver or defense. The additional doctrinal development and use 
of irregular forces served many purposes as this work has shown, but the main purpose which 
should not be overlooked was the shaping of  battlespace and the conservation of manpower for 
other purposes. Both the Germans and the Soviets used irregular forces to shape the battlespace 
prior to and during the execution of the breakout from the Leningrad Front. While the use of 
conventional forces formed an important part of both combatant's battle plans, the use of 
irregular forces allowed both combatants to pool more conventional combat power for other 
duties where more training was required for the execution of the mission.      
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 Another interesting question answered during the course of this work was addressed by 
task organization of units to specific purposes and how headquarters and commands can be 
created or adjusted based on operational needs. The example of task organization should not be 
overlooked, as most forces throughout the world have learned from this. The Germans and 
Soviets, were able to task organize forces to include the elements of command and control 
necessary to operate there.  In difference to the Germans, the Soviets gave the operational level 
commander full control over air and naval forces. This meant there was total unity of tactical-
level effect on the battlefield brought together by the operational commander and Soviet plan. At 
the operational-level, while the Germans had control of the naval and air assets, at the tactical-
level they lacked unified purpose. Senior German commanders were fighting around internal 
service politics, thus failing the soldier in the field and aiding the enemy.  
 Plans are ultimately about the creation of orders and taskings to subordinates. Failure to 
understand capabilities and what assets are available for tasking is a failure of the operational-
level. The operational level must correctly assess the capacity of assets in order to determine 
their specified tasks. At the tactical level, once these specified tasks have been analyzed, tactical 
commanders must also identify implied tasks that enable specified tasks to occur. Commanders 
at all levels must conduct this reconciliation or they will over task combat power they have 
available and will be less effective. Effective task organization ensures commanders are using 
the correct asset and level of manpower against the mission assigned. 
 In both cases, the Germans and Soviets task organized their tactical-level combat power 
under new operational-level commands for different reasons. The Germans identified the Narva 
Isthmus and Lake Peipus as physical geographic reasons to establish Army Group Narva, as the 
terrain dictated difficulties with 18th Army's ability to adequately provide command and control 
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to subordinates over this terrain. It required the Germans to reach the Narva River or the 
"Panther Position," a hard physical obstacle before the Germans could consider the establishment 
of a new headquarters while in contact. The Germans were able to implement this decision while 
in contact with Soviet forces based on years of experience, but more importantly because of 
necessity. Necessity is truly the mother of invention.  
 The Soviets on the other hand recognized the need to eliminate the Volkov Front and 
consolidate their combat power under the Leningrad Front at about the same time the Germans 
recognized the need to establish Army Group Narva.
660
 This is telling about the combatants 
ability to read the situation at the tactical-level on the battlefield and make the necessary changes 
to their task organizations to fulfill assigned missions along with the commander's intent. Where 
the Germans were able to break a headquarters and combat power out of other formations to 
facilitate the changing situation, the Soviets collapsed a command and consolidated its combat 
power under one commander and staff. This speaks to the differences between German 
centralized command and decentralized control and the Soviet method of centralized command 
and centralized control. Not only were these styles of command and control traditional methods 
for both combatants, they also complimented the tactical situation of the battlefield. As has been 
demonstrated throughout the course of this work, the terrain from Leningrad to Narva into the 
Blue Hills was largely comprised of forests and swamps that channelized military formations 
into limited avenues of approach. There is little doubt the terrain favored interior lines of 
operation and the defense, thus the Germans held a significant advantage in the execution of 
Operation BLAU. These circumstances posed a significant challenge for the Soviets to overcome 
in the time and space. The Soviets not only had to breakout of the Leningrad pocket, but had to 
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also reinvest the Baltic states per the strategic ends assigned by Stalin.
661
 Key to the Soviet 
problem was conducting offensive operations on exterior lines of operation in time and space 
dominated by the enemy. The Soviets quickly realized shortly after executing the attack to break 
out of the Leningrad pocket that collecting combat power under one commander in mass best 
used the limited avenues of approach under the unity of one commander. By placing more 
combat power directly under the command of the Leningrad Front, the Soviet could use their 
strength better in the offense. 
 In the end, The German movement from Leningrad to the "Panther Position" along with 
the subsequent fighting in the Blue Hills, followed by the withdrawal to Latvia accomplished the 
goal the Germans set operationally and tactically. They were able to hold the area for a longer 
period of time than anyone would have guessed and  inflicted heavy losses on advancing Soviet 
forces. The destruction of Soviet combat power was a German tactical victory, however the 
tactical defensive successes could not be translated into greater strategic success because of a 
lack of German strategic vision in Berlin.      
7.4 OPERATIONAL WAYS: 
 Plans for Operation BLAU demonstrated a level of German understanding of time and 
space practically applied as never examined before. This understanding provides the student of 
history, whether a military professional or scholar, a practical example to examine in the context 
of a strategic and tactical level problem. The operational ways provide the link between the 
strategic moral for war with the physical tactical means. The connection between strategy and 
tactics is made through the mental energy expended in the operational plan. Understanding 
Operation BLAU provides the context to see the use of tactical combat power to achieve a 
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strategic end state through operational art. Operation BLAU clearly shows the connection of 
strategic ends to tactical means through operational ways as defined by the models used 
throughout the work. As a case study, Operation BLAU makes the less tangible aspects of the art 
and science of war more understandable, as the plan is examined in its concrete form vice the 
abstract way most plans are. Examination of BLAU showed the German's holistic approach to 
understanding the environment and the problem set, while allowing the plan to articulate the 
commander's vision in concert with the desired strategic ends through the use of tactical means.  
 Often historians fail to examine the plans themselves or the planning used to create them. 
How can actions in war be historically understood in terms of cause and effect if the tools used to 
drive action are not understood? Operation BLAU as a plan was not executed as it was intended 
to be, but an examination of the tasks assigned to the various units in time and space clearly 
demonstrates how the Germans plan for battle. This understanding of the plan combined with the 
historiography of events as they happened on the northern front show how tactical level initiative 
was nested to operational and strategic-level intentions. Examination of Soviet actions in relation 
to Plan and Operation BLAU show the Germans had built enough flexibility into their plan to 
compliment the anticipated Soviet courses of action.   
 Planners and leaders at the operational-level use operational art to achieve strategic ends 
through available tactical means. The planner must understand the capabilities and limitations of 
the gear and men assigned to his charge to accomplish the mission. The planner must ignore 
institutional or personal bias and seek solutions to his problems that not only restore peace 
quickly, but also limit the loss of life, not only to friendly forces but also to the enemy. Planners 
at the operational-level must be the "sanity check" on goals at the strategic-level, because they 
also understands the terrible burdens carried by the tactical-level. Often times the operational 
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planner spends most of his time answering the "what now," thinking through what happens after 
the end state has been achieved using the tactical means available. The more an operational 
planner is able to maintain the design of his plan and make the opponent change his design, 
ultimately the more successful the planner is and the more efficient and effective his plan will be.  
 The ultimate question that needs to be answered is was the battle for the Blue Hills 
necessary? From the German perspective, clearly the answer is yes. The terrain provides the 
reasons why. As the Blue Hills formed the cork in the neck of the Narva Isthmus, they provided 
channelizing terrain from which the Germans could control every Soviet move. The Blue Hills 
battles allowed the Germans to prevent the Soviets from advancing straight to Reval (Tallinn), 
thus allowing bases of operation to still function. Once the weather warmed and the Soviets were 
trapped in the swampy area south of the Blue Hills, they had no choice but to fight out of the 
swamp to the north. Blocking operations in the Blue Hills allowed the Germans to bleed off 
combat power from the Blue Hills and position it on the route of advance toward Dorpat (Tartu) 
as another series of blocking positions in depth against Soviet advances to aid in the retrograde to 
Latvia. The battles for the Blue Hills was a significant German tactical defensive victory. The 
Germans had wisely chosen good  terrain to fight on and forced the Soviets to fight a battle they 
did not need to fight, costing them unnecessary losses. The Soviets were trapped between the 
Baltic Sea and Lake Peipus and Soviet pride caused them to continue attacking. Pride is a poor 
substitute for intelligence when dealing in lives and material. One can argue the Soviets had men 
and material to lose, perhaps locally, but not strategically when the effects of fighting are 
magnified across several fronts from the same resource pool.     
 The study of the art and science of war is made easier only through practical application 
rooted in the history of previous war experience. While the way in which man goes about 
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inflicting suffering and death on his fellow man may evolve through the use of new weapons and 
tactics, the end state has been the same since man was able to write. War is made constant 
throughout history by man and other tangibles such as terrain and weather. Technical advances 
have sometimes lessened the effects of terrain and weather, but not eliminated them. Historians 
have a responsibility to teach future generations of military leaders and those who will record 
conflict, the essence of war. Strategic end states are gathered from political desires, these ends 
are translated into action by tactical means through operational art in the form of operational 
plans. In the end, the plan is only as good as the leaders and soldiers who execute it. At the 
lowest tactical level, soldiers on both sides are imposing the will of nations, but they are really 
imposing their will to survive. Clausewitz was correct when he stated the essence of war was 
violent  struggle.
662
  
 Wars are won and lost not only the backs of nations, but rather on the backs of 18 and 19 
year old soldiers led by 23 and 24 year old enlisted leaders and officers. Nations cannot expect to 
win wars by only carrying either the strategic, operational or the tactical-levels. A nation can win 
the battles and still lose the war, as this case study has demonstrated. Incompetence in the 
military profession is magnified at the tactical level and is the raw material of death and 
suffering. It is the duty of leaders to teach their soldiers what war is all about through training 
and education. While training prepares soldiers for what to expect, education teaches them how 
to think and not what to think for the unexpected situation. Only through education can young 
soldiers survive the trials of the battlefield, either in antiquity or today. Leadership education is 
the chief intangible contributing to the art of art. It is leadership which crafts the will of 
subordinates and inspires them to attempt and achieve the impossible. Well led men will follow a 
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good leader to hell, however, it is the duty of the leader to show them as little of hell as he can. 
The military art is not the providence of the weak, for tactical battle will quickly melt away the 
impure qualities of a man or destroy him. Leaders must not only be strong willed, but they must 
be educated about the business of war. Leaders cannot be all format; they must, more 
importantly, be men of content and character who contribute instant substance to the problems 
they are tasked to solve. 
  Only the educated must lead and they must do it by setting the example, leading from the 
front. Leaders must master themselves and their own fears before they can effectively lead 
others. Learning how to think and not what to think saves lives and equipment. Understanding 
your doctrine and following it when it makes sense saves lives; following doctrine as dogma is 
counterproductive and deadly. While the journey of this work has been long and covered many 
corners of the globe to gain understanding, it has been the honor of the author to walk in the 
footsteps of men like himself to learn and teach others of their trials. In the exploration of the 
subjects of operational art, Plan BLAU and the tactical actions that culminated in the horrible 
loss of life in the Blue Hills in Estonia, it is the sincerest wish of the author that others can learn 
from what has been paid for with the blood of many from several nations. Soldiers know all too 
well the cost of war, scholars must continue to remind humanity of the cost of their nation's 
decisions.  
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